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Abstract
Nowadays, publishing of data is ubiquitous, but usually only permitted when com-
plying with a confidentiality policy to respect privacy or other secrecy concerns.
To this end, this thesis proposes an approach to weaken an original database in-
stance to a weakened view on this instance. This view is inference-proof in the
sense of “Controlled Interaction Execution” and does hence provably not enable
an adversary to infer confidential knowledge – even if this adversary tries to de-
duce confidential knowledge on the basis of a released weakened view, his general
awareness of the protection mechanism and some a priori knowledge he might
possibly have about the original database instance or the world in general.
To achieve this goal within a logic-oriented modeling, all pieces of definite knowl-
edge that compromise an element of a confidentiality policy are (whenever possi-
ble) replaced by weaker but true disjunctions of policy elements. Although this dis-
junctive knowledge deliberately introduces uncertainty about confidential knowl-
edge, it still provides more information about the original database instance than
complete refusals of confidential knowledge. To further guarantee that all of these
weakening disjunctions are – with respect to a considered application scenario –
both credible in terms of confidentiality and meaningful in terms of availability, a
criterion specifying which policy elements might possibly be grouped together to
an admissible weakening disjunction can be defined.
This approach is first developed in a generic way in the sense that non-trivial
disjunctions of any length ≥ 2 might be employed and the achieved level of confi-
dentiality varies with the length of disjunctions. Thereby, all knowledge is modeled
within a restricted but expressive subclass of first-order logic, which allows for effi-
cient decisions on the validity of implication relationships without general theorem
proving. Afterwards, an availability-maximizing instantiation of this generic ap-
proach is presented, which aims at constructing disjunctions of length 2 efficiently
on the basis of graph clustering, and is then also extended to handle an adver-
sary’s a priori knowledge in the form of a restricted subclass of well-known “Tuple
Generating Dependencies” without losing its inference-proofness or efficiency.
To demonstrate the practical efficiency of this (extended) availability-maximizing
approach, a prototype implementation is developed and evaluated under differ-
ent experiment setups. Thereby, disjunctions are constructed on the basis of an
admissibility criterion, which (locally) maximizes availability within a disjunction
in the sense that both of its disjuncts differ in only one constant parameter and
thereby generalizes this constant parameter to a wider set of possible values.
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Zusammenfassung
Obwohl die Veröffentlichung von Daten heutzutage allgegenwärtig ist, ist diese
häufig nur dann gestattet, wenn dabei Vertraulichkeitsanforderungen beachtet
werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird in dieser Arbeit ein Ansatz entwickelt, um
abgeschwächte Sichten auf gegebene Datenbankinstanzen zu erzeugen. Eine solche
abgeschwächte Sicht ist dabei inferenzsicher im Sinne der sogenannten „Kontrol-
lierten Interaktionsauswertung“ und verhindert damit beweisbar, dass ein Angrei-
fer vertrauliche Information erlangen kann – selbst dann, wenn dieser Angreifer
versucht, diese Information unter Zuhilfenahme seiner Kenntnis über den Sicher-
heitsmechanismus und etwaigem Vorwissen über die Datenbankinstanz oder all-
gemeine Sachverhalte logisch zu erschließen.
Dieses Ziel wird innerhalb einer logik-orientierten Modellierung verwirklicht, in
der alles sichere Wissen, das die Vertraulichkeitspolitik verletzt, (soweit möglich)
durch schwächere, aber dennoch wahre Disjunktionen bestehend aus Elementen
der Vertraulichkeitspolitik ersetzt wird. Auch wenn dieses disjunktive Wissen be-
wusst Unsicherheit über vertrauliche Information erzeugt, stellt es dennoch mehr
Information als eine vollständige Geheimhaltung von vertraulicher Information
bereit. Um dabei sicherzustellen, dass Disjunktionen im Hinblick auf ein betrach-
tetes Einsatzszenario sowohl glaubwürdig als auch aussagekräftig sind, kann ein
Kriterium definiert werden, aus welchen Kombinationen von Elementen der Ver-
traulichkeitspolitik eine mögliche Disjunktion bestehen kann.
Dieser Ansatz wird erst in einer generischen Variante entwickelt, in der nicht-trivi-
ale Disjunktionen jeder Länge ≥ 2 zum Einsatz kommen können und das erreich-
te Maß an Vertraulichkeit mit der Länge der Disjunktionen variiert. Dabei wird
jegliches Wissen in einem eingeschränkten, aber dennoch vielfältig einsetzbaren
Fragment der Prädikatenlogik modelliert, in dem die Gültigkeit von Implikations-
beziehungen effizient ohne den Einsatz von Theorembeweisern entschieden werden
kann. Anschließend wird eine Variante dieses generischen Ansatzes vorgestellt, die
die Verfügbarkeit maximiert, indem Disjunktionen der Länge 2 effizient mit Hil-
fe von Clustering auf Graphen konstruiert werden. Diese Variante wird daraufhin
derart erweitert, dass sie auch dann effizient inferenzsichere Sichten erzeugen kann,
wenn ein Angreifer Vorwissen in Form einer eingeschränkten Unterklasse von so-
genannten „Tuple Generating Dependencies“ hat.
Um die Effizienz dieser (erweiterten) Verfügbarkeit maximierenden Variante zu de-
monstrieren, wird ein Prototyp unter verschiedenen Testszenarien erprobt. Dabei
kommt ein Kriterium zur Konstruktion möglicher Disjunktionen zum Einsatz, das
(lokal) die Verfügbarkeit innerhalb von Disjunktion maximiert, indem sich beide
Disjunkte einer solchen Disjunktion nur in genau einer Konstante unterscheiden.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction and Related Work
During the last decades society continuously evolved from an industrial society, in
which material goods had the role of a key resource, to a service society built up on
information. Hence, one of the key challenges of today’s society lies in an effective
use and deployment of information. Beside an effective and efficient exchange and
processing of information, this key challenge also inevitably comprises effective
protection measures to preserve the value of collected information.
1.1 Challenges of Data Publishing
Nowadays, data publishing is ubiquitous. Governments are often legally obliged
to provide data about matters of public concern, companies release project-related
data to partners and even in most peoples’ private lives the sharing of data plays
a major role. But usually only certain portions of some data are appropriate for
being shared, as data often contains sensitive information. Hence, a major goal of
data publishing lies in the preservation of confidentiality requirements, which is a
well-known fundamental protection goal in the field of IT-security [5, 7, 59]. This
need for confidentiality preserving data publishing applies in particular to data
containing personal information, as surveyed in [56, 92].
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Additionally considering the rapid development of computing power, the massive
growth of the Internet and the continuous development of information systems [75,
78], collected data is usually managed and shared automatically and the amount
of collected data grows steadily. As an immediate consequence of automated
publishing of valuable data, the need for an automated and effective enforcement
of confidentiality requirements naturally arises to keep control over the publishing
of data and to thereby guarantee that each recipient of published data can only
retrieve those data records – or, more precisely, the knowledge embodied in these
records – he is actually allowed to get to know. Moreover, growing amounts of
data naturally require efficient protection mechanisms to prevent an information
system from running into an overload when processing huge amounts of data.
At first sight, mechanisms for the enforcement of confidentiality requirements seem
to only consider how publishing of data can be blocked effectively. But reconsid-
ering that publishing of appropriate portions of collected data is usually expressly
desired, protection mechanisms should (as far as possible) aim at achieving a max-
imum level of availability and should hence provide as much (knowledge embodied
in) data as possible without compromising any confidentiality requirements. Thus,
the development of protection mechanisms enforcing confidentiality requirements
is usually closely related to finding a reasonable trade-off between confidentiality
and availability requirements [5, 7, 59].
1.2 Enforcing Confidentiality
In the course of time, several approaches for the enforcement of confidentiality
requirements have been proposed. All of these approaches have in common that
they aim at preventively enforcing these confidentiality requirements, as knowledge
once, possibly accidentally, revealed to an adversary can – due to the nature of
information – not be revoked afterwards (cf. [59]). Hence, approaches to detect
unwanted disclosures of sensitive information afterwards can only help to mitigate
the damage resulting from these disclosures, but can not replace mechanisms for
the preventive enforcement of confidentiality requirements.
1.2.1 Traditional Access Control
Most approaches for the enforcement of confidentiality requirements operate on the
level of raw data and essentially aim at enforcing a collection of access rights spec-
ifying which user is (possibly not) allowed to access which data records. Thereby,
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these approaches can basically be divided into discretionary and mandatory access
control approaches [5, 7, 44, 59].
Within discretionary approaches each individual user is supposed to be responsible
for a certain set of data records and can hence set up access rights for these data
records at his own discretion. Such a specification of access rights can thereby
range from simple access rules – essentially explicitly listing how to decide on each
single request issued by a certain user wishing to access a certain data record –
to sophisticated sets of high-level (logic-based) rules, from which explicit access
decisions can be derived. Moreover, data records might be structured (as, for
example, in relational databases) and different approaches to (discretionary) access
control might hence differ in how fine-grained access rights can be specified and
in if and to what extent the actual values stored within certain data records can
be taken into account for decisions on access requests.
Mandatory approaches instead rely on the assumption that a single security officer
mandatorily sets up a system-wide set of access rights. These access rights are
specified by considering a partially ordered set of confidentiality levels and by
assigning such a confidentiality level to each data record as a classification and to
each individual user as a clearance. A user’s request to retrieve a data record is
then approved, if his clearance is at least as high as the classification of the data
record he wishes to read. Otherwise, his request is denied. This way of deciding
on access requests obviously aims at controlling data flows – and hence also the
flow of the information embodied in this data – by ensuring that data can only
flow into the direction of at least equally high confidentiality levels.
Under the supposition that the values of data records can change over the time
and that the partially ordered set of confidentiality levels forms a finite lattice, the
above sketched mandatory approach can be refined to capture the evolution of the
sensitivity of data records and to thereby introduce a kind of “history-awareness”.
This is essentially achieved by updating the security level of a data record each
time a value of this record is changed and this data record is not classified as
least as high as (the source of) the new data flowing into this record. In this case,
the supremum of the considered data record and the new data flowing into this
record – whose existence is guaranteed by the properties of a finite lattice – is
chosen as the new classification of this record.
1.2.2 The Need for Inference Control
Although approaches to access control have been continuously improved in terms
of expressiveness, granularity, content-sensitivity and even history-awareness as
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sketched above, they nonetheless operate essentially on the level of raw data. But
usually, a data owner’s confidentiality requirements primarily aim at keeping cer-
tain pieces of knowledge secret. Although this obviously means that those data
records containing this confidential knowledge need to be kept secret, there is
nonetheless a crucial difference between the protection of raw data and the pro-
tection of knowledge: while the protection of raw data can essentially be achieved
by preventing the delivery of certain data records to certain users, the protection
of knowledge requires to actually not enable an adversary to infer confidential
pieces of knowledge – even if this adversary tries to logically deduce confidential
knowledge on the basis of (the knowledge embodied in) the data revealed to him
and by additionally exploiting his general awareness of the protection mechanism
and some further a priori knowledge he might have [7, 9, 44].
To exemplify this difference, consider a hospital running an information system
in order to store the disease of each of its patients together with the prescribed
medication to cure this disease. In terms of privacy concerns, only doctors are
supposed to access the disease from which a patient suffers. Nurses are not al-
lowed to access a patient’s disease, but are instead allowed to access the prescribed
medication to enable them to take care of a patient’s medical treatment. Within
this scenario, a curious nurse might nonetheless be able to infer the disease a cer-
tain patient suffers from by simply considering which diseases can be cured by the
combination of drugs this patient takes: if there is only one disease cured by this
combination of drugs, she can logically deduce that the considered patient suffers
from this disease, although she is not able to (directly) access the corresponding
value of the patient’s data record.
Inference control hence means to protect the knowledge embodied in (elements
of) a confidentiality policy by suitably confining an adversary’s possible gain of
information such that this adversary is not able to infer a piece of knowledge to
be kept confidential by employing his reasoning capabilities [9, 16]. However, this
presupposes that data is handled on the level of its semantics and that further a
notion of implication (or entailment) between pieces of knowledge is provided on
the basis of this semantics [8, 10].
As surveyed in [55], several approaches to inference control have been explored in
the course of time, ranging from Denning’s seminal work [49] on inference con-
trol for statistical databases and information flows in programs to Halpern’s and
O’Neill’s work [61] emphasizing a purely abstract approach to achieve sophisti-
cated information-theoretic confidentiality within a high-level multiagent system
framework. On this thesis the seminal work presented in [82] and later revived
in [40] has a major influence, which aims at suitably confining the answers an in-
formation system replies to a user’s queries such that this user is provably not able
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to compromise any confidentiality requirements – and thereby lays the foundation
for the framework of so-called “Controlled Interaction Execution”, in which this
thesis is placed. Within this framework of Controlled Interaction Execution also
an instantiation of Halpern’s and O’Neill’s approach has been developed in [32]
taking a closer look at the connection between these approaches.
1.2.3 Controlled Interaction Execution
As outlined above, inference control can only be implemented successfully, if data
is handled on the level of its semantics and a notion of implication (or entailment)
is provided on the basis of this semantics. For that reason, the framework of
Controlled Interaction Execution is logic-based in the sense that all considered
knowledge is supposed to be modeled within some well-defined logic framework,
whose semantics is comprehensive enough to capture an adversary’s reasoning
capabilities [8, 10, 12]. Usually, a fragment of first-order logic [76], which is suitably
tailored to the needs of relational databases [68], is employed as such a logic
framework (cf. [15, 19, 27, 30, 38]), as it is well understood that first-order logic
provides a solid foundation for the modeling of relational databases [1]. But there
are also approaches relying on a non-monotonic logic framework (cf. [34]) to model
an adversary’s reasoning capabilities more appropriately and approaches relying
on propositional logic (cf. [36]) to simplify the overall modeling.
Due to the above gained insight that (harmful) inferences can be often drawn by
combining several pieces of (per se harmless) knowledge, it is indispensable that
the protection mechanism obtains an (as far as possible) complete picture of an
adversary’s view on a considered original database instance [8, 10, 12]. Thereby,
an adversary’s view on this original instance is established by his interactions
with the (protection mechanism of the) considered information system and some
further a priori knowledge he might possibly have independently of his interactions
with this information system. Typical examples of such a priori knowledge are
database constraints arranged for the database schema underlying the considered
original instance, but also some knowledge about the world in general – such as
the knowledge which diseases can be cured by which combination of drugs, as
assumed in the above given example.
To express the knowledge to be kept confidential from a certain adversary, a
declarative confidentiality policy is set up [8, 10, 11]. In most cases, such a confi-
dentiality policy consists of a finite set of so-called potential secrets, each of which
is a sentence of the employed logic framework and expresses that the considered
adversary must not be enabled to get to know that the knowledge embodied in this
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potential secret is satisfied by a considered original database instance. So, regard-
less of whether this potential secret is actually satisfied by this original instance
or not, from an adversary’s view on the original database instance – established
by his interactions with the information system and his a priori knowledge – it
must always be possible that this potential secret is not satisfied.
Consequently, a confidentiality policy can only be enforced, if for each of its po-
tential secrets the existence of an alternative database instance obeying – i.e., not
satisfying – this potential secret appears to be possible from an adversary’s point
of view. But such an alternative instance is not credible, if an adversary is able
to exclude it from being the “real” original instance by distinguishing it from this
original instance. A protection mechanism should hence be designed such that
• for each potential secret of a considered confidentiality policy the existence of
an alternative database instance obeying this potential secret is guaranteed
such that further
• each view an adversary can possibly gain on the original instance – on the
basis of his interactions with the (protection mechanism of the) informa-
tion system and his further a priori knowledge – remains the same, if the
protection mechanism of the information system is instantiated with this
alternative instance instead of the original instance.
In this case, the alternative instance obeying the considered potential secret is
indistinguishable from the original instance from an adversary’s point of view [8,
10, 11], even if the original instance does not obey this potential secret and an
adversary is further supposed to be aware of the protection mechanism instantiated
with all input parameters except for the original database instance to be protected.
This assumption that an adversary is supposed to have as much knowledge as
possible – and is, in particular, therefore usually also supposed to be aware of
the confidentiality policy set up for him – complies with the maxim “no security
by obscurity”, which is one of the principle design goals of Controlled Interaction
Execution [7, 8, 10, 12].
The above given confidentiality requirement, which is also referred to as “inference-
proofness”, can actually be implemented by dynamic or static protection mech-
anisms. The dynamic approaches (cf. [13, 15]) aim at controlling an adversary’s
gain of knowledge at runtime and must hence dynamically decide for each inter-
action request issued by an adversary, whether the reaction to this request needs
to be distorted because of enabling the adversary to compromise the confiden-
tiality policy. As an adversary’s view on the original instance hence evolves over
the sequence of issued interaction requests, all reactions an adversary receives in
response to his requests need (in general) to be recorded to be able to decide
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whether the knowledge embodied in these reactions is harmful in combination
with reactions to subsequent interaction requests.
In contrast, the static approaches (cf. [27, 30, 38]) first construct an inference-
proof materialized view on a given original database instance in a preprocessing
step. Although the protection mechanism aims at keeping this view as close to
the original instance as possible, it introduces distortions wherever necessary to
ensure that the knowledge of this materialized view does not enable an adversary
to compromise the confidentiality policy set up for him. After this preprocessing
step, an adversary’s interaction requests can then be processed safely on the basis
of this materialized view without any further interception.
Until now, two different techniques to distort confidentiality compromising knowl-
edge have been explored [8, 10, 11]. One is the explicit refusal of such knowledge
in the sense that an adversary is explicitly notified which pieces of knowledge are
not revealed to him. Employing this technique of course introduces the challenge
that protection mechanisms should be well prepared for adversaries trying to take
advantage of this additional knowledge in the form of refusal notifications. The
other distortion technique is to introduce lies in the sense that non-valid knowledge
might be declared as valid knowledge and vice versa. This technique introduces
the challenge of keeping an adversary’s view on the original database instance
consistent in order to prevent this adversary from inferring which truth values are
modified and thereby compromising the confidentiality policy. As demonstrated
in [14], a combined usage of both of these distortion techniques is possible, too.
1.3 Design Goals and Scope
Reconsidering the challenges of data publishing discussed in Section 1.1, the goal
of this thesis is to develop a novel approach allowing for confidentiality preserving
data publishing within the framework of Controlled Interaction Execution. This
approach to be developed should thus allow for the construction of an inference-
proof materialized view of a given complete database instance, which does provably
not enable a considered adversary to compromise a single element of a confiden-
tiality policy and can hence be safely released to this adversary.
1.3.1 Requirement Analysis
Following the notion of inference-proofness provided by the framework of Con-
trolled Interaction Execution, the approach to be developed should construct
materialized views satisfying the requirement that for each element of a given
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confidentiality policy the existence of a complete alternative database instance is
guaranteed such that
• this alternative instance obeys the considered policy element,
• this alternative instance nonetheless satisfies an adversary’s a priori knowl-
edge, including semantic database constraints an adversary is supposed to
be aware of, and
• the secure materialized view the protection mechanism would construct for
this alternative instance is – from an adversary’s point of view – indistin-
guishable from the actually released secure materialized view the protection
mechanism returned for the given original database instance.
In fact, an approach generating inference-proof materialized views within the
framework of Controlled Interaction Execution has already been proposed in [36,
37], then refined in [38, 91] and finally been implemented as described in [18]. This
approach essentially aims at achieving inference-proofness by modifying the truth-
values of some database tuples in the sense that valid tuples of a given complete
original database instance may become non-valid and non-valid tuples – i.e., tu-
ples, which are not contained in a given complete original database instance – may
instead become valid, thereby inducing a complete alternative database instance.
To keep availability as high as possible, the number of these modified truth-values
is minimized, i.e., it is just high enough to provably achieve inference-proofness.
Releasing such an alternative instance with modified truth values instead of the
original instance clearly means that a user’s view on the original database instance
contains lies, i.e., knowledge not complying with the real-world scenario captured
by the considered original database instance. To further prevent an adversary from
reconstructing original truth-values, it is of crucial importance that an adversary
is not able to detect which of the truth values are actually modified. Hence, there
might be some ethical concerns to release such an alternative instance and there
might even be some application scenarios, in which these distortions in the form
of lies mislead a legal user accidentally considering some censored knowledge to
draw wrong – and possibly even dangerous – conclusions on the basis of the data
released to him. Moreover, this approach also suffers from its high computational
complexity, as experimentally evaluated in [18].
Accordingly, the approach to be developed should generate secure materialized
views, which – despite distortions, possibly introduced by the protection mech-
anism – contain only true knowledge, which is not in conflict with the original
database instance. Additionally, it seems worthwhile that these distortions should
be readily identifiable for anyone using the released secure view. So, similar to
those approaches to Controlled Interaction Execution, which dynamically respond
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to interaction requests and, if necessary, explicitly refuse harmful requests by re-
turning a distinguished refusal notification [8, 10, 11, 12, 13], a distinguishing
feature making distortions identifiable and further providing a basis for achieving
inference-proofness should be selected as a means to distort knowledge.
In fact, one could even achieve this goal by employing an approach developed
in [15], which dynamically responds to a series of interaction requests in the form
of domain-independent open queries of a decidable subclass of first-order logic,
i.e., evaluable queries containing free variables. For each of these open queries
this approach returns a response, which answers for each of the (infinitely many)
constant substitutions of the free variables of this open query whether this query
is satisfied by the given complete original database instance under the considered
constant substitution of the free variables or not, provided that this answer for
the particular constant substitution – together with previous answers and a priori
knowledge – does not enable an adversary to compromise a considered confiden-
tiality policy. Otherwise, this answer is distorted by returning a distinguished
refusal notification.
This approach, which essentially answers an open query by simulating it by an ap-
propriate (finite) series of closed queries, can also handle an open query asking for
the whole database relation, i.e., an open query over a considered database rela-
tion containing only free variables and no constant symbols. Due to the inference-
proofness of the approach (cf. [15]) the answer to such a query immediately corre-
sponds to an inference-proof materialized view. But, as experimentally evaluated
in [17], this approach suffers from its high computational complexity and is hence
only applicable for small input instances.
Accordingly, the approach to be developed should be efficient enough to handle
even large input instances resulting from steadily growing collections of data (cf.
Section 1.1) within a reasonable timeframe. As inference-proofness follows the
goal that an adversary should not be able to (logically) infer pieces of knowledge
protected by a confidentiality policy, it generally requires costly theorem proving
on the level of an employed logic framework to check for harmful implications [8,
10, 11, 12]. To be able to achieve inference-proofness efficiently, the approach to
be developed should rely on a restricted fragment of a suitable logic framework,
within which the validity of implication relationships can be decided efficiently
without costly general theorem proving [69].
Such approaches for the construction of materialized views achieving confidential-
ity requirements without general theorem proving are proposed in [45, 46] and
in [2, 57]. Both of these approaches aim at achieving confidentiality by fragment-
ing a given database instance vertically into (at least) two fragments, each of
which consists of a subset of columns of the original database instance. Thereby,
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the approach proposed in [45, 46] aims at the construction of one non-secure frag-
ment, which must be kept secret, and one secure fragment to be released to an
adversary. The approach proposed in [2, 57] instead aims at the construction of a
fragmentation such that exactly one of its fragments can be chosen freely to be re-
leased to an adversary, but resorts to encryption of certain columns whenever the
enforcement of all confidentiality requirements is not possible on the sole basis of
fragmentation. From an adversary’s point of view the original database instance
is then split into one part of visible (cleartext) columns and one refused part con-
sisting of all non-visible (and all encrypted) columns. As he is supposed to know
the database schema underlying the original instance, an adversary can readily
identify which columns are refused, but he does not get to know their values.
As shown in [27] and [30], both of these approaches are able to achieve inference-
proofness in the sense of Controlled Interaction Execution, provided that an ad-
versary’s a priori knowledge and the considered confidentiality requirements “fit
together” structurally. In terms of efficiency, these fragmentation approaches have
the advantage that the computationally expensive task of determining a confiden-
tiality preserving fragmentation is solely performed on the level of the typically
small database schema, while the construction of fragments on the instance level
essentially corresponds to the computationally inexpensive task of constructing
projections of the original database instance on the schemas of the fragments.
Although these fragmentation approaches comply with the requirements set up
for the approach to be developed so far, they suffer from the major drawback
that confidentiality requirements can only be specified in a coarse-grained way on
the level of the database schema – in the sense that associations between (the
values of) certain columns should not be revealed. But in terms of availability
a more fine-grained specification of confidentiality requirements in the spirit of
potential secrets (cf. Section 1.2.3) is desirable. Moreover, even if the sentences of
an adversary’s a priori knowledge stem from the considered subclass of sentences,
the existence of an inference-proof fragmentation is not always guaranteed, as the
structure of an adversary’s a priori knowledge and the structure of the considered
confidentiality requirements need to “fit together” (cf. [27]).
Another already existing approach introduced in [4] aims at preserving confiden-
tiality by replacing certain values of certain database tuples of a given original in-
stance by null-values. Thereby, this approach relies on the assumptions that the
given original instance is possibly incomplete in the sense that it may already con-
tain null-values and that an adversary does neither know which knowledge is to
be kept confidential nor with which semantic constraints the original database in-
stance has to comply according to its underlying database schema. This approach
claims that hence confidentiality is achieved, as an adversary is – in contrast to the
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above mentioned design goal that distortions should be readily identifiable – not
able to distinguish between those null-values already contained in the original
instance and those null-values additionally introduced to suppress confidential
knowledge. While the former assumptions of incomplete databases [35, 8, 10] and
unknown confidentiality policies [6, 8, 10, 11] still comply with at least some ap-
proaches to Controlled Interaction Execution, the latter assumption of unknown
(but existing) semantic database constraints is in direct conflict with the principle
design goals of Controlled Interaction Execution, always following the maxim “no
security by obscurity” (cf. Section 1.2.3).
All of the above discussed existing approaches enforce confidentiality require-
ments by either deliberately introducing wrong knowledge or by refusing cer-
tain pieces of knowledge. Although the above mentioned design goals that only
true knowledge should be revealed and that distortions should be readily iden-
tifiable seem to immediately suggest to employ explicit refusals within the ap-
proach to be developed, the well-known approaches of k-anonymization and `-
diversification [47, 70, 79, 86] propose a less severe means: these approaches aim
at preventing the re-identification of individuals on the basis of so-called quasi-
identifiers, which describe some of the individuals’ properties, by generalizing the
values of these quasi-identifiers to wider sets of possible values.
Within the logic-based framework of Controlled Interaction Execution one could
analogously try to adapt this generalization of knowledge by replacing confidential
(definite) knowledge by weaker disjunctive knowledge. These disjunctions should
contain only true knowledge, but limit an adversary’s possible gain of information
to such an extent that this adversary is provably not able to compromise an ele-
ment of a considered confidentiality policy. Compared to the complete refusal of
confidential knowledge – which corresponds to its maximum generalization – this
weakening of knowledge is more cooperative in terms of availability in the sense
that more information about the original database instance is revealed. More-
over, an adversary is easily able to identify this weakened knowledge due to its
distinguished (syntactic) representation.
As a consequence of this additional knowledge provided by disjunctions, particular
attention must be paid to eliminate so-called meta-inferences [8, 10, 24]. A piece
of confidential knowledge is inferred with the help of such a meta-inference, if it is
obtained by excluding all possible alternative settings, under which this knowledge
is not valid, by simulating these alternative settings as inputs for the algorithm
generating the (inference-proof) materialized views and by being then able to
distinguish the materialized views resulting from each of the alternative settings
from the released one. Then, an adversary is able to conclude that only settings,
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under which this specific piece of knowledge is true, can comply with the original
database instance of his interest.
1.3.2 Survey of the Weakening Approach
This thesis introduces a novel approach within the framework of Controlled Inter-
action Execution creating inference-proof materialized views on complete relational
database instances, which are suitable for confidentiality preserving data publish-
ing in the sense that they provably comply with a confidentiality policy consisting
of potential secrets. To achieve this goal, confidentiality compromising database
tuples are replaced by weaker knowledge in the form of disjunctions (preferably)
consisting of certain elements of the confidentiality policy. These disjunctions con-
tain only true knowledge, but weaken an adversary’s possible gain of information
such that this adversary is provably not able to infer confidential knowledge.
At first, a generic weakening approach is developed, which allows for the construc-
tion of non-trivial disjunctions of any length ≥ 2 to weaken an adversary’s possible
gain of confidential knowledge. Thereby, the achieved level of confidentiality varies
with the length of disjunctions, as longer disjunctions of potential secrets obvi-
ously provide more alternatives which (combination of) policy elements of such a
disjunction might be satisfied by a considered original database instance. Similar
to the approaches of k-anonymization [47, 79, 86], which motivated the usage of
weakening disjunctions in Section 1.3.1 and aim at generalizing so-called quasi-
identifiers to such an extent that an individual can not be distinguished from (at
least) k − 1 other individuals on the basis of these quasi-identifiers, a disjunction
of length k should not enable an adversary to distinguish whether a certain po-
tential secret of this disjunction or one of the k − 1 other potential secrets of this
disjunction is satisfied by the original instance.
Considering confidentiality policies of a non-trivial size naturally raises the ques-
tion which policy elements should be grouped together to a weakening disjunction:
in terms of confidentiality all alternatives provided by a weakening disjunction
should be equally probable to prevent an adversary from excluding certain alter-
natives from being true and in terms of availability such a disjunction should pro-
vide as much useful information as possible. Hence, a criterion – which is referred
to as a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities – specifying which policy ele-
ments might be possibly grouped together to an admissible weakening disjunction
needs to be specified against the background of a considered application scenario.
Similar to clustering techniques known from machine learning (cf. [51, 74, 81]),
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such a criterion thereby specifies a kind of “nearness” between elements of a con-
fidentiality policy and thereby allows for a clustering of policy elements to both
confidentiality and availability preserving disjunctions.
Although the generic weakening approach specifies such a clustering of policy
elements on the declarative level, it does not provide an algorithmic instantiation
on the operational level. But such an algorithmic instantiation of the clustering
of policy elements is then provided for an availability-maximizing instantiation of
the generic weakening approach, which aims at the construction of availability-
maximizing disjunctions of length 2. This clustering is based on well-known and
efficient algorithms for the computation of maximum matchings [50, 67, 77, 80]
on graphs modeling each potential secret to be clustered as a vertex and each
admissible disjunction of length 2 as an edge.
In the field of privacy preserving data publishing there are also other approaches
enforcing certain confidentiality requirements on the basis of clusterings on graphs
(cf. [43, 62, 56, 92]). But these approaches usually aim at preventing the structural
re-identification of the graph itself by making the vertices of each cluster indistin-
guishable from each other, while the weakening approach developed in this thesis
employs the graph as a means to determine clusters, whose vertices in the form of
policy elements are to be made indistinguishable from each other regarding their
validity status. The graph itself is instead not sensitive and an adversary is even
supposed to be able to construct this graph himself.
As studied extensively in prior work on Controlled Interaction Execution, an ad-
versary’s possibilities to infer confidential knowledge might grow significantly, if
he is supposed to have some a priori knowledge [13, 15, 27, 38]. To also explore
the impact of an adversary’s a priori knowledge on his possibilities to compromise
the confidentiality policy within the developed weakening approach, a suitably
restricted subclass of so-called “Tuple Generating Dependencies”, which are well-
known in the field of relational databases [1, 54], is considered. This finally leads
to an extended weakening approach, which provably preserves inference-proofness
under the considered subclass of a priori knowledge, but still remains computa-
tionally efficient even for large input instances.
To be able to fully implement the (extended) availability-maximizing instantiation
of the weakening approach to demonstrate its high efficiency experimentally, an
example of a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities called interchangeability
is provided and evaluated. Interchangeability restricts distortion within a dis-
junction only locally in the sense that a pair of (possibly additional) potential
secrets only differs in exactly one constant parameter and thereby generalizes this
constant parameter to a wider set of possible values.
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1.4 Contributions to Joint Work
The ideas developed in this thesis are extensions of the seminal ideas published
in [28] as joint work with my supervisor Joachim Biskup. His contributions to
this work comprised joint exploration of potential approaches, ongoing discussions,
proof-reading and general advisory. But nevertheless, the proposed seminal ideas
to enforce confidentiality policies with the help of weakening disjunctions and their
further development to an algorithmic approach, on which this thesis is based, are
my own original work.
This thesis significantly extends the seminal ideas published in [28] by essentially
(but not limited to)
• giving a complete formalization of the generic weakening approach sketched
in [28] and analyzing its complexity,
• providing a detailed exploration of how confidentiality policies with existen-
tial quantification can be enforced (which is only sketched briefly in [28]),
• investigating more deeply which requirements criteria specifying the admis-
sibility of weakening disjunctions should fulfill,
• analyzing and disabling harmful inference-channels arising from an adver-
sary’s a priori knowledge in the form of a restricted subclass of well-known
Tuple Generating Dependencies,
• experimentally evaluating these extensions on the basis of a prototype im-
plementation and
• giving detailed proofs that declarative confidentiality requirements in the
sense of Controlled Interaction Execution are met.
Some of these extensions are also sketched briefly in [29], which is accepted for
publication as joint work with my supervisor Joachim Biskup and evolved on the
basis of the manuscript of this thesis. Thereby, Joachim Biskup contributed to
this work by summarizing the above mentioned extensions on an abstract level
and discussing improvements of these extensions. But nevertheless, all of these
extensions are my own original work.
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CHAPTER 2
Inference-Proofness by Weakening
After motivating the development of a novel approach for the construction of
inference-proof materialized views on relational database instances, which aims at
weakening confidential knowledge with the help of disjunctions, a suitable logic
framework needs to be developed to provide a basis for the construction of such
a weakening approach within the logic-based framework of Controlled Interaction
Execution. To this end, a restricted but expressive subclass of first-order logic is
now proposed, which allows for efficient decisions on the validity of implication
relationships without costly general theorem proving. Subsequently, the seminal
ideas how confidentiality requirements can be enforced within this logic framework
on the basis of weakening disjunctions are introduced.
2.1 The Formal Framework
Similar to other approaches to Controlled Interaction Execution, the new approach
to be developed is located in the field of relational databases. Thereby, for sim-
plicity, all data is supposed to be represented within a single complete relational
database instance r over a database schema 〈R|AR|SCR〉 with relational symbol
R and the finite set AR = {A1, . . . , An} of attributes. Moreover, all attributes
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are assumed to have the same fixed but infinite domain Dom of constant symbols
(cf. [15, 68]) and the set SCR is supposed to contain some database constraints
(cf. [1]), which must be satisfied by each database instance r constructed over
this schema. The further assumption that each database instance r represents
complete information thereby means that r is supposed to contain a finite set of
valid database tuples and each constant combination c of the infinite set Domn
with c /∈ r is assumed to be not valid by Closed World Assumption (cf. [68]).
In compliance with the general framework of Controlled Interaction Execution (cf.
Section 1.2.3), a database instance is supposed to be modeled logic-orientedly.
Therefore, a language L of first-order logic containing the predicate symbol R of
arity |AR| = n and the distinguished binary predicate symbol ≡ for expressing
equality is set up. To be able to actually model each possible database instance r
within this first-order language L , the fixed but infinite domain Dom, over which
the database tuples of an original instance r are supposed to be constructed, is also
taken as the set of constant symbols of the first-order language L . To be further
able to also model more complex sentences with variables within this language,
an infinite set Var of variables is supposed to be available.
All sentences of L are constructed inductively in the natural fashion [68, 76] using
the quantifiers ∀ and ∃ and the connectives ¬, ∧, ∨ and⇒. Thereby, each term is
either a constant symbol of Dom or a variable of Var (functions are not allowed)
and each variable is supposed to be either universally or existentially quantified.
Hence, only closed formulas (i.e., sentences) are supposed to be in L .
This syntactic specification of the first-order language L , which is obviously tai-
lored to the specific needs of the logic-oriented modeling of relational database
instances, is now also complemented with a semantics reflecting the characteris-
tics of databases [15, 68]. Such a database-specific semantics essentially restricts
commonly known semantics for first-order logic (cf. [76, 88]) in the sense that
• no further semantics is provided for the constant symbols of the first-order
language L and hence each constant symbol of L is interpreted by itself
and is moreover seen to be equal only to itself and
• interpretations of the predicate symbol R, which represent a finite Herbrand
interpretation of (a logic-oriented modeling of) a database instance r con-
sisting of only a finite number of database tuples, can correspondingly only
be of finite size.
This kind of database-specific semantics for first-order logic is also referred to as
a DB-Interpretation and can be formally captured as follows.
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Definition 2.1: DB-Interpretation
Given the first-order language L with the set Dom of constant symbols, an
interpretation I is a DB-Interpretation for L , if
(i) the set Dom of constant symbols is employed as the universe of I,
(ii) each element (constant symbol) of the universe of I is interpreted by
itself, i.e., I(v) = v holds for each v ∈ Dom,
(iii) the predicate symbol R for modeling database tuples of arity n is inter-
preted by a finite relation I(R) ⊂ Domn and
(iv) the distinguished binary predicate symbol ≡ is interpreted by the fixed
and infinite relation I(≡) = { (v, v) | v ∈ Dom }.
A DB-Interpretation Ir is induced by a complete database instance r, if its
relation Ir(R) is instantiated by r, i.e., Ir(R) = { c ∈ Domn | c ∈ r }.
The notion of satisfaction of sentences of the constructed first-order language L
by a DB-Interpretation is the same as in usual first-order logic, i.e., whether a
sentence Φ ∈ L is satisfied by a DB-Interpretation I or not is evaluated in the
natural fashion over the inductive structure of this sentence Φ [76, 88]. Similarly,
the notion of implication (or entailment) under DB-Semantics corresponds to the
notion of implication under usual first-order semantics.
Definition 2.2: DB-Implication
Consider the constructed first-order language L . A set S of sentences of L
implies a sentence Φ of L under DB-Implication, i.e.,
S |=DB Φ ,
if and only if each DB-Interpretation I satisfying S (written as I |=M S) also
satisfies Φ (written as I |=M Φ).
Slightly abusing the notation presented in this definition, DB-Implication under a
singleton set S = {Ψ} is in the following usually written as Ψ |=DB Φ. Moreover,
for convenience, DB-Implication is in the following often simply referred to as
“implication”, when it is clear from the context that DB-Implication is meant.
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r + –
(a, b, c) (a, a, a)
(a, c, c) (a, a, b)
(b, a, c) (a, a, c)
...
(a) Complete instance r
R(a, b, c), R(a, c, c), R(b, a, c)
(∀X)(∀Y )(∀Z) [
(X ≡ a ∧ Y ≡ b ∧ Z ≡ c) ∨
(X ≡ a ∧ Y ≡ c ∧ Z ≡ c) ∨
(X ≡ b ∧ Y ≡ a ∧ Z ≡ c) ∨
¬R(X,Y, Z) ]
(b) Logic-oriented modeling of r
Figure 2.1: Logic-oriented modeling of a complete database instance
As required by the framework of Controlled Interaction Execution, the constructed
first-order language L can be employed to model complete database instances
logic-orientedly. This is exemplified in Figure 2.1, in which a complete database
instance r is modeled as a set of first-order sentences of L . Thereby, each valid
tuple c ∈ r is modeled as a corresponding ground atom R(c) of L and the infinite
set of invalid tuples – which is not explicitly enumerable – is expressed implicitly
with the help of a so-called completeness sentence (cf. [15]) of the form
(∀X1) . . . (∀Xn)
 ∨
ν∈r
 ∧
Aj∈AR
(Xj ≡ ν[Aj ])
 ∨ ¬R(X1, . . . , Xn)

having a universally quantified variable Xj for each attribute Aj ∈ AR of the
corresponding database schema. This completeness sentence expresses that each
constant combination (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Domn, with which the universally quantified
variables X1, . . . , Xn can actually be substituted, is either explicitly excluded from
being invalid because of the disjunct
X1 ≡ c1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xn ≡ cn
or is invalid, as the sentence ¬R(c1, . . . , cn) holds. By construction, this complete-
ness sentence is satisfied by the DB-Interpretation Ir induced by r.
In general, implication between (sets of) sentences of first-order logic is known to
be computationally undecidable [42]. Although there are some rather expressive
classes of first-order logic, which allow for algorithmic theorem proving [15, 42],
implication is in general still computationally hard to decide within these classes.
To be able to nonetheless decide on the validity of implication relationships be-
tween first-order sentences efficiently, one must hence restrict to less expressive
subclasses of first-order logic [69]. Such a subclass of first-order logic is known
from the approaches proposed in [19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 69] and is in the following
referred to as existentially quantified atoms.
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Definition 2.3: Existentially Quantified Atom
A sentence of the first-order language L is an existentially quantified atom,
if it is of the form (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) and
(i) each term ti is either a constant symbol of Dom or a variable of X,
(ii) the setX of existentially quantified variables isX = {t1, . . . , tn}\Dom,
(iii) each variable occurs only once, i.e., ti 6= tj for all ti, tj ∈X with i 6= j.
In particular, ground atoms of the form R(c1, . . . , cn) with each term ci being a
constant symbol of Dom are also considered to be (a restricted kind of) existen-
tially quantified atoms with an empty set of existentially quantified variables. For
this special kind of existentially quantified atoms the implication problem is ob-
viously easy to solve: one ground atom implies another ground atom, if and only
if both of these ground atoms are equal.
But also for those existentially quantified atoms actually containing variables the
implication problem under DB-Semantics can be reduced to a simple pattern
matching problem, as there can not be any implicit equalities between different
terms of an existentially quantified atom due to the syntactic restriction that each
variable can occur only once within each existentially quantified atom. This re-
duction of the implication problem under DB-Semantics to an efficiently decidable
pattern matching problem is formally captured in the following.
Lemma 2.1: DB-Implication for Existentially Quantified Atoms
Suppose that both (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) and (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) are existentially
quantified atoms. The DB-Implication
(∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) |=DB (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n)
holds, if and only if for each term t¯i, which is a constant symbol of Dom, the
term ti is also a constant symbol of Dom such that ti = t¯i.
Proof. To start with the only-if-part, consider the given existentially quantified
atoms (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) and (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) and suppose that for each term
t¯i, which is a constant symbol of Dom, the term ti is also a constant symbol
of Dom such that ti = t¯i. Moreover, consider an arbitrary DB-Interpretation
I satisfying (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn). As this sentence is obviously satisfiable and not
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tautological, this DB-Interpretation I must contain a tuple (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ I(R)
with ci = ti for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with ti ∈ Dom. But such a DB-Interpretation
I also satisfies (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) due to t¯i = ti = ci for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with
t¯i ∈ Dom because of the assumption that for each term t¯i, which is a constant
symbol of Dom, the term ti is also a constant symbol of Dom such that ti = t¯i
and because of ci = ti for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with ti ∈ Dom. Hence, each DB-
Interpretation satisfying (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) also satisfies (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) and
the validity of the DB-Implication (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) |=DB (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) is a
direct consequence.
To now prove the if-part by contraposition, again consider the given existentially
quantified atoms (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) and (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) and suppose that there
is an m ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that t¯m is a constant symbol of Dom and tm is either
a variable of X or a constant symbol of Dom with tm 6= t¯m. Next, consider a
DB-Interpretation I with I(R) = { (c1, . . . , cn) } and with further
• ci = ti for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {m} with ti ∈ Dom
• cm = tm, if tm is a constant symbol of Dom and
• cm ∈ Dom \ {t¯m}, if tm is a variable of X.
This DB-Interpretation I obviously satisfies (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn), but it does not
satisfy (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) because of t¯m 6= cm due to either cm = tm 6= t¯m or
cm ∈ Dom \ {t¯m} and as a direct consequence the given implication relationship
(∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) |=DB (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) does not hold, either. ♠
To actually benefit from these efficiently decidable implication relationships within
the framework of Controlled Interaction Execution, the confidentiality policies em-
ployed within this framework – for whose elements (expressing user-specific prohi-
bitions) the non-implication must be guaranteed to achieve the wanted confiden-
tiality requirements [11] – should reasonably be restricted to the above mentioned
subclass of existentially quantified atoms. This leads to the following (restricted)
definition of confidentiality policies consisting of potential secrets.
Definition 2.4: Confidentiality Policy
A potential secret Ψ is an existentially quantified atom of the first-order lan-
guage L and a confidentiality policy psec is a finite set of potential secrets.
As usual, the semantics of a potential secret Ψ requires that an adversary must not
be able to infer that the information embodied in Ψ is satisfied by a considered
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(original) database instance (cf. Section 1.2.3). So, regardless of whether Ψ is
actually satisfied by this database instance or not, from the adversary’s point of
view – established by a possibly weakened view on the original instance – it must
always be possible that Ψ is not true. Correspondingly, a (possibly alternative)
database instance r is supposed to obey a potential secret Ψ of a confidentiality
policy psec, if r does not satisfy Ψ , i.e., Ir 6|=M Ψ . Moreover, this instance r obeys
the confidentiality policy psec, if r obeys each potential secret of this policy.
2.2 Basic Ideas of Protecting Information
To now start the development of an algorithmic approach generating inference-
proof materialized views within the framework of Controlled Interaction Execu-
tion, for now consider a simplified setup of input instances consisting of
• a simple confidentiality policy psec = {Ψ1, Ψ2} containing exactly two po-
tential secrets in the form of ground atoms and
• a complete original database instance r over a database schema 〈R|AR| ∅ 〉
without any database constraints.
Moreover, suppose that an adversary does not have any further a priori knowledge
about the original instance r, either.
2.2.1 A First Simple Weakening Approach
Summarizing the requirements collected in Section 1.3, the approach to be devel-
oped should enforce a given confidentiality policy psec by replacing any knowledge
about an original instance r, which might enable an adversary to compromise this
confidentiality policy, by weaker knowledge in the form of suitable disjunctions.
Thereby, these distortions are readily identifiable for a user due to their distin-
guished syntactic form. This results in a (possibly incomplete) weakened view
weak (r, psec) on the original instance r, which should further
• contain only true knowledge complying with the original database instance
r, i.e., Ir |=M weak (r, psec), and
• be inference-proof in the sense that for each potential secret Ψ ∈ psec the
existence of a complete alternative database instance rΨ over the schema
〈R|AR| ∅ 〉 is guaranteed such that
– this alternative instance rΨ obeys the considered potential secret Ψ ,
i.e., IrΨ 6|=M Ψ , and
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– the weakened view weak (rΨ , psec) the algorithm would compute to en-
force psec under the considered alternative instance rΨ is (from an
adversary’s point of view) indistinguishable from the weakened view
weak (r, psec) the algorithm has actually computed to enforce psec un-
der the original instance r, i.e., weak (rΨ , psec) = weak (r, psec).
Under the simplified setup – assuming that a simple confidentiality policy psec =
{Ψ1, Ψ2} of only ground atoms and an original database instance r without any
semantic database constraints are given – an algorithm computing such a weakened
view weak (r, psec) can be easily sketched as follows [28]:
• for each tuple c ∈ r with both R(c) 6= Ψ1 as well as R(c) 6= Ψ2 the corre-
sponding ground atom R(c) is added to the (initially empty) weakened view
weak (r, psec);
• if at least one of the ground atoms of the given confidentiality policy psec
is satisfied by the original instance r, i.e., Ir |=M Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2, the (weaker)
disjunctive knowledge Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2 is added to the weakened view weak (r, psec)
instead of the definite knowledge that Ψ1 or (and, respectively) Ψ2 is valid;
• finally, a (partial) completeness sentence exposing the non-validity of all
other constant combinations, which neither correspond to a ground atom
nor to a disjunct of the (so far constructed) weakened view weak (r, psec), is
added to weak (r, psec).
Thereby, in contrast to the original database instance r, a total order is sup-
posed to be defined on the sentences that (might) occur in a weakened view on
this instance r (cf. [15]). This guarantees that an alternative instance rΨ with
IrΨ |=M weak (r, psec) is not distinguishable from a considered original instance r
on the basis of a different (syntactic) arrangement of the sentences of its weak-
ened view weak (rΨ , psec) compared to the weakened view weak (r, psec) released
for r. Otherwise, an adversary might simulate the (deterministic) weakening al-
gorithm – he is supposed to be aware of – for this alternative instance rΨ and
might then be able to draw the meta-inference (cf. Section 1.3) that rΨ can not be
the original instance leading to the released weakened view weak (r, psec) because
of weak (rΨ , psec) 6= weak (r, psec) due to a different (syntactic) presentation. In
this case the adversary would hence be able to exclude rΨ from being the “real”
original instance of his interest, thereby making this alternative instance useless.
To exemplify the importance of this kind of normalization, assume that a weaken-
ing algorithm is constructed such that those disjuncts of a weakening disjunction,
which are actually satisfied by a considered original database instance, are printed
first. Considering a weakening disjunction Ψ1∨Ψ2 of a released weakened view, an
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adversary can then easily reason that Ψ1 must be satisfied by the original instance –
by simply considering the order of the elements within this disjunction – and can
thereby compromise the confidentiality policy containing Ψ1 as a potential secret.
Further, each alternative instance obeying Ψ1 – and hence satisfying Ψ2 instead
of Ψ1 – can easily be distinguished from the original instance satisfying Ψ1, as
the weakening algorithm would return the weakening disjunction Ψ2 ∨ Ψ1 for this
alternative instance, which syntactically differs from the disjunction Ψ1∨Ψ2 of the
released weakened view on the considered original instance.
As discussed above, a completeness sentence of the logic-oriented modeling of
a complete database instance indeed guarantees that this logic-oriented mod-
eling provides complete knowledge in the sense that there is exactly one DB-
Interpretation satisfying this logic-oriented modeling. Hence, for each possible
constant combination c ∈ Dom over the attributes of the corresponding database
schema either the ground atom R(c) or its negation ¬R(c) is implied by this
logic-oriented modeling of the considered database instance.
In contrast, a completeness sentence used within a weakened view on a complete
database instance may reveal only partial knowledge. In case that this weakened
view contains the disjunction Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2 instead of the definite knowledge about
which of the potential secrets Ψ1 and Ψ2 are actually satisfied by the considered
complete database instance, the (partial) completeness sentence does not reveal
any knowledge about a possible non-satisfaction of any of these potential secrets
by its construction – even if one of these potential secrets is actually not satisfied
by the considered database instance. Correspondingly, there is more than one DB-
Interpretation satisfying this weakened view and among these DB-Interpretations
there is one that satisfies Ψ1 and does not satisfy Ψ2 and another one that satisfies
Ψ2 and does not satisfy Ψ1. Hence, for each of the sentences Ψ1 and Ψ2 neither its
validity nor its non-validity can be deduced. Of course, any knowledge about the
(non-)validity of any of these policy elements is deliberately not revealed by the
weakened view to enforce the confidentiality policy. Hence, a weakened view may
remain incomplete by design.
Nonetheless, the algorithm sketched above immediately satisfies the above men-
tioned goal that each weakened view weak (r, psec) on an original instance r should
contain only true knowledge complying with this instance r. The disjunction
Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2 weakening the knowledge about which of the potential secrets Ψ1 and Ψ2
are satisfied by the original instance r is only added to weak (r, psec), if at least
one of these potential secrets is actually satisfied by r. If instead both Ψ1 and
Ψ2 are not satisfied by r, the completeness sentence of weak (r, psec) reveals this
definite knowledge about the non-satisfaction of these policy elements.
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Moreover, each weakened view weak (r, psec) returned by this algorithm is also
inference-proof: if the disjunction Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2 is contained in weak (r, psec) and both
Ψ1 = R(c1) and Ψ2 = R(c2) with c1, c2 ∈ Domn is supposed to hold,
• a complete alternative database instance rΨ1 obeying the potential secret
Ψ1 ∈ psec can be constructed by rΨ1 := (r \ {c1}) ∪ {c2} and
• a complete alternative database instance rΨ2 obeying the potential secret
Ψ2 ∈ psec can be constructed by rΨ2 := (r \ {c2}) ∪ {c1}.
In both of these sub-cases the resulting alternative instances rΨ1 and rΨ2 obvi-
ously satisfy the disjunction Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2, just as the original instance r. Accordingly,
if an adversary simulates the weakening algorithm on these alternative instances,
both of the corresponding weakened views weak (rΨ1 , psec) and weak (rΨ2 , psec) are
indistinguishable from the weakened view weak (r, psec) released for the original in-
stance r, provided that the sentences of these sequences are arranged in the same
order (to mitigate meta-inferences as argued above). So, from this adversary’s
point of view, the considered instances r, rΨ1 and rΨ2 are pairwise indistinguish-
able, too, because of weak (r, psec) = weak (rΨ1 , psec) = weak (rΨ2 , psec).
If the disjunction Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2 is instead not contained in weak (r, psec), the original
instance r already obeys both of the potential secrets Ψ1 and Ψ2 and hence – accord-
ing to the semantics of potential secrets – no distortions are necessary to enforce
the confidentiality policy. As a consequence, alternative instances obeying the po-
tential secrets Ψ1 and Ψ2 – as required by the definition of inference-proofness – can
easily be constructed by rΨ1 := r and rΨ2 := r, thereby obviously both obeying
Ψ1 and Ψ2 and also satisfying the property of indistinguishability.
At first sight, one might argue that this weakening algorithm decreases availabil-
ity more than necessary, as it always weakens the knowledge about the validity of
both policy elements Ψ1 and Ψ2, even if only one of these policy elements is actu-
ally satisfied by the given original database instance. But under the supposition
that only knowledge about those potential secrets, which are actually satisfied
by a given original instance, is weakened, such a modified algorithm would not
guarantee the existence of indistinguishable alternative instances as required by
inference-proofness and an adversary could hence easily exploit his knowledge
about the algorithm to compromise the confidentiality policy with the help of
meta-inferences. This observation that additional distortions of per se harmless
knowledge may be necessary to effectively enforce confidentiality policies is also
well-known from other approaches to Controlled Interaction Execution enforcing
confidentiality policies without lies [13, 15, 8, 10].
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r = { (a, b, c), (a, c, c), (b, a, c) }
(a) Original database instance r
R(b, a, c)
R(a, b, c) ∨R(a, c, c)
(∀X)(∀Y )(∀Z) [
(X ≡ a ∧ Y ≡ b ∧ Z ≡ c) ∨
(X ≡ a ∧ Y ≡ c ∧ Z ≡ c) ∨
(X ≡ b ∧ Y ≡ a ∧ Z ≡ c) ∨
¬R(X,Y, Z) ]
(b) Weakened view weak (r, psec) on r
enforcing the confidentiality policy
psec = {R(a, b, c), R(a, c, c) }
R(a, c, c)
R(b, a, c)
R(a, b, c) ∨R(a, b, d)
(∀X)(∀Y )(∀Z) [
(X ≡ a ∧ Y ≡ b ∧ Z ≡ c) ∨
(X ≡ a ∧ Y ≡ b ∧ Z ≡ d) ∨
(X ≡ a ∧ Y ≡ c ∧ Z ≡ c) ∨
(X ≡ b ∧ Y ≡ a ∧ Z ≡ c) ∨
¬R(X,Y, Z) ]
(c) Weakened view weak (r, psec′) on r
enforcing the confidentiality policy
psec′ = {R(a, b, c), R(a, b, d) }
Figure 2.2: Enforcing simple confidentiality policies by weakening instances
2.2.2 Exemplifying the Simple Weakening Approach
To exemplify the algorithm for simplified input instances, consider the original
database instance r given in Figure 2.2(a) and the confidentiality policy
psec = {Ψ1 = R(a, b, c), Ψ2 = R(a, c, c) }
both of whose potential secrets Ψ1 and Ψ2 are satisfied by the original instance
r. The algorithm hence weakens this sensitive (definite) knowledge by replacing
it by the weaker (but true) disjunctive knowledge R(a, b, c) ∨R(a, c, c) and corre-
spondingly returns the weakened view weak (r, psec) depicted in Figure 2.2(b).
An adversary can now try to draw conclusions about the (original) input instance,
which led to this weakened view weak (r, psec), based on the knowledge this weak-
ened view reveals about this input instance together with his general knowledge
about the algorithm used to create the weakened view and his knowledge about
the confidentiality policy psec set up for him. He can thereby gain
• the positive knowledge that (b, a, c) must be a tuple of this input instance,
• the disjunctive knowledge that at least one of the tuples (a, b, c) and (a, c, c)
must be contained in this input instance and
• the negative knowledge that no other tuples are in this input instance.
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The adversary can thus conclude that only one of the following (complete) input in-
stances could have led to the released (incomplete) weakened view weak (r, psec):
• r = { (a, b, c), (a, c, c), (b, a, c) } (the original instance itself) ;
• rΨ1 = { (a, c, c), (b, a, c) } (an alternative instance obeying Ψ1) ;
• rΨ2 = { (a, b, c), (b, a, c) } (an alternative instance obeying Ψ2) .
From the adversary’s point of view each of these instances is not distinguishable
from the original instance r used to construct weak (r, psec) because of
weak (r, psec) = weak (rΨ1 , psec) = weak (rΨ2 , psec)
and might hence be the “real” input instance. As there are the instances rΨ1
obeying the potential secret Ψ1 and rΨ2 obeying the potential secret Ψ2 among
these possibly “real” input instances, the adversary is not able to conclude that a
specific policy element of psec is satisfied by the instance actually used to create
weak (r, psec) and is hence not able to compromise the confidentiality policy psec.
As another example, again consider the original database instance r given in Fig-
ure 2.2(a) and the (different) confidentiality policy
psec′ = {Ψ1 = R(a, b, c), Ψ2 = R(a, b, d) }
containing only one potential secret satisfied by the original instance r. Simi-
lar to the above given example the algorithm replaces the knowledge about the
satisfaction of Ψ1 and the non-satisfaction of Ψ2 by the weaker (but true) disjunc-
tive knowledge R(a, b, c)∨R(a, b, d) and returns the weakened view weak (r, psec′)
depicted in Figure 2.2(c).
An adversary can now again employ the knowledge this released weakened view
weak (r, psec′) reveals about the original input instance together with his general
knowledge about the weakening algorithm and the confidentiality policy psec′ and
can then conclude that only one of the following (complete) input instances could
have led to the (incomplete) weakened view weak (r, psec′):
• r = { (a, b, c), (a, c, c), (b, a, c) } (the original instance itself, obeying Ψ2) ;
• rΨ1 = { (a, b, d), (b, a, c) } (an alternative instance obeying Ψ1) ;
• rΨ2 = { (a, b, c), (b, a, c) } (an alternative instance obeying Ψ2) .
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Again, each of these instances is not distinguishable from the original instance r
used to construct weak (r, psec′) from the adversary’s point of view because of
weak (r, psec′) = weak (rΨ1 , psec′) = weak (rΨ2 , psec′)
and might hence be the “real” input instance. As there are the instances r and
rΨ2 both obeying the potential secret Ψ2 as well as the instance rΨ1 obeying the
potential secret Ψ1 among these possibly “real” input instances, the adversary is
again not able to conclude that a specific policy element of psec′ is satisfied by
the instance actually used to create weak (r, psec′).
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CHAPTER 3
A Generic Weakening Approach
So far, the basic ideas of achieving inference-proofness by weakening a database
instance have been introduced. But for now, only simple confidentiality policies
containing exactly two policy elements in the form of ground atoms have been
considered. These basic ideas are now extended to be able to also deal with non-
simple confidentiality policies containing an arbitrary number of policy elements
in the more expressive form of existentially quantified atoms. This leads to the
construction of a generic algorithm, which is proved to be confidentiality preserving
and which is furthermore analyzed with respect to its complexity.
3.1 Clustering Non-Simple Confidentiality Policies
Until now, a simple confidentiality policy has essentially been enforced by (if
necessary) constructing a disjunction containing both of its policy elements in the
form of ground atoms. But in the more general case of non-simple confidentiality
policies containing an arbitrary number of existentially quantified atoms, it is not
desirable – neither in terms of availability, nor in terms of confidentiality – to
construct disjunctions by arbitrarily grouping policy elements together.
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Hence, dealing with non-simple confidentiality policies raises the question of how
to construct a set of disjunctions, which is suitable for enforcing the confidential-
ity requirements specified by the non-simple policy without neglecting (implicit
or explicit) availability requirements. This construction of disjunctions is to be
discussed both on the technical level – dealing with how a given confidentiality
policy can be enforced (independent of a specific application scenario) by a suit-
able set of disjunctions, thereby keeping availability as high as possible – as well
as on the ontological level – dealing with structural properties each disjunction
should have to be both meaningful in terms of availability and credible in terms
of confidentiality with respect to a considered application scenario.
3.1.1 Basic Ideas of Clustering Potential Secrets
For now still restricting to policy elements in the form of ground atoms, a first
generic approach to construct a suitable set of disjunctions enforcing a given con-
fidentiality policy psec of arbitrary size relies on a partitioning of this policy psec
into disjoint subsets called clusters. Each of these clusters C then induces a cor-
responding disjunction template ∨Ψ∈C Ψ and – in accordance with the basic ideas
introduced in Chapter 2 – a weakened view on an original database instance r ac-
tually contains this disjunction ∨Ψ∈C Ψ , if at least one of its disjuncts is satisfied
by this instance r, i.e., Ir |=M Ψ .
But usually an arbitrary partitioning of a given confidentiality policy psec into a
set of clusters is not desirable. Instead, a clustering of psec should be tailored
to the needs of a specific application considered, thereby prudently balancing
confidentiality and availability requirements induced by the characteristics of this
application, as later discussed in more detail in Section 3.1.3. For the purpose
of creating such an application-specific clustering, a so-called notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities inducing a set Ca of admissible clusters should be provided.
Two examples of such sets of admissible clusters are given in Figure 3.1.
Definition 3.1: Admissible Clusters
Given a confidentiality policy psec, the set Ca = {Ca1 , . . . , Cap} with Cai ⊆ psec
and |Cai | ≥ 2 for each Cai ∈ Ca is a set of admissible clusters over psec.
Given a set Ca of admissible clusters, each non-empty and non-singleton subset
C ⊆ Cai of potential secrets of an admissible cluster Cai ∈ Ca can be employed to
construct the corresponding admissible disjunction template ∨Ψ∈C Ψ . But when
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Ψ1
Ψ2
Ψ3 Ψ4
Ca1
Ca2 C
a
3
(a) Set of induced admissible clusters of
size 2 over the confidentiality policy
psec = {Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3, Ψ4 }
Ψ1
Ψ2
Ψ3
Ψ4 Ψ5
Ψ6
Ca1
Ca2
Ca3
(b) Set of induced admissible clusters of
size 3 over the confidentiality policy
psec = {Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3, Ψ4, Ψ5, Ψ6 }
Figure 3.1: Examples of induced sets of admissible clusters
constructing a set of multiple disjunction templates covering each potential se-
cret contained in an admissible cluster, care must be taken to ensure that these
templates are pairwise disjoint as required above. This requirement becomes even
more difficult when considering that admissible clusters do not need to be pairwise
disjoint to make the task of defining such a set of admissible clusters – and hence
also a security officer’s duty to find a suitable notion of admissible indistinguisha-
bilities – as easy as possible. Instead, the construction of a disjoint clustering C,
each of whose clusters is admissible, is the task of a clustering algorithm.
Definition 3.2: Clustering of a Confidentiality Policy
Suppose that Ca = {Ca1 , . . . , Cam} is a set of admissible clusters induced by
a given notion of admissible indistinguishabilities for a given confidentiality
policy psec.
The set C = {C1, . . . , Cq} is a clustering of psec obeying Ca, if
(i) for each cluster Cj ∈ C there is
• an admissible cluster Cai ∈ Ca with Cj ⊆ Cai or
• Cj is a singleton cluster Cj = {Ψ} with Ψ ∈ psec,
(ii) Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for all pairs of different clusters Ci, Cj ∈ C and
(iii) for each potential secret Ψ ∈ psec there is a cluster Cj ∈ C with Ψ ∈ Cj .
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This definition obviously guarantees that each potential secret is contained in
exactly one cluster and that a clustering is hence pairwise disjoint. To also allow
the handling of policy elements, for which the considered notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities (in combination with the given confidentiality policy) does
not induce an admissible cluster (of non-trivial size1), each singleton subset of
the considered confidentiality policy is always supposed to be a valid (but trivial)
cluster. But even under the supposition that each policy element is contained in a
(non-trivial) admissible cluster, it might nonetheless not be possible to construct
a disjoint clustering of only non-singleton clusters.
To exemplify the latter case, consider the set of admissible clusters of size 2, which
is given in Figure 3.1 (a). Each of the potential secrets Ψ2, Ψ3 and Ψ4 is contained
in only one admissible cluster such that each of these policy elements can only
admissibly be paired with the potential secret Ψ1. Hence, a clustering of only
non-singleton clusters covering each element of the given confidentiality policy
psec = {Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3, Ψ4 } can not be constructed without violating the requirement
that a clustering should be disjoint.
In case of the set of admissible clusters of size 3 given in Figure 3.1 (b), a valid
clustering of only non-singleton clusters can instead easily be constructed. An
example of such a clustering is C = {C1, C2, C3} with
C1 = {Ψ1, Ψ2 } ⊆ Ca1 , C2 = {Ψ4, Ψ5 } ⊆ Ca2 and C3 = {Ψ3, Ψ6 } ⊆ Ca3 .
This clustering of only non-singleton clusters is valid, as it consists of pairwise
disjoint clusters in the form of subsets of admissible clusters together covering
each potential secret of the given policy psec = {Ψ1, . . . , Ψ6 }. But under the
supposition that clusters of a size larger than 2 are required (as discussed below),
one can easily see that neither of the two example sets of admissible clusters given
in Figure 3.1 allow for the construction of such a clustering.
Generally, each singleton cluster Cj = {Ψ} of a clustering C is not suitable for
enforcing the potential secret Ψ , as it induces the trivial disjunction template∨
Ψ¯∈Cj Ψ¯ = Ψ revealing definite knowledge about the satisfaction of Ψ . In fact, each
disjunction must consist of at least two (semantically pairwise different) disjuncts
to be able to hide which of its disjuncts are actually satisfied by a considered
original database instance. Then, an adversary only knows that a non-empty
subset of these disjuncts is satisfied by this instance.
In some application scenarios it might be even worthwhile to require disjunctions
of a length longer than 2 – and hence also clusters of a corresponding size – to
1 Note that a singleton set of policy elements possibly induced by a notion of admissible indis-
tinguishabilities is not considered to be an admissible cluster according to Definition 3.1.
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correspondingly increase this number of non-empty subsets of policy elements,
which might – from an adversary’s point of view – possibly be satisfied by a
considered original instance. This decreases the knowledge an adversary can gain
about this instance and hence increases the achieved level of confidentiality.
As exemplified above, it might sometimes not be possible to construct a cluster-
ing consisting only of clusters of a certain minimum size of k∗ with k∗ ≥ 2. To
nonetheless guarantee a wanted level of confidentiality, so-called additional poten-
tial secrets are (artificially) introduced to allow for the construction of clusters not
smaller than k∗. Such a clustering, which is (possibly) extended by additional po-
tential secrets, is referred to as an extended clustering C∗. Thereby, an additional
potential secret is an existentially quantified atom (or a ground atom, as assumed
in this subsection) just like any non-additional potential secret stemming from the
given confidentiality policy.
Definition 3.3: Extended Clustering of a Confidentiality Policy
Let psec be a confidentiality policy and suppose that a notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities is given. Further, suppose that k∗ ∈ N with k∗ ≥ 2 is
the minimum size each (extended) cluster should have.
The set C∗ = {C1, . . . , Cq} is an extended clustering of psec obeying the given
notion of admissible indistinguishabilities and k∗, if
(i) each (extended) cluster Cj ∈ C∗ is a set of existentially quantified atoms
and has a minimum size of k∗, i.e., |Cj | ≥ k∗,
(ii) each (extended) cluster Cj ∈ C∗ contains at least one original policy
element, i.e., Cj ∩ psec 6= ∅ for each Cj ∈ C∗,
(iii) for each (extended) cluster Cj ∈ C∗ each existentially quantified atom
ΨA ∈ Cj with ΨA /∈ psec is an additional potential secret,
(iv) the given notion of admissible indistinguishabilities induces a set Ca
of admissible clusters for the set ⋃Cj∈C∗ Cj of all (possibly additional)
potential secrets such that C∗ is a clustering of ⋃Cj∈C∗ Cj obeying Ca
according to Definition 3.2 and
(v) the set psecA := ⋃Cj∈C∗ Cj \ psec is an admissible set of additional
potential secrets (still to be defined).
Requirement (iv) of this definition guarantees that each constructed cluster –
including those containing additional potential secrets – is admissible with respect
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to a considered notion of admissible indistinguishabilities. As a direct consequence,
such a notion might – dependent on the inputs of the clustering algorithm and
hence also on the employed notion of admissible indistinguishabilities itself – need
to be able to also handle a certain set of additional potential secrets to enable the
clustering algorithm to construct a valid extended clustering. A detailed discussion
of the requirements such a well-defined notion of admissible indistinguishabilities
should meet is given in Section 3.1.3. Additionally, condition (v) of Definition 3.3
deliberately leaves open which further requirements an admissible set of additional
potential secrets has to fulfill to ensure that the given definition of an extended
clustering is “generic enough” to be also applicable within the extended scenario
handling potential secrets in the form of existentially quantified atoms (instead of
only ground atoms), which is later discussed in Section 3.1.2.
If an employed notion of admissible indistinguishabilities allows for the construc-
tion of an extended clustering C∗ such that each extended cluster C ∈ C∗ contains
only one non-additional potential secret and |C| − 1 additional potential secrets,
such an extended clustering C∗ is a trivial but feasible solution from the point of
view of a clustering algorithm. But such a trivial solution is usually not desirable
in terms of availability, as each constructed additional potential secret specifies
some additional knowledge, whose validity must not be revealed to an adversary.
Hence, usually the goal is to find an extended clustering C∗ containing only a min-
imum number of additional potential secrets and to thereby maximize availability
within the limits given by the confidentiality requirements.
In general, the construction of an extended clustering should not depend on a given
original database instance r, although such an instance-dependent construction
might open up extended possibilities to construct availability-maximizing cluster-
ings. For example, an instance-dependent clustering algorithm could deliberately
maximize the number of (possibly additional) potential secrets grouped to clus-
ters, whose corresponding disjunction templates are not satisfied by a considered
original instance. Thereby, this algorithm could increase the number of potential
secrets, whose real truth values do not need to be kept confidential and are hence
revealed to an adversary. On the downside, such an instance-dependent clustering
must take additional care to ensure that each alternative instance, which should
be indistinguishable from the original instance from an adversary’s point of view,
leads to exactly the same clustering – and hence also to the same weakened view –
as the original instance to mitigate harmful meta-inferences an adversary might
use to exclude some alternative instances from being credible.
To eliminate another source for meta-inferences, an artificially introduced addi-
tional potential secret should generally be treated just like any non-additional
potential secret when constructing a weakened view. This disables an adversary
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of taking advantage of his knowledge about which of the disjuncts of a published
weakened view are artificially introduced. This knowledge is supposed to be pub-
licly available as trying to keep this knowledge confidential is not a promising
approach anyway: an adversary is supposed to be aware of the clustering algo-
rithm as well as of the confidentiality policy and the employed notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities and is hence able to determine the computed extended clus-
tering – including the construction of additional potential secrets – himself by
simulating the computations of the protection mechanism.
3.1.2 Dealing with Existentially Quantified Potential Secrets
Until now, the enforcement of confidentiality policies with the help of disjunctions
has been discussed under the assumption that a confidentiality policy only contains
potential secrets in the form of ground atoms. But in fact, a confidentiality policy
may also contain more expressive sentences in the form of existentially quantified
atoms according to Definition 2.4. While this clearly improves the expressiveness
of confidentiality policies on the one hand, it might also open up new possibilities
for an adversary to draw harmful inferences on the other hand.
To realize that there is indeed such a new possibility to draw harmful inferences,
consider the following confidentiality policy
psec = {R(a, b, c), R(a, b, d), (∃X)R(a, b,X), (∃X)R(b, b,X) }
containing existentially quantified potential secrets. Assuming that disjunction
templates of a minimum length of 2 are required, the clustering sketched so far
might lead to a weakened view containing the disjunction R(a, b, c) ∨ R(a, b, d).
But this disjunction directly implies the knowledge (∃X)R(a, b,X), which itself
is protected by a potential secret of the policy psec. Hence, an adversary – to
whom this disjunction is revealed as true knowledge about the original instance –
is able to violate the confidentiality policy psec, as there is no alternative database
instance, which satisfies the considered disjunction R(a, b, c)∨R(a, b, d) and which
furthermore obeys the potential secret (∃X)R(a, b,X).
More generally, this example indicates that the clustering sketched so far might
induce disjunctions implying knowledge, which itself is protected by potential se-
crets of the confidentiality policy. So, this implied – and hence weaker – knowledge
is still too strong. A possibility to avoid the construction of these too strong dis-
junctions is to first clean the given confidentiality policy in a preprocessing step
and then subsequently apply the clustering discussed above. Thereby, cleaning
a confidentiality policy means to reduce this policy to a maximum “core” subset
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of its weakest sentences and hence results in a set of potential secrets which do
pairwise not imply each other.2
Definition 3.4: Cleaned Set
Let S be a set of sentences of the first-order language L . Its cleaned set Ŝ
is a maximum subset of weakest sentences of S such that no pair of different
sentences of Ŝ is semantically equivalent.
A sentence Ψ ∈ S is a weakest sentence of S, if for each sentence Ψ ′ ∈ S
(i) either the implication Ψ ′ |=DB Ψ holds or
(ii) both non-implications Ψ ′ 6|=DB Ψ and Ψ 6|=DB Ψ ′ hold.
On the operational level a cleaned set Ŝ of a set S of sentences can be computed
by initially setting Ŝ := S and then repeatedly removing an arbitrary sentence Ψ ′
from Ŝ, for which there is a sentence Ψ ∈ Ŝ with Ψ ′ 6= Ψ and Ψ ′ |=DB Ψ . This
sentence Ψ ′ can be safely removed from Ŝ as it is stronger than Ψ or semantically
equivalent to Ψ and must hence not be in the cleaned set. The algorithm finally
terminates as soon as there is no such sentence Ψ ′ ∈ Ŝ anymore. Then, for each
pair of (syntactically) different sentences Ψ, Ψ ′ ∈ Ŝ there is no semantic equivalence
between Ψ and Ψ ′ and there is also no implication relationship between Ψ and Ψ ′
as required by condition (ii) of Definition 3.4 – and hence each remaining sentence
of Ŝ is also a weakest sentence of the non-cleaned set S. As a consequence, Ŝ is a
cleaned set, as it is moreover maximum because adding an arbitrary sentence of
S \ Ŝ would result in a violation of the properties of a cleaned set.
Reconsidering the example policy psec given above, the corresponding cleaned
confidentiality policy is
p̂sec = { (∃X)R(a, b,X), (∃X)R(b, b,X) } .
Obviously, both policy elements of this cleaned policy p̂sec do not imply each other.
Moreover, the potential secrets R(a, b, c) and R(a, b, d) of the original policy psec
are not taken over into the cleaned policy p̂sec, as the original policy psec also
contains the (weaker) sentence (∃X)R(a, b,X) implied by both of the (stronger)
sentences R(a, b, c) and R(a, b, d).
2 Note that weakest sentences can equivalently be found by considering “|=DB” as a partial
preorder on existentially quantified atoms – in the sense that Ψ ≤ Ψ ′ is supposed to hold, if
and only if Ψ ′ |=DB Ψ holds – and then taking the minimal elements (cf. [52]).
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Assuming that the disjunction (∃X)R(a, b,X) ∨ (∃X)R(b, b,X) is constructed
to enforce the cleaned policy p̂sec, this disjunction does not imply any (weaker)
knowledge, which itself is protected by the cleaned policy p̂sec or the original policy
psec. In particular, even the potential secrets R(a, b, c) and R(a, b, d), which are
only contained in the original policy psec and not in cleaned policy p̂sec, are
protected by this disjunction: from an adversary’s point of view the existence of
an alternative instance r′ with
Ir′ |=M (∃X)R(a, b,X) ∨ (∃X)R(b, b,X) and Ir′ 6|=M (∃X)R(a, b,X)
is possible and for such an instance r′ also Ir′ 6|=M R(a, b, c) and Ir′ 6|=M R(a, b, d)
has to hold – otherwise Ir′ |=M (∃X)R(a, b,X) would hold, too.
This implicit protection of all of those policy elements of the original policy psec,
which are not taken over into the cleaned policy p̂sec, by disjunctions enforcing
the potential secrets of p̂sec can be generalized as follows.
Lemma 3.1: Implicit Protection
Let ΨS and ΨW be sentences of L such that ΨW is at least as weak as ΨS ,
i.e., ΨS |=DB ΨW , and let Ir be a DB-Interpretation with Ir 6|=M ΨW . Then
ΨS is not satisfied by Ir either, i.e., Ir 6|=M ΨS .
Proof. According to the definition of DB-Implication, ΨS |=DB ΨW if and only if
for each DB-Interpretation I with I |=M ΨS also I |=M ΨW . By contraposition,
this is equivalent to ΨS |=DB ΨW if and only if for each DB-Interpretation I with
I 6|=M ΨW also I 6|=M ΨS . So, Ir 6|=M ΨW directly implies Ir 6|=M ΨS under the
assumption that ΨS |=DB ΨW is given. ♠
As known from Section 3.1.1, it is not always possible to construct a disjoint
clustering, which solely consists of potential secrets stemming from the original
confidentiality policy. Instead, it may be necessary to extend too small clusters by
creating so-called additional potential secrets. As a direct consequence, care must
be taken to ensure that the disjunctions resulting from these extended clusters do
not provide too strong knowledge compromising the confidentiality policy. Hence,
adopting the counter measure discussed above, additional potential secrets should
be constructed such that the union of all additional potential secrets and all non-
additional potential secrets satisfies the properties of a cleaned set. This leads to
the following criterion for an admissible set of additional potential secrets, which
implements the purely generic requirement an extended clustering has to satisfy
according to condition (v) of Definition 3.3.
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Definition 3.5: Admissible Additional Potential Secrets
Let p̂sec be a cleaned confidentiality policy. A set p̂secA of additional potential
secrets is admissible with respect to the given confidentiality policy p̂sec, if
the union p̂sec ∪ p̂secA is a cleaned set.
As a direct consequence of this definition relying on the definition of a cleaned set,
there is no implication relationship – and hence also no semantic equivalence – be-
tween each pair of different (possibly additional) potential secrets of an extended
clustering. As a further consequence, the confidentiality policy psec must not
contain a potential secret ΨW , which is semantically equivalent to the weakest
possible potential secret (∃X)R(X) not containing any constant symbols. Oth-
erwise, the corresponding cleaned confidentiality policy p̂sec would solely consist
of this weakest policy element ΨW – as all other potential secrets of psec would
imply this weakest policy element ΨW and would hence not be taken over into the
cleaned policy – and no admissible additional potential secret ΨAW not implying
ΨW could be constructed for ΨW .
According to Definition 3.3, each cluster of an extended clustering must obey a
given notion of admissible indistinguishabilities. This, in particular, also applies
for clusters containing additional potential secrets. Hence, the construction of
an admissible set of additional potential secrets is closely related to a reasonable
notion of admissible indistinguishabilities, as discussed in the following.
3.1.3 About Admissible Indistinguishabilities
As already mentioned in Section 3.1.1, the quality of a weakening crucially relies
on the employed notion of admissible indistinguishabilities, which induces the set
of admissible clusters and thereby restricts the construction of admissible disjunc-
tion templates. Although the purpose of disjunctions is to protect information by
weakening an adversary’s knowledge about the original instance, each disjunction
should still provide as much useful information as possible in terms of availabil-
ity – otherwise the enforcement of confidentiality policies by disjunctions might
not provide any advantage over the (traditional) complete refusal of protected
information. In terms of confidentiality all alternatives provided by a disjunction
should moreover be equally probable from an adversary’s point of view. Other-
wise, this adversary might be able to strengthen his knowledge about the original
instance by excluding those alternatives provided by a disjunction, whose validity
seems to be highly unlikely from a practical point of view. Hence, it is of crucial
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importance that the employed notion of admissible indistinguishabilities fits the
specific application scenario considered.
Obviously, there is no general notion of admissible indistinguishabilities that fits
each possible application scenario and there is also no generally valid approach
to find such a notion for a specific application scenario. Instead, it is the duty
of a security officer to analyze the characteristics of such a specific application
scenario with scrutiny and to subsequently develop a suitable notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities, which prudently balances confidentiality and availability.
But as it is not desirable – and for policies of realistic size usually even impossible –
to let a security officer manually design sets of admissible clusters resulting from
such a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities, a generic method to construct
admissible clusters based on a high level specification language is needed.
Usually, a confidentiality policy should be managed by a database system imple-
menting well-known and widespread query languages such as SQL or relational
algebra [75, 78, 1]. As an admissible cluster induced by a notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities is essentially a subset of potential secrets, a security officer
can create a set of admissible clusters of size k by computing a series of k − 1
self-joins on the database table managing the confidentiality policy. Then, the
security officer’s concrete notion of admissible indistinguishabilities corresponds
to the implemented join conditions. But of course, a security officer is free to use
any other programming language, which is expressive enough.
As already known, there might be the need to introduce additional potential se-
crets to be able to construct an extended clustering. But the definition of an
extended clustering requires that the potential secrets of each of its clusters –
without making a difference between non-additional potential secrets stemming
from the confidentiality policy and additional potential secrets not stemming from
the confidentiality policy – form a valid cluster according to the given notion of
admissible indistinguishabilities. Hence, considering a specific confidentiality pol-
icy and a minimum size k∗ each (extended) cluster should have, it may not be
sufficient that such a given notion of admissible indistinguishabilities is able to
handle only the non-additional potential secrets of the considered confidentiality
policy. Instead, this notion must be “generic enough” to also handle a certain
set of additional potential secrets allowing for the construction of at least one
extended clustering for the considered confidentiality policy.
In a worst-case scenario up to k∗−1 additional potential secrets are needed for each
non-additional potential secret of the cleaned confidentiality policy to construct
an extended clustering with clusters of size k∗. To later free the proof of inference-
proofness from the burden of discussing non-determinism, each additional poten-
tial secret should be constructed by a deterministic algorithm. This construction
39
3 A Generic Weakening Approach
of such an additional potential secret might require the use of additional constant
symbols not occurring in any original policy element, but should only use constant
symbols of the domain Dom of L to guarantee that each constructed additional
potential secret – in the form of an existentially quantified atom – is a sentence
of the employed first-order language L . Hence, additionally considering that an
extended clustering C∗ contains a finite number of (possibly additional) potential
secrets each of which is of finite arity, the active domain of C∗ – consisting of the
union of all constant symbols occurring in a (possibly additional) potential secret
of C∗ – should be a finite subset of the domain Dom.
Definition 3.6: Well-Defined Indistinguishability
Let p̂sec be the cleaned set of a given confidentiality policy psec. Further,
suppose that k∗ ∈ N with k∗ ≥ 2 is the minimum size each (extended) cluster
of an extended clustering should have.
A notion of admissible indistinguishabilities is well-defined with respect to
psec and k∗, if there is an extended clustering C∗ of p̂sec obeying the con-
sidered notion of admissible indistinguishabilities and k∗ according to Defini-
tion 3.3 such that
(i) there is a deterministic algorithm creating this extended clustering C∗
with all of its additional potential secrets ΨA with ΨA /∈ p̂sec,
(ii) the active domain of C∗ is a finite subset of the domain Dom and
(iii) the domain Dom contains at least one constant symbol, which is not
contained in the active domain of the extended clustering C∗.
Reconsidering that the active domain ad (C∗) of C∗ is a finite set and that the
domain Dom of L is supposed to be infinite, requirement (iii) of this definition
seems to be always satisfied at first sight because of |Dom| > |ad (C∗)|. But while
this assumption of an infinite domain – together with the assumption of a database
system providing only untyped attributes (cf. [18, 75, 78]) – is adequate in theory, it
is usually not realizable in practice: technical limitations such as finite memory or
the finite number of bits a data type provides to represent values limit the overall
number of different representable values. Moreover, the considered application
scenario might also limit the number of reasonable values for a specific column of
a database instance. For example, a column representing the biological sex of a
person should usually only contain the values male and female, even if the data
type of the corresponding column offers a much larger domain.
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As already discussed in Section 3.1.2 and later elaborated in more detail in Sec-
tion 3.3, the inference-proofness of a weakened view crucially relies on clustering
only (possibly additional) potential secrets not implying each other to disjunction
templates. Thereby, this notion of non-implication (employed in the definition of
a cleaned set) relies on DB-Implication, which in turn relies on DB-Interpretations
employing the infinite domain Dom as their universe. But if instead only a “small
enough” finite domain is considered for a DB-Interpretation, an adversary might
be able to draw confidentiality compromising conclusions regarding the satisfac-
tion of a potential secret based on the satisfaction of other potential secrets with
the help of so-called combinatorial effects.
To exemplify that an adversary might indeed take advantage of such a “small
enough” finite domain, suppose that the (extended) clusters
• C1 = { (∃X)R(a,X, a), (∃X)R(a,X, b) } and
• C2 = { (∃X)R(a, a,X), (∃X)R(a, b,X) }
constitute an extended clustering C∗ of a given confidentiality policy. This policy
is cleaned and does hence not contain any implication relationships between pairs
of different potential secrets in terms of usual DB-Implication. Additionally con-
sidering an original database instance r, which satisfies a potential secret of the
cluster C1 but not any potential secret of the cluster C2, the released weakened
view contains the disjunction
(∃X)R(a,X, a) ∨ (∃X)R(a,X, b) ,
but does not contain the disjunction template
(∃X)R(a, a,X) ∨ (∃X)R(a, b,X) .
An adversary is hence supposed to know that the original instance does neither
satisfy (∃X)R(a, a,X) nor (∃X)R(a, b,X).
Further assuming that Dom = {a, b} is the underlying finite domain, the disjunct
(∃X)R(a,X, b) of the constructed disjunction (corresponding to C1) can only be
satisfied by an alternative instance containing (at least) one of the tuples (a, a, b)
or (a, b, b). But an adversary can exclude such an alternative instance from being
the original instance r, as such an instance would – in contrast to the original
instance r – satisfy at least one of the potential secrets of the cluster C2. Hence,
the disjunct (∃X)R(a,X, b) can not be satisfied by any (alternative) instance and
the adversary can consequently employ the constructed disjunction to conclude
that the potential secret (∃X)R(a,X, a) must be satisfied by the original instance
r, thereby compromising the confidentiality policy.
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If the considered finite domain Dom is extended by an additional “fresh” con-
stant symbol c not occurring in the active domain of the clustering C∗ – thereby
satisfying requirement (iii) of Definition 3.6 – the alternative instances
• r′ = { (a, c, a) } obeying the potential secret (∃X)R(a,X, b) and
• r′′ = { (a, c, b) } obeying the potential secret (∃X)R(a,X, a),
which both satisfy the constructed disjunction and both do not satisfy any poten-
tial secret of the cluster C2, can easily be constructed. Hence, an adversary is not
able to compromise the confidentiality policy under this extended finite domain,
as the additional “fresh” constant symbol breaks up the above mentioned impli-
cation relationships between policy elements, which are based on combinatorial
effects possible because of a too small finite domain.
So, although favoring an infinite domain in theory to avoid combinatorial effects
possibly leading to harmful inferences, a “sufficiently large” finite domain is ad-
equate in practice. When later showing the inference-proofness of the approach
in Section 3.3, a so-called ground operator is employed. This ground operator
is shown to be well-defined in Lemma 3.2 and the supposition that only one
“fresh” constant symbol is sufficient to disable any implication relationships within
a cleaned set is a direct consequence of the proof of this lemma. But in terms of
the credibility of these non-implications from an adversary’s point of view – and
hence also in terms of the credibility of alternative instances – a much larger sup-
ply of “fresh” constant symbols, which moreover fit the (different) domains of the
attributes occurring in the database schema as well as the semantic context of the
application scenario, is of course highly desirable.
3.2 Construction of Weakened Views
Now that the challenge of clustering a confidentiality policy to a set of pairwise
disjoint admissible disjunction templates is succeeded, these disjunction templates
can be employed to enforce this confidentiality policy by constructing a suitably
weakened view on a given (original) database instance.
Similar to the simple weakening algorithm, which is sketched in Section 2.2.1 and
aims at the construction of a weakened view enforcing a simplified confidentiality
policy, the basic idea is to replace each confidentiality compromising tuple of a
given original database instance by the subset of all those disjunction templates,
which are implied by this database tuple. Thereby, such a database tuple is
considered to be confidentiality compromising, if it implies at least one disjunction
template. Otherwise, this tuple is considered to be harmless and the validity of
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this tuple is revealed. As a consequence, the knowledge about the validity of those
policy elements, which are actually satisfied by the original database instance, is
weakened by corresponding disjunctions and an adversary is hence not able to
infer which of the alternatives provided by a disjunction is actually satisfied by
the original database instance.
The construction of the simple weakening algorithm in Section 2.2.1 suggests that
a weakened view should also reveal the knowledge about the non-validity of those
constant combinations over the considered database schema, which are actually
not contained in the original database instance and whose exact validity status is
not deliberately left unknown to enforce the confidentiality policy. For this pur-
pose, the simple weakening algorithm introduces a so-called (partial) completeness
sentence. This concept can be adapted for potential secrets (and hence disjuncts)
with existentially quantified variables by constructing a (partial) completeness
sentence exposing the non-validity of each constant combination, which neither
corresponds to a harmless positive ground atom of the weakened view nor induces
a DB-Interpretation satisfying a disjunction of the weakened view.
But if a confidentiality policy does not only consist of ground atoms, such a
completeness sentence might not capture all negative knowledge an adversary
is actually aware of. For example, consider an extended clustering inducing the
disjunction templates
• (∃X)R(b,X, e) ∨ (∃X)R(b,X, d) and
• (∃X)R(b, e,X) ∨ (∃X)R(c, e,X)
and further suppose that an original database instance r is given, which satisfies
the first of these disjunction templates, but not the second one. Then, in accor-
dance with the basic algorithmic ideas of Section 2.2.1, the weakened view on r
contains only the first of the above given disjunctions and the completeness sen-
tence of this weakened view correspondingly excludes each constant combination
satisfying one of the disjuncts (∃X)R(b,X, e) and (∃X)R(b,X, d) of the satisfied
disjunction template from being non-valid.
As an adversary is supposed to be aware of both the confidentiality policy as well
as of the algorithm used to construct the weakened view and as the construction of
an extended clustering does further not depend on the considered original database
instance, this adversary can simulate the construction of the extended clustering,
whose corresponding disjunction templates are given above. Additionally consid-
ering that the released weakened view does not contain the second disjunction
template (∃X)R(b, e,X) ∨ (∃X)R(c, e,X), the adversary can again employ his
knowledge about the weakening algorithm to reason that neither (∃X)R(b, e,X)
nor (∃X)R(c, e,X) is satisfied by the original database instance – as otherwise
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the corresponding disjunction template would have been added to the weakened
view as a disjunction.
So, although the adversary knows that each constant combination (b, e,) with 
being an arbitrary constant symbol of Dom is not valid according to the original
database instance, this knowledge is not reflected properly by the (partial) com-
pleteness sentence of the constructed weakened view. In particular, the adversary
knows that the constant combination (b, e, e) is not satisfied, but this knowledge
is not reflected by the completeness sentence as this sentence explicitly excludes
each constant combination satisfying (∃X)R(b,X, e) from being non-valid.
More generally, this problem of a (partial) completeness sentence not reflecting an
adversary’s negative knowledge properly arises, if
• an extended clustering contains one cluster, whose corresponding disjunction
Ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ Ψk is satisfied by a considered original database instance, and
another cluster, whose corresponding disjunction Ψ¯1∨ . . .∨ Ψ¯k¯ is not satisfied
by this instance and
• these disjunctions contain disjuncts Ψi and Ψ¯j such that there is a constant
combination over the database schema of the original instance, which satis-
fies both Ψi and Ψ¯j .
To mitigate this problem – and to hence take care that a weakened view reflects
all knowledge an adversary actually has – the (partial) completeness sentence of a
weakened view should be complemented by each negated disjunction ¬ [∨Ψ∈C Ψ ]
corresponding to a cluster C of the constructed extended clustering, which is not
satisfied by the original database instance.
These considerations extending the basic ideas of the simple weakening algorithm
introduced in Section 2.2.1 finally lead to the following construction of weakened
views. As also motivated in Section 2.2.1, such a weakened view should consist of
ordered sequences of sentences to suitably normalize these weakened views and to
thereby prevent an adversary from drawing harmful meta-inferences on the basis
of the syntactic appearance of weakened views.
Definition 3.7: Weakened View
Let r be a complete database instance over a database schema 〈R|AR| ∅ 〉.
Further, suppose that C∗r is the subset of those clusters of an extended clus-
tering C∗ of a cleaned confidentiality policy p̂sec such that Ir |=M ∨Ψ∈C Ψ
holds for each cluster C ∈ C∗r .
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Then, the weakened view weak (r, psec) on r consists of the following totally
ordered sequences of sentences of the first-order language L :
(i) Positive knowledge weak (r, psec)+: Each tuple c ∈ r, for which the non-
implication R(c) 6|=DB Ψ holds for each (possibly additional) potential
secret Ψ ∈ ⋃C∈C∗r C, is modeled as the ground atom R(c).
(ii) Disjunctive knowledge weak (r, psec)∨: For each cluster C ∈ C∗r the dis-
junction ∨Ψ∈C Ψ is constructed.
(iii) Negative knowledge weak (r, psec)−: For each cluster C ∈ (C∗ \ C∗r ) the
negated disjunction ¬ [∨Ψ∈C Ψ ] is constructed. Moreover, a (partial)
completeness sentence having a universally quantified variable Xj for
each attribute Aj ∈ AR is built. This sentence is supposed to contain a
disjunct (∧i∈{1,...,n} with ti∈Dom Xi ≡ ti ) for
• each ground atom R(t1, . . . , tn) of weak (r, psec)+ and
• each disjunct (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) occurring in weak (r, psec)∨
and finally contains ¬R(X1, . . . , Xn) as its last disjunct.
Under the supposition that there is a total order on the set of those (constant
and variable) symbols, which might appear as terms of sentences of a weakened
view, a total order on the sentences actually occurring within a weakened view
weak (r, psec) can for example be established as follows:
• the presentation of the weakened view starts with all ground atoms of the
positive knowledge weak (r, psec)+ and the sequence of these ground atoms
is sorted lexicographically according to the order on their constant symbols;
• then, all disjunctions of the disjunctive knowledge weak (r, psec)∨ follow such
that first within each of these disjunctions the sequence of its disjuncts is
sorted lexicographically according to the order on their terms and subse-
quently the sequence of all of these disjunctions is sorted lexicographically
according to the order on their terms;
• after that all negated disjunctions of the negative knowledge weak (r, psec)−
are presented and the sequence of (and within) these sentences is ordered
just as the disjunctions of weak (r, psec)∨;
• and finally, the (partial) completeness sentence of the negative knowledge
weak (r, psec)− is given and normalized as follows: first, within each of its
disjuncts of the form (∧i∈{1,...,n} with ti∈Dom Xi ≡ ti ) the sequence of the
conjuncts of the form Xi ≡ ti is sorted lexicographically according to the
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order on the variable symbols Xi and after that the sequence of these dis-
juncts is sorted lexicographically according to the order on their terms; then,
¬R(X1, . . . , Xn) is finally appended as the last disjunct.
A detailed example of such a construction of a weakened view is later given in
Figure 4.4, when discussing a concrete (availability-maximizing) instantiation of
the generic weakening algorithm in Chapter 4.
According to the above given construction of weakened views, the knowledge rep-
resented by a weakened view weak (r, psec) is completely true with respect to
the considered original database instance r, i.e., Ir |=M weak (r, psec): for each
ground atom R(c) of the positive knowledge weak (r, psec)+ the tuple c is actually
contained in the original instance r and hence Ir |=M weak (r, psec)+ is a direct
consequence. Moreover, each disjunction ∨Ψ∈C Ψ of the disjunctive knowledge
weak (r, psec)∨, which is constructed for a cluster C ∈ C∗r , contains at least one
disjunct satisfied by Ir – otherwise, the cluster C would not be in C∗r according to
its definition. This immediately results in Ir |=M weak (r, psec)∨.
Similarly, none of the disjuncts of each negated disjunction ¬ [∨Ψ∈C Ψ ] of the neg-
ative knowledge weak (r, psec)− is satisfied by Ir – otherwise, the corresponding
cluster C would be in the subset C∗r of those clusters, whose corresponding dis-
junction templates are satisfied by the original instance r and do hence not result
in negated disjunctions. And finally, for each constant combination c ∈ Domn, for
which ¬R(c) holds according to the completeness sentence of the negative knowl-
edge weak (r, psec)−, the tuple c is indeed invalid in r, as each valid tuple d ∈ r
with d = (d1, . . . , dn) either
• results in the ground atom R(d) ∈ weak (r, psec)+, if there is no potential
secret Ψ ∈ ⋃C∈C∗r C with R(d) |=DB Ψ or
• results in a disjunct (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) of weak (r, psec)∨, which is satisfied
by the DB-Interpretation Id induced by d, if there is a potential secret
Ψ ∈ ⋃C∈C∗r C with R(d) |=DB Ψ ,
and in both of these cases the completeness sentence contains either
• the disjunct (∧i∈{1,...,n}Xi ≡ di ) or
• the disjunct (∧i∈{1,...,n} with ti∈Dom Xi ≡ ti )
preventing that the last disjunct ¬R(X1, . . . , Xn) of the completeness sentence
must necessarily hold for the constant substitution, which the constant combina-
tion d = (d1, . . . , dn) induces for the universally quantified variables X1, . . . , Xn
of the (partial) completeness sentence. This results in Ir |=M weak (r, psec)−.
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Now that all basic operations are known, the overall generic algorithm generating
an inference-proof weakened view is presented. This algorithm is generic in the
sense that – beside the employed notion of admissible indistinguishabilities, which
is deliberately left open as argued in Section 3.1.3 – the construction of an extended
clustering is only defined in a purely declarative way in Definition 3.3. So, while the
definitions of all other basic subroutines of the algorithm induce straightforward
implementations, algorithms computing an extended clustering still need to be
designed on the operational level.
Algorithm 3.1: Inference-Proof Weakening (Generic)
Let r be a complete database instance over a database schema 〈R|AR| ∅ 〉, let
psec be a confidentiality policy of existentially quantified atoms and let k∗ ∈ N
with k∗ ≥ 2 be the minimum length each disjunction template should have.
Moreover, suppose that a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities is given,
which is well-defined with respect to psec and k∗ according to Definition 3.6.
Then, a weakened view weak (r, psec) on r is created as follows:
• Stage 1 (independent of r): Disjoint clustering of potential secrets
(i) Construct the cleaned set p̂sec based on psec (Def. 3.4)
(ii) Create an extended clustering C∗ of p̂sec obeying the given notion
of admissible indistinguishabilities and k∗ (Def. 3.3)
• Stage 2 (dependent on r): Creation of weakened view
(iii) Create the subset C∗r := {C ∈ C∗ | Ir |=M
∨
Ψ∈C Ψ } of (extended)
clusters containing a potential secret satisfied by Ir
(iv) Create the weakened view weak (r, psec) on r (Def. 3.7)
The inference-proofness of a weakened view weak (r, psec) returned by this algo-
rithm crucially relies on a strict isolation of the disjunctive knowledge given in
weak (r, psec)∨ – which aims at not revealing the real truth values of the disjuncts
of weak (r, psec)∨ to an adversary – from the definite knowledge an adversary can
gain about the original database instance. This isolation follows the goal that the
satisfaction or non-satisfaction of a disjunct of weak (r, psec)∨ can not be concluded
based on the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of a piece of definite knowledge the
adversary is aware of.
At first, for each ground atom R(c) of the positive knowledge weak (r, psec)+ the
non-implication R(c) 6|=DB Ψ holds for each (possibly additional) potential secret
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Ψ ∈ ⋃C∈C∗r C occurring in a disjunction of weak (r, psec)∨. As a direct consequence,
an (alternative) database instance satisfying R(c) does not necessarily need to
satisfy Ψ . Similarly, the (partial) completeness sentence of the negative knowledge
weak (r, psec)− contains the disjunct
(
∧
i∈{1,...,n} with ti∈Dom
Xi ≡ ti )
for each (possibly additional) potential secret Ψ = (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) of a dis-
junction of weak (r, psec)∨. Hence, an (alternative) database instance satisfy-
ing this completeness sentence can nonetheless satisfy Ψ , as the last disjunct
¬R(X1, . . . , Xn) of this completeness sentence does not need to be satisfied for
each constant substitution of the universally quantified variables X1, . . . , Xn in-
ducing a DB-Interpretation satisfying Ψ .
Even within an extended clustering C∗ there is no implication relationship between
each pair Ψ1, Ψ2 of different (possibly additional) potential secrets of C∗ as the set
of all of these clustered potential secrets is supposed to be cleaned. Hence, an
(alternative) database instance satisfying the clustered potential secret Ψ1 does
not necessarily need to satisfy the clustered potential secret Ψ2 and an (alterna-
tive) instance not satisfying Ψ1 might nonetheless satisfy Ψ2. As each potential
secret of the extended clustering C∗ is moreover contained in exactly one cluster
of C∗ – due to C∗ being a disjoint clustering – the satisfaction of a disjunction of
weak (r, psec)∨ and the non-satisfaction of a disjunction template, whose negation
is in weak (r, psec)−, do not influence each other.
To exemplify that this isolation within an extended clustering is of crucial impor-
tance, suppose that the clustering algorithm creates the cluster C1 = {Ψ1, Ψ2}.
Further, suppose that the corresponding disjunction template Ψ1 ∨Ψ2 is not satis-
fied by a considered original database instance r and hence leads to the construc-
tion of the corresponding negated disjunction ¬[Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2] providing the definite
knowledge that neither Ψ1 nor Ψ2 is satisfied by this original instance r. If the
clustering algorithm further created the cluster C2 = {Ψ3, Ψ4} with Ψ3 |=DB Ψ2
(possibly because of Ψ2 = Ψ3 due to a non-disjoint clustering), whose correspond-
ing disjunction template Ψ3 ∨ Ψ4 is satisfied by the considered original instance r,
the adversary would be able to reason that Ψ3 is not satisfied by this instance r
(cf. Lemma 3.1). As he moreover knows that the disjunction Ψ3 ∨ Ψ4 is satisfied
by r because of being in weak (r, psec)∨, he can infer that Ψ4 must be satisfied by
r, thereby violating the potential secret Ψ4 of the cluster C2.
Considering the isolation properties discussed above – whose purpose is to pre-
vent the flow of definite knowledge into disjunctive knowledge – each alternative
database instance, which
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• satisfies all ground atoms of the positive knowledge weak (r, psec)+,
• satisfies an arbitrary non-empty subset of disjuncts of each disjunction of
the disjunctive knowledge weak (r, psec)∨ without satisfying a disjunction
template, whose negated disjunction is in weak (r, psec)−, and
• does not satisfy any other knowledge
(and hence satisfies the completeness sentence of weak (r, psec)−),
is consistent with the weakened view weak (r, psec) and is therefore indistinguish-
able from the original instance r from an adversary’s point of view. If such an
alternative instance rΨ does further not satisfy a potential secret Ψ – by satis-
fying a corresponding non-empty subset of disjuncts of the disjunction template
containing Ψ , if this disjunction template is satisfied by the original instance –
this alternative instance rΨ also obeys this potential secret Ψ as required by the
definition of inference-proofness.
3.3 Inference-Proofness of the Generic Approach
Now that the generic algorithm is formalized, the inference-proofness of this algo-
rithm is formally verified. Similar to the proofs of other approaches to Controlled
Interaction Execution (cf. [13, 15, 27, 30]), this proof is basically achieved by
providing a generic method to construct alternative database instances, which are
both indistinguishable from a considered original database instance from an adver-
sary’s point of view and do not satisfy a particular potential secret of a considered
confidentiality policy. Such an alternative instance hence serves as a witness that
the considered potential secret does not necessarily need to be satisfied from an
adversary’s point of view.
As the set of all those (possibly additional) potential secrets, which occur as
disjuncts of disjunction templates, is supposed to be cleaned, the definition of
DB-Implication – or, more precisely, non-implication – guarantees that for each
disjunct of such a disjunction template there is an “exclusively satisfying” DB-
Interpretation. This DB-Interpretation consists of only one tuple and satisfies
this particular disjunct, but does not satisfy any other disjunct occurring in a
(possibly different) disjunction template. Hence, within the main proof an alter-
native database instance satisfying a particular subset of disjuncts of a weakened
view – without accidentally satisfying some other disjuncts not to be satisfied –
can be constructed by uniting the tuples of the corresponding “exclusively sat-
isfying” DB-Interpretations. For convenience, these “exclusively satisfying” DB-
Interpretations are supposed to be constructed by a so-called ground operator.
49
3 A Generic Weakening Approach
Definition 3.8: Ground Operator
Consider a cleaned and finite set Ŝ of existentially quantified atoms all con-
structed over a predicate symbol R of arity n and a sentence Ψ ∈ Ŝ. The
ground operator grnd (Ψ, Ŝ) deterministically returns a constant combination
c ∈ Domn such that the induced DB-Interpretation Ic with Ic(R) = {c}
(i) satisfies the existentially quantified atom Ψ , i.e., Ic |=M Ψ , and
(ii) does not satisfy any other existentially quantified atom Ψ¯ ∈ Ŝ \ {Ψ},
i.e., Ic 6|=M Ψ¯ for each Ψ¯ ∈ Ŝ \ {Ψ}.
As this ground operator will be used within a formal proof to show the inference-
proofness of the (generic) weakening algorithm, it is of importance to also give a
formal proof that this ground operator itself is well-defined.
Lemma 3.2: Well-Defined Ground Operator
Let Ŝ be a cleaned and finite set of existentially quantified atoms all con-
structed over a predicate symbol R of arity n. For each sentence Ψ ∈ Ŝ
the ground operator grnd (Ψ, Ŝ) is able to return a constant combination
c ∈ Domn as required by Definition 3.8.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary existentially quantified atom Ψ = (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn)
of the given set Ŝ. To construct the constant combination c = (c1, . . . , cn) to be
returned by grnd (Ψ, Ŝ), set ci := ti for each i with ti ∈ Dom. Moreover, for each
i with ti ∈X deterministically choose ci from the subset
Dom \ { t¯i | (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) ∈ Ŝ and t¯i ∈ Dom and 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
of constant symbols, i.e., the subset of constant symbols of Dom which is not
contained in the active domain of Ŝ. This construction is always possible as Dom
is supposed to be an infinite set of constant symbols while the set Ŝ is a finite set
of existentially quantified atoms each of which is of finite arity.3
Obviously, this construction of c guarantees that the induced DB-Interpretation
Ic with Ic(R) = {c} satisfies the existentially quantified atom Ψ , i.e., Ic |=M Ψ .
3 If the ground operator is applied to a cleaned confidentiality policy p̂sec and in practical
scenarios only a finite set Dom of constant symbols is available as argued in Section 3.1.3, a
well-defined notion of admissible indistinguishabilities guarantees the existence of at least one
“fresh” constant symbol not contained in the active domain of p̂sec according to Definition 3.6.
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To furthermore assure that Ic does not satisfy any other existentially quantified
atom of Ŝ \ {Ψ}, assume that there is such a sentence Ψ¯ = (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n)
different from Ψ in Ŝ \ {Ψ} with Ic |=M Ψ¯ . Then, for each i with ti ∈ Dom
either t¯i = ci = ti or t¯i ∈ Y holds and for each i with ti ∈ X the term t¯i must
be a variable of Y because of choosing ci from a subset of constant symbols not
containing any constant symbol occurring in a sentence of Ŝ. Hence, by applying
Lemma 2.1, the implication Ψ |=DB Ψ¯ holds in contradiction to the assumption
that Ŝ is a cleaned set. ♠
According to the semantics of potential secrets, a potential secret Ψ only needs to
be (actively) protected, if Ψ is satisfied by the original instance r considered. If
Ψ is instead not satisfied by r, this potential secret Ψ is already obeyed by r and
there is hence no need to prevent an adversary from knowing the real truth value
of this potential secret [8, 10, 11, 13]. Thus, in the following Theorem 3.1 the
existence of a certain number of different “secure” alternative instances protecting
a potential secret Ψ is only required, if Ψ is actually satisfied by r.
Note that this notion of inference-proofness, which guarantees the existence of a
certain number of different “secure” alternative instances for each satisfied policy
element, clearly strengthens the notion of inference-proofness used in prior work
on “Controlled Interaction Execution”, which guarantees the existence of only one
“secure” alternative instance for each policy element [8, 10, 11, 13, 15].
Theorem 3.1: Inference-Proofness of the Generic Approach
Let r be a complete database instance over a database schema 〈R|AR| ∅ 〉, let
psec be a confidentiality policy of existentially quantified atoms and let k∗ ∈ N
with k∗ ≥ 2 be the minimum length each disjunction template should have.
Moreover, suppose that a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities is given,
which is well-defined with respect to psec and k∗ according to Definition 3.6.
Algorithm 3.1 then creates a weakened view weak (r, psec) on the database
instance r, which is inference-proof in the sense that for each potential secret
Ψ ∈ psec with Ir |=M Ψ the existence of at least 2k∗−1 − 1 pairwise different
complete alternative instances rΨi (with 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k
∗−1 − 1) over schema
〈R|AR| ∅ 〉 is guaranteed. Each of these alternative instances rΨi
(i) obeys the potential secret Ψ , i.e., IrΨi 6|=M Ψ , and
(ii) the corresponding weakened view weak (rΨi , psec) is indistinguishable
from weak (r, psec), i.e., weak (rΨi , psec) = weak (r, psec).
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary potential secret Ψ˜ ∈ psec, which is satisfied by the
original database instance r, i.e., Ir |=M Ψ˜ . By construction of the cleaned confi-
dentiality policy p̂sec there is a (weakest) potential secret Ψˆ ∈ p̂sec such that the
implication Ψ˜ |=DB Ψˆ holds. Then, the potential secret Ψˆ is also satisfied by the
considered original instance r, i.e., Ir |=M Ψˆ , as a direct consequence of Ir |=M Ψ˜
and Ψ˜ |=DB Ψˆ . Moreover, suppose that Stage 1 of Algorithm 3.1 generated an
extended clustering C∗ according to Definition 3.3 consisting of pairwise disjoint
clusters each of which is of a minimum size of k∗. The existence of such an ex-
tended clustering is guaranteed according to Definition 3.6, as the given notion of
admissible indistinguishabilities is supposed to be well-defined. Further, assume
that Ψˆ is in the cluster Cˆ ∈ C∗.
Now, it is shown that at least 2k∗−1 − 1 pairwise different complete alternative
instances obeying the potential secret Ψˆ (and hence also Ψ˜ , as discussed later) can
be constructed based on the ground operator introduced in Definition 3.8. For
that purpose, consider the set
p̂sec∗ :=
⋃
C ∈C∗
C
of all (possibly additional) potential secrets occurring in a cluster of the extended
clustering C∗ as well as the subset
p̂sec+ := {Ψ ∈ p̂sec∗ | Ir |=M Ψ }
of those (possibly additional) potential secrets, which are satisfied by the original
instance r. Then, assuming that P (S) denominates the power set of a set S, for
each possible subset
Ci ∈ P (Cˆ \ {Ψˆ}) with Ci 6= ∅
a complete alternative instance rΨˆi protecting Ψˆ can be constructed by adding
(i) the tuple c for each ground atom R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec)+,
(ii) the tuple grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) for each
(possibly additional) potential secret Ψ ∈ (p̂sec+ \ Cˆ) and
(iii) the tuple grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) for each
(possibly additional) potential secret Ψ ∈ Ci
to this initially empty database instance rΨˆi . This construction instantiates the
ground operator only with valid arguments, as the set p̂sec∗ contains all non-
additional potential secrets of the cleaned and finite confidentiality policy p̂sec and
each of the finitely many additional potential secrets extending p̂sec such that the
union of all non-additional potential secrets and all additional potential secrets is
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again a cleaned (cf. Definition 3.5) and finite set of existentially quantified atoms.
Further, note that the sequence in which these tuples are added to rΨˆi is not of
importance, as the ground operator only depends on a potential secret Ψ ∈ p̂sec∗
and on the cleaned and finite set p̂sec∗ of all (possibly additional) potential secrets,
which remains unchanged during the construction of rΨˆi .
Two complete alternative instances rΨˆi and rΨˆj are different, if their corresponding
sets Ci and Cj in the form of non-empty subsets of Cˆ \{Ψˆ} are different, i.e., there
is – without loss of generality – a (possibly additional) potential secret Ψ ∈ Ci,
which is not in Cj . Then, rΨˆi contains the tuple grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) according to
construction rule (iii), but this tuple is not contained in rΨˆj . First of all, there is no
tuple c ∈ rΨˆj , which is added for a ground atom R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec)+ according
to construction rule (i) and which is equal to grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗), because the non-
implication R(c) 6|=DB Ψ holds: if Ψ is in a cluster of C∗r , this non-implication is
guaranteed by the construction of weak (r, psec)+ according to Definition 3.7; if Ψ
is not in a cluster of C∗r , the DB-Interpretation Ir induced by the original instance
r satisfies R(c) because of c ∈ r, but does not satisfy Ψ as a direct consequence
of the construction of C∗r , thereby establishing the non-implication.
Moreover, the considered tuple grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) of rΨˆi is not added to rΨˆj by the
remaining construction rules, either: the potential secret Ψ is neither – in case
of construction rule (ii) – contained in the set p̂sec+ \ Cˆ because of Ψ ∈ Ci ⊆ Cˆ
nor – in case of construction rule (iii) – in the set Cj because of the assumption
Ψ /∈ Cj and each other tuple grnd (Ψ¯ , p̂sec∗) with Ψ¯ 6= Ψ , which is added to rΨˆj
for a (possibly additional) potential secret of the set p̂sec+ \ Cˆ or the set Cj , is
not equal to grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) by the construction of the ground operator according
to Lemma 3.2. As hence each non-empty subset Ci ∈ P (Cˆ \ {Ψˆ}) induces an
alternative instance different from the alternative instances induced by all other
non-empty subsets Cj ∈ P (Cˆ\{Ψˆ}) with Ci 6= Cj and as the power set P (Cˆ\{Ψˆ})
contains a total number of 2|Cˆ\{Ψˆ}| − 1 different non-empty subsets of potential
secrets of Cˆ \ {Ψˆ}, there is also a minimum number of
2|Cˆ\{Ψˆ}| − 1 = 2|Cˆ|−1 − 1 ≥ 2k∗−1 − 1
different complete alternative instances. Note that the existence of at least one
alternative instance is always guaranteed due to k∗ ≥ 2.
In the following consider an arbitrary complete alternative instance rΨˆi constructed
on the basis of a corresponding non-empty subset Ci ∈ P (Cˆ \ {Ψˆ}). By the con-
struction of rΨˆi , the induced DB-Interpretation IrΨˆi does not satisfy the considered
53
3 A Generic Weakening Approach
potential secret Ψˆ , i.e., there is no single tuple c ∈ rΨˆi inducing a DB-Interpretation
satisfying Ψˆ . First of all, each tuple c ∈ rΨˆi stemming from a ground atom
R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec)+ according to construction rule (i) does not induce such
a DB-Interpretation, as Ψˆ is supposed to be in a cluster of C∗r due to Ir |=M Ψˆ and
as hence the non-implication R(c) 6|=DB Ψˆ holds by construction of weak (r, psec)+
according to Definition 3.7.
Moreover, each tuple grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) ∈ rΨˆi constructed for a (possibly additional)
potential secret Ψ ∈ p̂sec∗ by the remaining construction rules does not induce such
a DB-Interpretation satisfying Ψˆ , either: the tuple grnd (Ψˆ , p̂sec∗) is not added
to rΨˆi , as the potential secret Ψˆ is neither – in case of construction rule (ii) –
contained in p̂sec+ \ Cˆ because of Ψˆ ∈ Cˆ nor – in case of construction rule (iii) – in
the subset Ci ∈ P (Cˆ \{Ψˆ}) and each other tuple grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) added to rΨˆi for a
(possibly additional) potential secret Ψ ∈ p̂sec∗ with Ψ 6= Ψˆ does not induce a DB-
Interpretation satisfying Ψˆ by construction of the ground operator according to
Lemma 3.2. So, by I
rΨˆi
6|=M Ψˆ and Ψ˜ |=DB Ψˆ and by further applying Lemma 3.1,
the constructed alternative instance rΨˆi does not satisfy the potential secret Ψ˜ to
be protected, i.e., I
rΨˆi
6|=M Ψ˜ .
As the potential secret Ψˆ of the cluster Cˆ ∈ C∗ is supposed to be satisfied by the
original instance r, the disjunction template ∨Ψ∈Cˆ Ψ corresponding to this cluster
Cˆ is satisfied by r, too. This disjunction template ∨Ψ∈Cˆ Ψ is also satisfied by
the considered complete alternative instance rΨˆi , i.e., IrΨˆi |=M
∨
Ψ∈Cˆ Ψ , as Ci is
supposed to be a non-empty subset of Cˆ \ {Ψˆ} and for each (possibly additional)
potential secret Ψ ∈ Ci the tuple grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) is added to rΨˆi by construction
rule (iii). This guarantees that the alternative instance rΨˆi satisfies each potential
secret Ψ ∈ Ci ⊆ Cˆ – and hence also the disjunction template ∨Ψ∈Cˆ Ψ – due to the
construction of the ground operator according to Lemma 3.2.
For each other cluster C ∈ C∗ with C 6= Cˆ a (possibly additional) potential secret
Ψ ∈ C is satisfied by the considered alternative instance rΨˆi if and only if it
is satisfied by the given original instance r. If such a potential secret Ψ ∈ C
is satisfied by the original instance r, i.e., Ir |=M Ψ , this potential secret Ψ is
contained in the subset p̂sec+ of those (possibly additional) potential secrets of
p̂sec∗, which are satisfied by r. As the clusters C and Cˆ of the extended clustering
C∗ are supposed to be disjoint, the considered potential secret Ψ of C can not
be in the cluster Cˆ and is hence contained in the set p̂sec+ \ Cˆ. Consequently,
the tuple grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) is added to the alternative instance rΨˆi by construction
rule (ii) and the considered potential secret Ψ is thus satisfied by rΨˆi due to the
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construction of the ground operator according to Lemma 3.2.
If a (possibly additional) potential secret Ψ of the considered cluster C is not
satisfied by the original instance r, i.e., Ir 6|=M Ψ , the alternative instance rΨˆi does
not satisfy this potential secret Ψ , either, as there is no single tuple c ∈ rΨˆi inducing
a DB-Interpretation satisfying Ψ . Each tuple c ∈ rΨˆi stemming from a ground atom
R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec)+ according to construction rule (i) does not induce such a
DB-Interpretation: otherwise, the original instance r, which satisfies R(c) because
of c ∈ r, would also satisfy the considered potential secret Ψ in contradiction to
the assumption. Moreover, each tuple grnd (Ψ¯ , p̂sec∗) ∈ rΨˆi constructed for a
(possibly additional) potential secret Ψ¯ ∈ p̂sec∗ by the remaining construction
rules (ii) and (iii) does not induce such a DB-Interpretation, either: the tuple
grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) is not added to rΨˆi , as the construction of p̂sec+ guarantees Ψ /∈
p̂sec+ due to the assumption Ir 6|=M Ψ and by further ensuring Ψ /∈ Ci due to the
disjoint clustering. Each other tuple grnd (Ψ¯ , p̂sec∗) added to rΨˆi with Ψ¯ 6= Ψ does
not induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying Ψ by the construction of the ground
operator according to Lemma 3.2.
Summarizing the results above, each (possibly additional) potential secret Ψ of a
cluster C ∈ C∗ with C 6= Cˆ is satisfied by the considered alternative instance rΨˆi , if
and only if it is satisfied by the given original instance r. The disjunction template∨
Ψ∈Cˆ Ψ corresponding to the cluster Cˆ, which is supposed to contain the potential
secret Ψˆ , is moreover satisfied by both the original instance r and the alternative
instance rΨˆi . Hence, for each cluster C ∈ C∗ (including C = Cˆ) the corresponding
disjunction template ∨Ψ∈C Ψ is satisfied by the considered alternative instance
rΨˆi , if and only if it is satisfied by original instance r. This immediately implies
C∗
rΨˆi
= C∗r and hence also weak (rΨˆi , psec)∨ = weak (r, psec)∨.
For each ground atom R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec)+ the tuple c is contained in rΨˆi due
to construction rule (i) and – by the construction of weak (r, psec)+ according
to Definition 3.7 – the non-implication R(c) 6|=DB Ψ is guaranteed to hold for
each (possibly additional) potential secret Ψ of a cluster of C∗r . Again consid-
ering C∗
rΨˆi
= C∗r , this non-implication R(c) 6|=DB Ψ also holds for each (possibly
additional) potential secret Ψ of a cluster of C∗
rΨˆi
and hence this tuple c of the
alternative instance rΨˆi is also contained in weak (rΨˆi , psec)+ according to Defini-
tion 3.7. For each other tuple grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) added to rΨˆi for a (possibly addi-
tional) potential secret Ψ ∈ p̂sec∗ by the remaining construction rules (ii) and (iii),
the construction of the ground operator guarantees the validity of the implication
R(grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗)) |=DB Ψ and hence – additionally considering that Ψ is in a
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cluster of C∗
rΨˆi
due to grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) ∈ rΨˆi – the tuple grnd (Ψ, p̂sec∗) is not qual-
ified for being in weak (rΨˆi , psec)+ according to Definition 3.7. This results in
weak (rΨˆi , psec)+ = weak (r, psec)+.
Reconsidering the construction of the negative knowledge of a weakened view
according to Definition 3.7 – which consists of a sequence of negated disjunctions
and a (partial) completeness sentence – the validity of both
• weak (rΨˆi , psec)+ = weak (r, psec)+ and
• weak (rΨˆi , psec)∨ = weak (r, psec)∨ as well as
• C∗ \ C∗
rΨˆi
= C∗ \ C∗r (due to C∗rΨˆi = C
∗
r )
immediately leads to weak (rΨˆi , psec)− = weak (r, psec)−. Hence, indistinguisha-
bility is achieved because of weak (rΨˆi , psec) = weak (r, psec), provided that the
sentences of both of these sequences are arranged in the same order. ♠
As mentioned above, Theorem 3.1 only requires the existence of a certain minimum
number of different “secure” alternative instances for potential secrets, which are
satisfied by the original instance r. But if instead a potential secret Ψ ∈ psec
with Ir 6|=M Ψ is considered, the existence of at least one complete alternative
instance rΨ protecting Ψ can nonetheless be guaranteed: in this case the given
original instance r can serve as an alternative instance rΨ , i.e., rΨ := r. This
construction of rΨ directly implies IrΨ 6|=M Ψ and consequently the constructed
alternative instance rΨ obeys Ψ . Furthermore, the property of indistinguishability,
i.e., weak (rΨ , psec) = weak (r, psec), is a direct consequence of rΨ = r.
To exemplify that it is indeed not always possible to construct more than one
alternative instance protecting a particular potential secret not satisfied by a given
original instance, consider
• the original instance r = ∅ and
• the (cleaned) policy psec = {R(c1), R(c2) } with c1, c2 ∈ Domn
and suppose that Stage 1 of Algorithm 3.1 creates the extended clustering C∗
consisting of the single cluster
C = {R(c1), R(c2) } .
Then, Stage 2 of Algorithm 3.1 creates a weakened view weak (r, psec) containing
the sequences
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• weak (r, psec)+ = ∅ and
• weak (r, psec)∨ = ∅ .
Now, suppose that the potential secret Ψ := R(c1) of psec is considered to be
protected. As described above, it is possible to construct the alternative in-
stance rΨ1 := r = ∅, which obeys Ψ and which is indistinguishable from r as
well. To create an alternative instance rΨ2 also obeying Ψ = R(c1) but being dif-
ferent from rΨ1 = ∅, this instance rΨ2 must contain at least one tuple c ∈ Domn
with c 6= c1. If c = c2, the corresponding weakened view weak (rΨ2 , psec) con-
tains the disjunction R(c1) ∨ R(c2) because of IrΨ2 |=M R(c2) and hence alsoIrΨ2 |=M
∨
Ψ∈C Ψ . Thus, the property of indistinguishability is violated due to
weak (rΨ2 , psec)∨ 6= weak (r, psec)∨. Otherwise, if c 6= c2, the corresponding weak-
ened view weak (rΨ2 , psec) contains the ground atom R(c) because R(c) does not
imply any of the policy elements of psec and thus the property of indistinguisha-
bility is violated due to weak (rΨ2 , psec)+ 6= weak (r, psec)+.
3.4 Complexity of the Generic Weakening Approach
As already outlined in Section 1.3.2, the construction of weakened views is related
to the well-known approaches of k-anonymization [47, 79, 86]. These approaches
aim at preventing the re-identification of individuals on the basis of so-called quasi-
identifiers, which describe some of the individuals’ properties, by generalizing the
values of these quasi-identifiers to such an extent that each individual can not be
distinguished from (at least) k − 1 other individuals on the basis of these quasi-
identifiers. Considering only maximum generalizations of values in the form of
complete suppressions and aiming at the construction of k-anonymized database
instances with only a minimum number of suppressed values, this (optimization)
problem is known to be NP-hard according to [3, 39] when choosing k ≥ 3. For
k = 2 this problem is instead known to be solvable in polynomial time.
Similarly, the developed generic weakening approach aims at the construction of
disjunctions of potential secrets and such a disjunction of length k does not re-
veal which (subset) of its disjuncts is satisfied by a considered original database
instance. An adversary can hence not distinguish, whether a certain potential se-
cret of this disjunction or one of the k−1 other potential secrets of this disjunction
is satisfied by the original instance. Moreover, in both of these approaches gener-
alizations can not be introduced arbitrarily: k-anonymization requires that these
generalizations achieve indistinguishability within subgroups of individuals violat-
ing the required indistinguishability property and the generic weakening approach
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requires each disjunction template to be admissible according to some notion of
admissible indistinguishabilities.
These similarities between k-anonymization and the generic weakening approach –
in combination with the above mentioned results about the complexity of k-
anonymization – suggest that the deterministic computation of weakened views
with disjunctions of a minimum length of 3 (always guaranteeing more than one
alternative instance) is in general not possible in polynomial time, as long as
NP 6= P is supposed to hold [48].
In the following, a formal analysis of the complexity of the generic weakening al-
gorithm is provided. For that purpose, its subroutine for computing an extended
clustering is considered under the commonly used optimization goal that only a
minimum number of additional potential secrets – each of which introduces addi-
tional knowledge to be kept confidential and hence reduces availability – should
be employed for the construction of an extended clustering (cf. Section 3.1.1).
As the complexity class NP contains only decision problems [48, 65, 90], a decision
variant of the extended clustering problem under the above mentioned optimiza-
tion goal is now developed to show that this decision variant is NP-complete. To
capture the optimization goal of minimizing the employed number of additional
potential secrets within this decision variant, a valid extended clustering is only
accepted by the decision variant of the extended clustering problem, if it – similar
to a decision variant for the well-known “Traveling Salesman”-problem (cf. [65]) –
does not exceed a certain upper bound of costs.
Definition 3.9: Decision Variant of Extended Clustering
Let psec be a confidentiality policy and suppose that a notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities is given. Further, suppose that k∗ ∈ N with k∗ ≥ 2 is
the minimum size each (extended) cluster should have and let c ∈ N0 be the
maximum number of additional potential secrets, which are allowed to be in
an extended clustering.
Then, the policy psec, the given notion of admissible indistinguishabilities
and the values k∗ and c form a valid input for the decision variant of the
extended clustering problem, if
(i) there is an extended clustering C∗ of the confidentiality policy psec obey-
ing the given notion of admissible indistinguishabilities and k∗ according
to Definition 3.3 such that
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(ii) this extended clustering C∗ contains at most c additional potential se-
crets not stemming from psec, i.e.,∑
C∈C∗
|C \ psec | ≤ c .
Otherwise, the policy psec, the given notion of admissible indistinguishabili-
ties and the values k∗ and c form a non-valid input for this decision problem.
As usual, the NP-completeness of this decision variant of the extended clustering
problem is proved by showing that this decision problem is in NP – i.e., checking
the validity of an input instance must be possible in polynomial time in the size of
this input instance – and by reducing another “reference” decision problem, which
is already known to be NP-complete, to this decision variant of the extended
clustering problem [65, 90]. The goal of this reduction is to prove that each
(original) input instance for the reference decision problem can be transformed in
polynomial time in the size of this (original) input instance into a (transformed)
input instance for the decision variant of the extended clustering problem such
that the original input is valid for the reference decision problem, if and only if
the transformed input is valid for the decision variant of the extended clustering
problem. Then, it is shown that the decision variant of the extended clustering
problem is generally not easier to solve than the NP-complete reference problem.
In the remainder of this complexity analysis of the decision variant of the extended
clustering problem, the NP-complete “Exact Cover by 3-Sets”-problem [58] serves
as such a reference decision problem.
Definition 3.10: Exact Cover by 3-Sets
Let X be a set of elements with |X | = 3p for an arbitrary p ∈ N \ {0} and let
S = {S1, . . . , Sm} be a collection of 3-element subsets of X , i.e., Si ⊆ X with
|Si| = 3 for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
The sets X and S form a valid input for the “Exact Cover by 3-Sets”-problem,
if there is an exact cover, i.e., there is a subcollection S ′ ⊆ S such that
(i) for each element x ∈ X the subcollection S ′ contains a subset Sj ∈ S ′
with x ∈ Sj and
(ii) Si ∩ Sj = ∅ holds for all pairs of different subsets Si, Sj ∈ S ′ with i 6= j.
Otherwise, the sets X and S form a non-valid input for this decision problem.
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In the following, the proof that the decision variant of the extended clustering prob-
lem is NP-complete is established under the assumption that the admissibility of
a cluster according to a considered notion of admissible indistinguishabilities can
be decided efficiently in polynomial time. Otherwise, this decision variant can not
be solved efficiently anyway because of instantiating it with an input in the form
of a non-efficient subroutine. Similarly, it is assumed that the requirements addi-
tional potential secrets have to satisfy according to condition (v) of Definition 3.3
can be checked efficiently in polynomial time, as this requirement is (deliberately)
left generic and can hence be seen as an input-like subroutine instantiating the
extended clustering problem.
Theorem 3.2: Complexity of Extended Clustering
Consider a decision variant of the extended clustering problem such that
• the admissibility of a cluster according to a considered notion of admis-
sible indistinguishabilities can be decided in polynomial time in the size
of the other inputs psec and k∗ and
• the validity of the requirements additional potential secrets have to
satisfy according to condition (v) of Definition 3.3 can be checked in
polynomial time in the size of the inputs psec and k∗.
This decision variant of the extended clustering problem is NP-complete, i.e.,
(i) this decision problem is in NP and
(ii) an arbitrary input for the NP-complete “Exact Cover by 3-Sets”-problem
can be transformed into an input for the considered decision variant of
the extended clustering problem in polynomial time in the size of the
input for the “Exact Cover by 3-Sets”-problem such that
(iii) this transformed input is valid for the decision variant of the extended
clustering problem, if and only if the (original) input is valid for the
“Exact Cover by 3-Sets”-problem.
Proof. It is easy to verify that the decision variant of the extended clustering
problem is in NP. Reconsidering the assumptions that
• the admissibility of a cluster according to a considered notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities can be decided in polynomial time in the size of the
other inputs psec and k∗ and
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• the validity of the requirements additional potential secrets have to satisfy
according to condition (v) of Definition 3.3 can be checked in polynomial
time in the size of the inputs psec and k∗,
it can obviously be decided in polynomial time in the size of the remaining inputs
psec and k∗, whether an extended clustering C∗ complies with the requirements
given in Definition 3.3.
Moreover, counting the number of additional potential secrets occurring within an
extended clustering C∗ and comparing this result with the upper bound c is also
possible in polynomial time in the size of the inputs psec, k∗ and c, as the number of
clusters of an extended clustering is limited to |psec| because of the requirement
that each extended cluster must contain at least one non-additional potential
secret. Further – in case that (unnecessarily) huge clusters are constructed with
the help of additional potential – the counting of additional potential secrets can
be aborted as soon as the upper bound of c is exceeded.
Now, consider an input for the “Exact Cover by 3-Sets”-problem consisting of
an arbitrary set X of elements with |X | = 3p for an arbitrary p ∈ N \ {0} and
an arbitrary collection S = {S1, . . . , Sm} of 3-element subsets of X . Under the
further supposition that there is an injective function δ mapping each element of
X to a potential secret in the form of a ground atom, the considered input of
the “Exact Cover by 3-Sets”-problem can be transformed into an input for the
decision variant of the extended clustering problem as follows:
• psec := { δ(x) | x ∈ X } is the confidentiality policy,
• the notion of admissible indistinguishabilities is constructed such that it
induces the set
{ {δ(x1), δ(x2), δ(x3)} | {x1, x2, x3} ∈ S }
of admissible clusters for the (non-additional) potential secrets of psec and
further allows that each potential secret of psec can be grouped together
with arbitrary additional potential secrets not occurring in psec,
• k∗ := 3 is the minimum size each (extended) cluster should have,
• c := 0 is the maximum number of additional potential secrets and
• no further requirements are set up for the construction of additional potential
secrets, i.e., condition (v) of Definition 3.3 is supposed to be always satisfied.
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Note that such an injective function δ can always be constructed, as the set X is
supposed to contain only a finite number of elements, while the infinite domain
Dom allows for the construction of an infinite number of potential secrets in the
form of ground atoms.
Moreover, the considered notion of admissible indistinguishabilities can be con-
structed in polynomial time in the size of X : the policy psec is of the same
cardinality as X and the set of admissible clusters induced for psec by this notion
of admissible indistinguishabilities is of the same cardinality as S. As this set S
is supposed to contain 3-element subsets of X , the number of induced admissible
clusters is hence limited to(
|X |
3
)
= |X |!3! · (|X | − 3)! =
|X | · (|X | − 1) · (|X | − 2)
6 < |X |
3
and this notion of admissible indistinguishabilities can accordingly be constructed
in polynomial time in the size of X by exhaustively listing all admissible clusters
over psec. Considering also the construction of the remaining inputs psec, k∗ and
c for the decision variant of the extended clustering problem, this transformation
of the input for the “Exact Cover by 3-Sets”-problem obviously takes only time
polynomial in the size of X and the size of S.
In the remainder of this proof it is shown that X and S form a valid input for
the “Exact Cover by 3-Sets”-problem, if and only if the transformed inputs in
the form of the policy psec, the notion of admissible indistinguishabilities and
the values k∗ and c form a valid input for the decision variant of the extended
clustering problem.
To prove the if-part of the equivalence, suppose that X and S form a valid input
for the “Exact Cover by 3-Sets”-problem. Hence, there is a subcollection S ′ ⊆ S
such that each element x ∈ X is in exactly one set of the subcollection S ′. Now,
construct the extended clustering C∗ by setting
C∗ := { {δ(x1), δ(x2), δ(x3)} | {x1, x2, x3} ∈ S ′ } .
Obviously, each potential secret δ(x) ∈ psec occurs in exactly one cluster of C∗
because of x occurring in exactly one 3-element subset of the subcollection S ′ and
because of the injective function δ guaranteeing that different elements x1, x2 ∈ X
are mapped to different potential secrets δ(x1), δ(x2) ∈ psec. As each cluster
{δ(x1), δ(x2), δ(x3)} ∈ C∗ is of size k∗ = 3 and further admissible according to
the construction of the notion of admissible indistinguishabilities, the constructed
C∗ is an extended clustering of psec obeying the considered notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities and k∗ according to Definition 3.3.
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Moreover, this extended clustering does not contain any additional potential se-
crets not stemming from psec and accordingly the number of additional potential
secrets occurring in C∗ is ∑
C∈C∗
|C \ psec | = 0 .
So, the transformed inputs in the form of the policy psec, the notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities and the values k∗ and c form a valid input for the decision
variant of the extended clustering problem.
To next prove the only-if-part of the equivalence, suppose that the transformed
inputs in the form of the policy psec, the notion of admissible indistinguishabil-
ities and the values k∗ and c form a valid input for the decision variant of the
extended clustering problem. Consequently, there is an extended clustering C∗ of
psec obeying the considered notion of admissible indistinguishabilities and k∗ such
that further ∑
C∈C∗
|C \ psec | ≤ 0
holds, i.e., this extended clustering C∗ does not contain any additional potential
secret not stemming from psec.
Each cluster C ∈ C∗ consisting only of original policy elements must be completely
contained in an admissible cluster induced by the considered notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities. As each of these admissible clusters is of cardinality 3, each
cluster C ∈ C∗ has a maximum cardinality of 3. Further considering that each
cluster of C∗ must have a minimum cardinality of k∗ := 3, each cluster C ∈ C∗ has
a cardinality of exactly 3. Hence, an exact cover in the form of a subcollection
S ′ ⊆ S can be constructed as
S ′ := { {δ−1(Ψ1), δ−1(Ψ2), δ−1(Ψ3)} | {Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3} ∈ C∗ } .
By considering that the injective function δ guarantees that different potential
secrets Ψ1, Ψ2 ∈ psec have different preimages δ−1(Ψ1), δ−1(Ψ2) ∈ X and by further
considering that each potential secret Ψ of psec must occur in exactly one of the
pairwise disjoint clusters of the extended clustering C∗ according to Definition 3.3,
it is guaranteed that each element δ−1(Ψ) ∈ X is in a subset Sj ∈ S ′ and that all
of these subsets contained in S ′ are pairwise disjoint. Hence, the sets X and S
form a valid input for the “Exact Cover by 3-Sets”-problem. ♠
Now, it is proved that the decision variant of the extended clustering problem is
NP-complete and as a consequence there is no deterministic algorithm solving this
decision problem efficiently (in polynomial time in the size of its inputs) as long as
NP 6= P is supposed to hold. As an optimization problem is generally not easier
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to solve than its corresponding decision variant [90], there is also no deterministic
and efficient algorithm solving the above mentioned optimization variant of the
extended clustering problem under the NP 6= P hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 4
An Availability-Maximizing Instantiation
Although the generic weakening algorithm developed in Chapter 3 specifies the
computation of inference-proof weakened views on original database instances,
this algorithm crucially relies on a so-called extended clustering of the potential
secrets of a given confidentiality policy. But until now, for this extended clustering
only a purely declarative definition is given, which does not induce a straightfor-
ward implementation on the operational level. Similarly, to keep this algorithm
adaptable for different application scenarios, well-defined notions of admissible
indistinguishabilities, which are needed to induce sets of admissible clusters, are
only specified in a purely abstract way by giving requirements such a well-defined
notion of admissible indistinguishabilities should meet.
In the following a concrete instantiation of the developed generic weakening al-
gorithm is given on the operational level, thereby focusing on the construction
of extended clusterings with clusters of size 2. This leads to a both (globally)
availability-maximizing and computationally efficient instantiation of the weaken-
ing algorithm. Moreover, an example of a provably well-defined notion of admis-
sible indistinguishabilities is introduced, which also follows the goal of (locally)
maximizing availability and essentially implements the idea of protecting knowl-
edge by generalizing certain constant values of some database tuples to wider sets
of possible constant values.
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4.1 An Efficient and Availability-Maximizing Clustering
As shown in Section 3.4, the construction of an extended clustering with only a
minimum number of additional potential secrets and with clusters of a minimum
size of k∗ ≥ 3 is NP-hard and as a direct consequence there is no deterministic
algorithm solving this clustering problem efficiently as long as NP 6= P is supposed
to hold. To nonetheless design an efficient instantiation of the generic weakening
algorithm, which is applicable even for large confidentiality policies, the clustering
algorithm developed in the following focuses on the construction of an extended
clustering with clusters of size 2.
According to the generic weakening algorithm, such an extended clustering imme-
diately induces a set of disjunctions of length 2, which are the shortest possible
non-trivial disjunctions and guarantee the existence of only one secure alternative
instance for each element of the confidentiality policy. Hence, this instantiation
of the generic weakening algorithm meets the minimum requirements to achieve
inference-proofness in the sense of Theorem 3.1 and in turn maximizes availability
with respect to the knowledge an adversary can gain about the original database
instance without compromising the confidentiality policy.
4.1.1 Construction of Maximum Clusterings
Under the supposition that solely clusters of size 2 are to be constructed, it seems
reasonable to further assume that each admissible cluster induced by a notion of
admissible indistinguishabilities is also of size 2. Even if some of these admissible
clusters are larger, each of these larger admissible clusters can be substituted
by the collection of all of its 2-element subsets without affecting the resulting
clustering. As an admissible cluster of size k > 2 has a total number of(
k
2
)
= k!2! · (k − 2)! =
k · (k − 1)
2 < k
2
2-element subsets, this substitution of too large admissible clusters increases the
total number of admissible clusters to be finally handled by the clustering algo-
rithm only polynomially.
Obviously, an admissible cluster of size 2 corresponds to a binary relation. Hence,
the set of all admissible clusters induced by a given notion of admissible indistin-
guishabilities can be represented by an undirected graph, which is also referred to
as an indistinguishability graph.
66
4.1 An Efficient and Availability-Maximizing Clustering
R(a, a, a) R(a, b, a)
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(∃X)R(c, e,X)
Figure 4.1: Indistinguishability graph with (bold) maximum matching
Definition 4.1: Indistinguishability Graph
Let p̂sec be a cleaned confidentiality policy and further suppose that Ca is
a set of admissible clusters of size 2 over p̂sec, which is induced by a given
notion of admissible indistinguishabilities.
The indistinguishability graph corresponding to the set Ca of admissible clus-
ters is an undirected graph G = (V,E) such that
(i) V := p̂sec is the set of vertices of G and
(ii) each (unordered) pair {Ψ1, Ψ2} with Ψ1, Ψ2 ∈ V and Ψ1 6= Ψ2 constitutes
an undirected edge of E, provided that {Ψ1, Ψ2} is in the set Ca of all
admissible clusters.
An example of an indistinguishability graph for a cleaned confidentiality policy
p̂sec is given in Figure 4.1. Each potential secret of this policy p̂sec is modeled
as a vertex of the given graph and each admissible cluster of size 2 corresponds
to an edge connecting both of the (vertices corresponding to the) policy elements
contained in this admissible cluster. Thereby, each of the given admissible clusters
is induced by a concrete example of a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities
called “interchangeability”, which is later introduced in Section 4.2.1.
Still focusing on the goal to construct an extended clustering – containing only a
minimum number of additional potential secrets, thereby minimizing the knowl-
edge to be distorted additionally – based on a given set of admissible clusters of
size 2, the clustering algorithm to be developed should select a maximum subset
of admissible clusters such that all of these selected clusters are pairwise disjoint.
Since each of the cleaned policy elements, which is not contained in any of the
selected admissible clusters, trivially induces a (too small) singleton cluster, the
set of all selected clusters of size 2 and all singleton clusters obviously is a (not
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necessarily extended) clustering according to Definition 3.2, which contains only
a minimum number of (too small) singleton clusters.
Considering an indistinguishability graph as introduced above, such a maximum
subset of selected pairwise (vertex-)disjoint admissible clusters of size 2 in the form
of edges of this graph is a maximum matching on this graph. Such a maximum
matching on a general, i.e., not necessarily bipartite, graph G = (V,E) can be
computed efficiently – in time O(
√|V |·|E|) as demonstrated in [73, 89] – with well-
known maximum matching algorithms and is defined as follows [50, 67, 77, 80].
Definition 4.2: Maximum Matching
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected (not necessarily bipartite) graph without
loops, i.e., v1 6= v2 holds for each edge {v1, v2} ∈ E.
A subset M ⊆ E of edges of the graph G is a matching on G, if
{v1, v2} ∩ {v¯1, v¯2} = ∅
holds for each pair of different matching edges {v1, v2}, {v¯1, v¯2} ∈M .
A matching M on the considered graph G is moreover
• maximum with respect to its cardinality, if |M ′| ≤ |M | holds for each
possible matching M ′ on the graph G, and further
• perfect, if each vertex v ∈ V is covered by the considered matching M ,
i.e., there is a matching edge {v1, v2} ∈M with v ∈ {v1, v2}.
Reconsidering the example given in Figure 4.1, the subset of bold edges of the
indistinguishability graph constitutes a matching. Although this matching is ob-
viously maximum, it is not perfect as neither of the vertices (∃X)R(b,X, e) and
(∃X)R(a, e,X) is an element of a matching edge. Considering only the connected
component of this graph, whose vertices correspond to ground atoms of the given
confidentiality policy, this connected component induces a subgraph on which the
given maximum matching is even perfect.
4.1.2 Extending Maximum Clusterings
This insight that a perfect matching covering each of the cleaned policy elements
can not be found on each indistinguishability graph immediately complies with the
insight gained in Section 3.1.1 that – dependent on the set of admissible clusters
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induced by a considered notion of admissible indistinguishabilities – it is not always
possible to find a valid (non-extended) clustering covering each policy element and
consisting only of non-singleton clusters. Instead, it may be necessary to artificially
introduce additional potential secrets providing a basis for the construction of an
extended clustering of only non-singleton clusters.
Correspondingly, an obvious idea is to create an extended clustering on the basis
of a computed maximum matching M by simply pairing each potential secret
uncovered by the matchingM with a newly constructed additional potential secret.
Again considering that a maximummatching already pairs as many elements of the
considered (cleaned) confidentiality policy as possible, the number of additional
potential secrets – artificially introducing knowledge to be additionally distorted –
is minimized and hence availability is correspondingly maximized.
This pairing of uncovered policy elements with additional potential secrets is re-
ferred to as a matching extension, which is defined as follows.
Definition 4.3: Matching Extension
Let p̂sec be a cleaned confidentiality policy and suppose that M is a maxi-
mum matching on the indistinguishability graph corresponding to the set of
admissible clusters over p̂sec, which is induced by a given notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities.
A matching extension M∗ of the maximum matching M and the policy p̂sec
under the given notion of admissible indistinguishabilities consists of
(i) each matching edge of M , i.e., M ⊆M∗, and
(ii) a cluster {Ψ, ΨA} ∈M∗ for each Ψ ∈ p̂sec not covered by M such that
• ΨA is an additional potential secret not occurring in p̂sec and
• M∗ is an extended clustering of p̂sec with clusters of size 2 accord-
ing to Definition 3.3, which obeys the given notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities.
Although such a matching extension M∗ is always an extended clustering, it re-
stricts the construction of an extended clustering in the sense that this clustering
must contain all clusters selected by the particular maximum matching – chosen
from the set of possibly several maximum matchings on the corresponding indis-
tinguishability graph – on which this matching extension is based. Hence, such a
matching extension can only be constructed, if an additional potential secret ΨA
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Figure 4.2: Too weak well-defined notion of admissible indistinguishabilities
can be constructed for each potential secret Ψ uncovered by the given maximum
matching such that the resulting cluster {Ψ, ΨA} is admissible according to the
given notion of admissible indistinguishabilities.
But even if a considered notion of admissible indistinguishabilities is supposed to
be well-defined for clusters of size 2 in the sense of Definition 3.6, this require-
ment may be violated as exemplified in Figure 4.2. Under the supposition that
the set of admissible clusters corresponding to the indistinguishability graph of
Figure 4.2(a) is induced by this considered notion of admissible indistinguishabil-
ities, Definition 3.6 guarantees that there is at least one extended clustering with
clusters of size 2. Now, assume that solely the existence of the extended clustering
given in Figure 4.2(b) – pairing the policy element Ψ1 with the additional potential
secret ΨA1 – is guaranteed and that the employed matching algorithm returns the
maximum matching depicted in Figure 4.2(c) – pairing the policy element Ψ1 with
the other policy element Ψ2. Then, the matching extension would require that the
remaining policy element Ψ3 is paired with an additional potential secret ΨA3 . But
according to the assumption that solely the extended clustering of Figure 4.2(b)
complies with the given notion of admissible indistinguishabilities, the resulting
cluster {Ψ3, ΨA3 } would not be admissible.
To nonetheless always guarantee the existence of a matching extension indepen-
dent of the computed maximum matching, the definition of well-defined notions
of admissible indistinguishabilities can be strengthened as follows.
Definition 4.4: Well-Defined Indistinguishability (Strengthened)
Let p̂sec be the cleaned set of a given confidentiality policy psec and let G be
the indistinguishability graph corresponding to the set of admissible clusters
over p̂sec, which is induced by a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities.
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This notion of admissible indistinguishabilities is well-defined with respect to
psec, if there is a matching extension M∗ of each maximum matching M ,
which can be constructed on the indistinguishability graph G, such that
(i) there is a deterministic algorithm creating this matching extension M∗
with all of its additional potential secrets ΨA with ΨA /∈ p̂sec,
(ii) the active domain of M∗ is a finite subset of the domain Dom and
(iii) the domain Dom contains at least one constant symbol, which is not
contained in the active domain of the matching extension M∗.
Similar to the algorithmic construction of the set of all admissible clusters over a
given (cleaned) confidentiality policy (cf. Section 3.1.3), the development of an al-
gorithm constructing an extended clusteringM∗ on the operational level – together
with all of its additional potential secrets – crucially depends on the considered
notion of admissible indistinguishabilities. Such an algorithm must hence be de-
veloped in accordance with this specific notion of admissible indistinguishabilities
set up for the considered application scenario.
To guarantee that a constructed matching extension M∗ satisfies all requirements
of an extended clustering, particular attention must be paid that for each addi-
tional potential secret ΨA of this matching extension
• both non-implications ΨA 6|=DB Ψ¯ and Ψ¯ 6|=DB ΨA hold for each (possibly
additional) potential secret Ψ¯ occurring in a cluster of M∗ and
• the corresponding additional cluster {Ψ, ΨA} of M∗ is admissible according
to the considered notion of admissible indistinguishabilities.
Another challenge is that the construction of one additional cluster might limit
the constructibility of other additional clusters. For example, suppose that the
potential secrets Ψ1 and Ψ2 are not covered by a maximum matching and hence
need to be paired with additional potential secrets. Moreover, suppose that
• Ψ1 can be paired with the additional potential secrets ΨA1 and ΨA2 and
• Ψ2 can solely be paired with the additional potential secret ΨA2 .
If the algorithm constructing the corresponding matching extension first chooses
to construct the additional cluster {Ψ1, ΨA2 }, the opportunity to afterwards also
suitably pair Ψ2 with an additional potential secret is gone.
At first sight, this example seems to suggest to again model the problem of con-
structing admissible additional clusters as a maximum matching problem on a
(now even bipartite) graph, whose edges pair each potential secret Ψ uncovered
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Figure 4.3: Indistinguishability graph with (bold) matching extension
by a maximum matching on the corresponding indistinguishability graph with
each additional potential secret ΨA, which would allow for the construction of an
admissible additional cluster {Ψ, ΨA}. But in general this approach is not fea-
sible, as the selection of one additional potential secret for the construction of
an additional cluster might exclude other additional potential secrets from being
selectable for the construction of other additional clusters because of implication
relationships between these additional potential secrets. Further considering that
the employed domain Dom of constant symbols is supposed to be infinite, the
number of additional potential secrets, with which an uncovered policy element
can be paired, might also be infinite.
Reconsidering the maximum but not perfect matching M given in Figure 4.1, a
matching extension M∗ of M can be constructed as shown in Figure 4.3. This
matching extension contains each edge of M and additionally pairs each of the
policy elements (∃X)R(b,X, e) and (∃X)R(a, e,X), which are not covered byM ,
with an additional potential secret such that the resulting additional clusters com-
ply with the interchangeability criterion (cf. Section 4.2.1) employed as a concrete
notion of admissible indistinguishabilities. Considering the set
p̂sec∗ :=
⋃
{Ψ1,Ψ2}∈M∗
{Ψ1, Ψ2}
of all (possibly additional) potential secrets of the matching extensionM∗ and the
indistinguishability graph corresponding to the set of admissible clusters over p̂sec∗
induced by the employed notion of admissible indistinguishabilities, the matching
extension M∗ is a perfect matching on this indistinguishability graph.
4.1.3 The Availability-Maximizing Weakening Algorithm
Now that all basic operations needed to actually compute an inference-proof weak-
ened view – except for those whose algorithmic instantiation depends on the em-
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ployed notion of admissible indistinguishabilities – are specified on the operational
level, an instantiation of the generic algorithm introduced in Chapter 3 in the form
of an availability-maximizing weakening algorithm can be presented. As already
argued in Section 3.1.3, the employed notion of admissible indistinguishabilities
must be adapted to the needs of each specific application scenario.
Algorithm 4.1: Inference-Proof Weakening (Availability-Max.)
Let r be a complete database instance over a database schema 〈R|AR| ∅ 〉 and
let psec be a confidentiality policy of existentially quantified atoms. Moreover,
suppose that a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities inducing admissible
clusters of size 2 is given, which complies with the strengthened Definition 4.4
of well-defined notions of admissible indistinguishabilities.
Then, a weakened view weak (r, psec) on r is created as follows:
• Stage 1 (independent of r): Disjoint clustering of potential secrets
(i) Construct the cleaned set p̂sec based on psec (Def. 3.4)
(ii) Generate the indistinguishability graph G = (V,E) (Def. 4.1)
(iii) Compute a maximum matching M on G (Def. 4.2)
(iv) Create the matching extension M∗ of M and p̂sec (Def. 4.3)
• Stage 2 (dependent on r): Creation of weakened view
(v) Create the subset C∗r := {C ∈M∗ | Ir |=M
∨
Ψ∈C Ψ } of (extended)
clusters containing a potential secret satisfied by Ir
(vi) Create the weakened view weak (r, psec) on r (Def. 3.7)
By applying Theorem 3.1, this algorithm returns an inference-proof weakened view
in the sense that for each potential secret Ψ ∈ psec the existence of at least one
complete alternative instance rΨ is guaranteed, which
• obeys the considered potential secret Ψ , i.e., IrΨ 6|=M Ψ , and
• guarantees that the corresponding weakened view weak (rΨ , psec) is indistin-
guishable from weak (r, psec), i.e., weak (rΨ , psec) = weak (r, psec).
This theorem is applicable, as the availability-maximizing Algorithm 4.1 is equal
to the generic Algorithm 3.1 except for the more concrete instantiation of the
computation of an extended clustering within Stage 1. Further, each notion of
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r = { (a, b, c), (a, f, g), (b, a, e), (b, b, d), (b, d, f), (g, e, i), (g, h, i) }
(a) Original database instance r
psec = { R(a, a, a), R(a, b, a), R(a, b, c), R(a, b, d), R(a, b, e), R(a, c, a),
(∃X)R(a, e,X), (∃X)R(b, e,X), (∃X)R(c, e,X), (∃X)R(b,X, e) }
(b) Confidentiality policy psec (already cleaned, i.e., p̂sec := psec)
{R(a, b, c), R(a, b, d) },
{ (∃X)R(b,X, e), (∃X)R(b,X, d)A },
{ (∃X)R(a, e,X), (∃X)R(a, f,X)A }
(c) Set C∗r of extended clusters of Figure 4.3,
whose disjunctions are satisfied by Ir
{R(a, a, a), R(a, c, a) },
{R(a, b, a), R(a, b, e) },
{ (∃X)R(b, e,X), (∃X)R(c, e,X) }
(d) Set M∗ \ C∗r of extended clusters of Fig-
ure 4.3 (not satisfied by Ir)
R(b, d, f)
R(g, e, i)
R(g, h, i)
R(a, b, c) ∨R(a, b, d)
(∃X)R(a, e,X) ∨ (∃X)R(a, f,X)
(∃X)R(b,X, d) ∨ (∃X)R(b,X, e)
¬ [R(a, a, a) ∨R(a, c, a) ]
¬ [R(a, b, a) ∨R(a, b, e) ]
¬ [ (∃X)R(b, e,X) ∨ (∃X)R(c, e,X) ]
(∀X)(∀Y )(∀Z) [
(X ≡ a ∧ Y ≡ b ∧ Z ≡ c ) ∨
(X ≡ a ∧ Y ≡ b ∧ Z ≡ d ) ∨
(X ≡ a ∧ Y ≡ e ) ∨
(X ≡ a ∧ Y ≡ f ) ∨
(X ≡ b ∧ Z ≡ d ) ∨
(X ≡ b ∧ Z ≡ e ) ∨
(X ≡ b ∧ Y ≡ d ∧ Z ≡ f ) ∨
(X ≡ g ∧ Y ≡ e ∧ Z ≡ i ) ∨
(X ≡ g ∧ Y ≡ h ∧ Z ≡ i ) ∨
¬R(X,Y, Z) ]
(e) Weakened view weak (r, psec) on r returned by Algorithm 4.1
Figure 4.4: Inference-proof weakening obeying the cleaned policy of Figure 4.1
admissible indistinguishabilities complying with the strengthened Definition 4.4
for well-defined notions of admissible indistinguishabilities – which essentially re-
quires the existence of an extended clustering (in the form of a matching extension)
containing all clusters induced by an arbitrary maximum matching – also com-
plies with the non-strengthened Definition 3.6 – which essentially just requires the
existence of at least one arbitrary extended clustering.
To give an example of the overall (availability-maximizing) weakening algorithm,
consider the original database instance r given in Figure 4.4(a) and the (already
cleaned) confidentiality policy psec given in Figure 4.4(b). Moreover considering a
notion of admissible indistinguishabilities called “interchangeability”, which is in-
troduced below in Section 4.2 and which provably complies with the strengthened
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definition of well-defined notions of admissible indistinguishabilities, the indistin-
guishability graph given in Figure 4.1 corresponds to the set of induced admissible
clusters over p̂sec. The subset of bold edges of this graph is a maximum matching
M , for which a matching extension M∗ – corresponding to an extended cluster-
ing – can be determined as exemplified in Figure 4.3.
Within Stage 2 of the algorithm this determined extended clustering M∗ is then
partitioned into the subset C∗r of those extended clusters of M∗ given in Fig-
ure 4.4(c), whose corresponding disjunctions are satisfied by the considered origi-
nal database instance r, and into the remaining subset M∗ \ C∗r of those extended
clusters of M∗ given in Figure 4.4(d), whose corresponding disjunctions are not
satisfied by this instance r.
Now turning to the constructed weakened view weak (r, psec) on r given in Fig-
ure 4.4(e), the positive knowledge weak (r, psec)+ of this view only consists of
those 3 tuples of the original instance r (represented as a lexicographically or-
dered sequence of corresponding ground atoms) not inducing a DB-Interpretation
satisfying a disjunction, which corresponds to a cluster of C∗r . For each of these
clusters {Ψ1, Ψ2} ∈ C∗r the disjunctive knowledge weak (r, psec)∨ then presents the
disjunction Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2. Thereby, the sequence of the disjuncts Ψ1 and Ψ2 may be
changed, dependent on the natural lexicographic order on these disjuncts, and the
sequence on all of these disjunctions is also ordered lexicographically.
The presentation of the negative knowledge weak (r, psec)− then starts with each
negated disjunction ¬[Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2 ] corresponding to a cluster {Ψ1, Ψ2} ∈ M∗ \ C∗r
to ensure that an adversary’s knowledge that neither of the sentences of a clus-
ter of M∗ \ C∗r is satisfied by the original instance r is captured properly within
the constructed weakened view on r (cf. Section 3.2). Thereby, these negated
disjunctions are sorted just as the disjunctions of weak (r, psec)∨. The negative
knowledge weak (r, psec)− is then concluded with the completeness sentence es-
sentially expressing that each constant combination (c1, c2, c3) ∈ Dom3 neither
inducing a DB-Interpretation satisfying a sentence of the positive knowledge nor
inducing a DB-Interpretation satisfying any disjunct of the disjunctive knowledge
is supposed to be not valid, i.e., ¬R(c1, c2, c3) is supposed to hold. Thereby, the
arrangement of (and also within) the disjuncts of this completeness sentence is
again inspired by the ordering of the disjunctive knowledge.
4.2 Admissible Indistinguishabilities by Local Distortion
So far, an availability-maximizing instantiation of the generic weakening algorithm
has been developed. This instantiation specifies each of its basic operations, whose
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algorithmic instantiation does not depend on the employed notion of admissible
indistinguishabilities, on the operational level. For the construction of admis-
sible clusters and the computation of a matching extension, whose algorithmic
instantiation needs to be tailored to the employed notion of admissible indistin-
guishabilities, only coarse design guidelines could instead be given.
In fact, notions of admissible indistinguishabilities have only been discussed in a
purely abstract way, yet. This discussion culminates in definitions declaratively de-
scribing requirements a possible notion of admissible indistinguishabilities should
meet to be well-defined, but is far from giving any concrete implementable no-
tion of admissible indistinguishabilities. On the one hand it is reasonable to keep
possible notions of admissible indistinguishabilities as generic as possible and to
thereby keep the weakening algorithm applicable for different application scenar-
ios (cf. Section 3.1.3). On the other hand prototype implementations needed to
evaluate the constructed weakening approach experimentally require a notion of
admissible indistinguishabilities, which is concrete enough to be implemented.
4.2.1 Introducing Interchangeability
An example of an easy to implement notion of admissible indistinguishabilities for
the construction of admissible clusters of size 2, which moreover complies with the
strengthened definition of well-defined notions of admissible indistinguishabilities,
is the so-called notion of interchangeability. This notion restricts distortion within
a disjunction only locally in the sense that a pair of (possibly additional) potential
secrets is interchangeable, if they differ in exactly one constant parameter. Note
that the disjunctions of all examples given for the weakening approach so far are
created in accordance with interchangeability.
Definition 4.5: Interchangeability
Two existentially quantified atoms (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) and (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n)
are interchangeable, if
(i) there is a single differing position m ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that both tm and
t¯m are constant symbols of Dom with tm 6= t¯m and
(ii) for each other position i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {m} either
• both ti and t¯i are existentially quantified variables or
• both ti and t¯i are constant symbols of Dom with ti = t¯i.
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Figure 4.5: Indistinguishability graph complying with interchangeability
An example of a set of admissible clusters induced by this notion of interchange-
ability – represented in the form of an indistinguishability graph already known
from Figure 4.3 – is given in Figure 4.5. For convenience, each edge of this graph
is labeled with the single differing position of its incident potential secrets.
Note that all indistinguishability graphs resulting from interchangeability have the
structure known from a specific class of graphs introduced by Knuth in [66]. The
vertices of these graphs are supposed to be words of fixed length and a pair of
these vertices is to be neighbored, if their corresponding words differ in exactly
one character position. As further analyzed by Stiege in [83, 85], the vertices of
each maximal clique of such a graph correspond to a maximal subset of words,
which all pairwise differ in exactly one character at the same character position.
Hence, each maximal clique of an indistinguishability graph resulting from inter-
changeability immediately induces a maximal subset of pairwise interchangeable
potential secrets all sharing the same single differing position.
Inspired by this insight, the definition of interchangeability – which follows the
spirit of this chapter and aims at constructing availability-maximizing clusters of
size 2 – can naturally be extended to be also applicable for the construction of
larger admissible clusters of size k ≥ 2. Then, a subset of existentially quantified
atoms is interchangeable, if all of its sentences are pairwise interchangeable and
all of these pairs moreover share the same single differing position m. This leads
to clusters inducing disjunctions of the form∨
i∈{1,...,k}
(∃X)R(t1, . . . , tm−1, c˜(i)m , tm+1, . . . , tn)
with each term tj occurring in each of the disjuncts and being either a constant
symbol of Dom or a variable of X and with each term c˜(i)m occurring solely in the
i-th disjunct and being a constant symbol of Dom such that c˜(i1)m 6= c˜(i2)m holds
for each pair 1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ k of disjuncts. Such a disjunction restricts distortion
only locally within this disjunction by revealing the knowledge that the original
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database instance satisfies the sentence template
(∃X)R(t1, . . . , tm−1,, tm+1, . . . , tn)
and only hides with which (non-empty subset) of the constant values c˜(1)m , . . . , c˜(k)m
the m-th term  of this sentence template is actually instantiated.
This generalization of a specific value to a wider set of possible values is known from
the well-known approaches of k-anonymization and `-diversification [47, 70, 79, 86],
which motivated the usage of weakening disjunctions – instead of less cooperative
refusals – to distort confidential knowledge (cf. Section 1.3.1). Hence, this con-
nection between the weakening algorithm developed in this thesis instantiated
with the interchangeability criterion and the approaches of k-anonymization and
`-diversification might allow the construction of k-anonymized and `-diverse in-
stances with the help of a suitably adapted version of the weakening algorithm.
This is of particular interest when considering also further a priori knowledge an
adversary might have (as done in Chapter 5), as current standard approaches
to k-anonymization and `-diversification do not handle an adversary’s a priori
knowledge in a formal way.
On the downside, a disadvantage of this notion of interchangeability clearly is that
it only provides a suitable number of admissible disjunction templates, if a given
confidentiality policy contains a lot of potential secrets structurally not differing
much from each other. If this is not the case, a large number of additional poten-
tial secrets – each of which requires additional knowledge to be distorted – may
be needed to construct a suitable disjunction template for each of the (cleaned)
policy elements and hence employing this notion of admissible indistinguishabili-
ties may even result in a loss of availability. This is also experimentally confirmed
by Experiment 2 of Section 6.3 and demonstrates that the task of suitably defin-
ing a concrete notion of admissible indistinguishabilities crucially depends on the
specific application scenario considered.
Reconsidering that an indistinguishability graph resulting from interchangeability
can be decomposed into a set of maximal cliques covering this graph and that each
of these maximal cliques consists of a maximal subset of pairwise interchangeable
potential secrets all sharing the same single differing position, this property seems
to induce a straightforward algorithm for the construction of clusters of a size
larger than 2. Additionally considering that this decomposition into maximal
cliques is also computationally efficient on graphs of this special structure [84, 85],
this approach seems to be even more promising. But as (maximal) cliques of such
a graph do generally not need to be pairwise vertex-disjoint [85] (cf. Figure 4.5) –
while it is mandatory that (extended) clusters inducing disjunction templates are
pairwise disjoint (cf. Section 3.2) – it is still to decide to which cluster each of the
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Ψ5 Ψ6
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Figure 4.6: Constructing clusters of size 3 on graphs based on interchangeability
vertices occurring in more than one clique should be assigned, thereby minimizing
the number of additional potential secrets needed to extend too small clusters.
This problem is exemplified in Figure 4.6. As depicted in Figure 4.6(a), the given
indistinguishability graph contains the (maximal) clique {Ψ2, Ψ3, Ψ4} and follow-
ing the above mentioned ideas this clique might induce a corresponding cluster of
size 3. Consequently, each of the remaining policy elements Ψ1, Ψ5 and Ψ6 needs
to be paired with 2 additional potential secrets to obtain an extended clustering
with clusters of size 3. Instead choosing the three disjoint cliques depicted in
Figure 4.6(b), each of the (too-small) induced clusters of size 2 needs to be com-
plemented with only one additional potential secret to obtain clusters of size 3,
thereby resulting in an extended clustering with less additional potential secrets.
On a graph, on which the construction of an extended clustering with clusters of
size 3 is possible without introducing any additional potential secrets, the problem
of constructing an extended clustering with clusters of size 3 obviously corresponds
to the decision problem of whether a given graph can be partitioned into a certain
given number of (vertex-)disjoint triangles, as (sub-)cliques of size 3 correspond to
triangles. This problem is well-known to be NP-complete for general graphs [58]
and seems to be NP-complete for the above mentioned subclass of graphs resulting
from the interchangeability property, too. But nonetheless, these insights might
provide a promising basis for the construction of reasonable heuristic solutions.
4.2.2 Well-Defined Interchangeability
Now returning to the construction of availability-maximizing disjunctions consist-
ing of 2 disjuncts, it is still to show that the interchangeability criterion complies
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with the strengthened Definition 4.4 for well-defined notions of admissible indis-
tinguishabilities. In fact, the even stronger property that interchangeability is
well-defined according to Definition 4.4 for each possible confidentiality policy is
shown, as long as this policy does not contain a sentence semantically equivalent
to the weakest possible potential secret (∃X)R(X) without any constant sym-
bols. This specific notion of admissible indistinguishabilities is hence applicable
independent of the structure such a policy has.
As already elaborated in Section 3.1.2, the construction of an extended cluster-
ing – and hence also the construction of a matching extension being an extended
clustering – is in general only possible for confidentiality policies not contain-
ing a potential secret semantically equivalent to the weakest possible existentially
quantified atom (∃X)R(X). As a consequence, there can not be any notion of
admissible indistinguishabilities, which is well-defined for confidentiality policies
containing such a potential secret, as the well-definedness of such a notion essen-
tially requires the constructibility of an extended clustering.
Now, the well-definedness of interchangeability is formally captured in the follow-
ing theorem. Thereby, the proof of this theorem is constructive in the sense that
it sketches an efficient as well as easy to implement algorithm for the construction
of matching extensions under interchangeability.
Theorem 4.1: Well-Defined Interchangeability
Let p̂sec be the cleaned set of an arbitrary confidentiality policy psec, which
does not contain a sentence semantically equivalent to the weakest possible
potential secret (∃X)R(X) without any constant symbols. Further, consider
the indistinguishability graphG corresponding to the set of admissible clusters
over p̂sec induced by interchangeability as known from Definition 4.5.
This notion of interchangeability implements a well-defined notion of admis-
sible indistinguishabilities with respect to psec in the sense that the existence
of a matching extension M∗ of each maximum matching M , which can be
constructed on G, is guaranteed such that
(i) there is a deterministic algorithm creating this matching extension M∗
with all of its additional potential secrets ΨA with ΨA /∈ p̂sec,
(ii) the active domain of M∗ is a finite subset of the domain Dom and
(iii) the domain Dom contains at least one constant symbol, which is not
contained in the active domain of the matching extension M∗.
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Proof. To prove the existence of a matching extension constructed by a deter-
ministic algorithm, consider the cleaned set p̂sec of a given (finite) confidentiality
policy psec and a finite set p̂secA of (possibly already constructed) additional po-
tential secrets such that the union p̂sec ∪ p̂secA is a cleaned set. Then, a (further)
additional potential secret ΨA = (∃X)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) obeying the interchangeability
criterion can be constructed deterministically as follows for each potential secret
Ψ = (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) of the cleaned policy p̂sec:
• choose a differing position m ∈ {1, . . . , n} with tm ∈ Dom deterministically,
• set t¯j := tj for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {m} and
• deterministically choose t¯m to be a constant of Dom such that t¯m 6= t˜m holds
for each (∃Y )R(t˜1, . . . , t˜n) ∈ p̂sec ∪ p̂secA with t˜m ∈ Dom.
Note that a differing position m ∈ {1, . . . , n} with tm ∈ Dom can always be found
as psec (and hence also p̂sec) does not contain a sentence semantically equivalent
to the weakest possible potential secret (∃X)R(X) without any constant symbols.
Additionally considering that the domain Dom of constant symbols is supposed
to be infinite and that the union p̂sec ∪ p̂secA is supposed to be a finite set of
existentially quantified atoms, a “fresh” constant symbol as required above can
always be found for each admissible differing position m with tm ∈ Dom.
Next, consider a maximum matching M constructed on the indistinguishability
graph corresponding to the set of admissible clusters over p̂sec, which are induced
by interchangeability. Then, assuming that the elements of p̂sec are ordered in
a deterministic way, a matching extension M∗ of M and p̂sec under interchange-
ability can always be constructed deterministically as follows:
• initially, set p̂secA := ∅ and M∗ := M ,
• then, for each policy element Ψi ∈ p̂sec uncovered by M , one after another
according to their assumed order,
– construct an additional potential secret ΨAi as described above and
– add the cluster {Ψi, ΨAi } to M∗ and ΨAi to p̂secA.
This construction, which leads to a finite matching extensionM∗ and which further
relies on the above mentioned construction of additional potential secrets using
only constant symbols occurring in policy elements of p̂sec (and hence stemming
from Dom) or “fresh” constant symbols of Dom not occurring in p̂sec, obviously
guarantees that the active domain of M∗ is a finite subset of Dom. As a direct
consequence, the infinite domain Dom contains at least one constant symbol,
which is not contained in the finite active domain of the matching extension M∗.
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Reconsidering that a matching extension must be an extended clustering according
to Definition 3.3, the constructed M∗ obviously is such an extended clustering,
provided that p̂sec ∪ p̂secA is cleaned as required by Definition 3.5. To prove
that p̂sec ∪ p̂secA is cleaned after each construction step of M∗, consider an arbi-
trary potential secret Ψi = (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ p̂sec uncovered by the maximum
matching M and an arbitrary set p̂secA of (possibly already constructed) addi-
tional potential secrets such that the union p̂sec ∪ p̂secA is a cleaned set – which
is in particular true for p̂secA = ∅ because of p̂sec being a cleaned set.
Now, suppose that in one construction step the above sketched algorithm con-
structs an interchangeable additional potential secret ΨAi = (∃X)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) for
the considered policy element Ψi such that the union p̂sec ∪ p̂secA ∪ {ΨAi } vio-
lates the cleaned set property, i.e., there is a (possibly additional) potential secret
Ψ˜ = (∃Z)R(t˜1, . . . , t˜n) ∈ p̂sec ∪ p̂secA with Ψ˜ |=DB ΨAi or ΨAi |=DB Ψ˜ . Consid-
ering that the above given construction of ΨAi requires the term t¯m of ΨAi to be
a constant symbol of Dom with t¯m 6= t˜m, the implication Ψ˜ |=DB ΨAi can not
hold according to Lemma 2.1. Under the assumption that the other implication
ΨAi |=DB Ψ˜ holds, Lemma 2.1 requires that for each term t˜j of Ψ˜ , which is a con-
stant symbol of Dom, the term t¯j of ΨAi is also a constant symbol of Dom with
t¯j = t˜j . Hence, the term t˜m of Ψ˜ must be a variable of Z, as t¯m 6= t˜m is supposed
to hold by construction of ΨAi . For each other term t˜j of Ψ˜ with t˜j ∈ Dom, for
which t˜j = t¯j is supposed to hold, the equality t˜j = tj must also hold for the term
tj of Ψi as t¯j = tj is supposed to hold by construction of ΨAi . So, by again applying
Lemma 2.1, the validity of the implication Ψ |=DB Ψ˜ is a direct consequence in
contradiction to the assumption that p̂sec ∪ p̂secA is a cleaned set. ♠
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Introducing A Priori Knowledge
The generic weakening algorithm and its availability-maximizing instantiation
have been developed to enforce a confidentiality policy in the sense that an adver-
sary is provably not able to infer that the knowledge embodied in a potential secret
of this policy is satisfied by a considered original database instance – even if this
adversary tries to recover confidential knowledge with the help of logical reason-
ing. Thereby, he might employ his knowledge about the released weakened view
on the original database instance as well as his awareness of the algorithm used
to construct this weakened view – parameterized with all inputs except for the
original database instance to be protected – as a basis for his logical reasoning.
But until now, an adversary is not supposed to have any further a priori knowledge
about semantic database constraints possibly arranged for the schema underlying
the original database instance or about the world in general. This additional
knowledge is of particular interest, as it might open up extended possibilities
to draw confidentiality compromising conclusions. In the following, semantic
database constraints stemming from a restricted subclass of well-known “Tuple
Generating Dependencies” are considered and analyzed with respect to an ad-
versary’s extended possibilities to draw harmful inferences. Then, an adapted
version of the availability-maximizing weakening algorithm, which provably elim-
inates these additional inference-channels, is provided.
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5.1 A Subclass of Tuple Generating Dependencies
As mentioned above, an adversary might from now on have some a priori knowl-
edge prior consisting of semantic database constraints stemming from a restricted
subclass of Tuple Generating Dependencies (cf. [1, 54]). The constraints of this
subclass, which are referred to as single premise tuple generating dependencies, are
supposed to be arranged for the schema underlying a considered original database
instance. As usual, each database instance has to satisfy all database constraints
arranged for its underlying schema [1].
Definition 5.1: Single Premise Tuple Generating Dependency
A sentence Γ of the first-order languageL is a single premise tuple generating
dependency over a predicate symbol R of arity n, if it is of the form
(∀X) [R(t1, . . . , tn)⇒ (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) ]
and furthermore
(i) each term ti of the premise of Γ is either a constant symbol of Dom or
a universally quantified variable of X, i.e., ti ∈X ∪Dom,
(ii) each term t¯i of the conclusion of Γ is either a constant symbol of Dom,
a universally quantified variable ofX or an existentially quantified vari-
able of Y , i.e., t¯i ∈X ∪ Y ∪Dom,
(iii) the set X of variables is X = {t1, . . . , tn} \Dom,
(iv) the set Y of variables is Y = {t¯1, . . . , t¯n} \ (Dom ∪X),
(v) each variable of X can occur at most once in R(t1, . . . , tn), i.e., ti 6= tj
for all ti, tj ∈ {t1, . . . , tn} \Dom with i 6= j, and
(vi) each variable of X ∪ Y can occur at most once in R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n), i.e.,
t¯i 6= t¯j for all t¯i, t¯j ∈ {t¯1, . . . , t¯n} \Dom with i 6= j.
As later discussed in Section 5.3, it might be worthwhile to additionally require
that at least one term ti of the premise of Γ and at least one term t¯j of the
conclusion of Γ is a constant symbol of Dom.
The semantics of single premise tuple generating dependencies is the same as for
(the more general) tuple generating dependencies, which are well-known from the
area of relational databases: if the premise of such a dependency Γ is satisfied
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under a constant substitution σ – substituting the universally quantified variables
of X with constant symbols of Dom – by a DB-Interpretation I, the conclusion
of this dependency Γ must be satisfied under this constant substitution σ by the
DB-Interpretation I, too.
A single premise tuple generating dependency hence is a tuple generating depen-
dency, which is syntactically restricted such that its premise must not contain
more than one (conjunctively connected) atom and that – considering a constant
substitution of the universally quantified variables of X – both the premise and
the conclusion of such a dependency are existentially quantified atoms in the sense
of Definition 2.3. Hence, the validity of DB-Implications, in which a premise or a
conclusion of such a dependency is involved, can be decided efficiently as known
from Lemma 2.1 by reducing the (generally hard to solve) implication problem
under DB-Semantics to an efficiently decidable pattern matching problem.
To be able to handle single premise tuple generating dependencies more conve-
niently in the remainder of this chapter, the following conventions are used.
Definition 5.2: Handling of Single Premise TGDs
Suppose that Γ is a single premise tuple generating dependency of the form
(∀X) [R(t1, . . . , tn)⇒ (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) ]. Then,
(i) prem (Γ ) := (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) is the existentially quantified premise of
the dependency Γ and
(ii) concl (Γ ) := (∃Y )(∃Z)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) with Z := X ∩ {t¯1, . . . , t¯n} is the
existentially quantified conclusion of the dependency Γ .
Moreover, consider σ to be a constant substitution of the variables of X in
the form of a function σ : X ∪ Y ∪Dom → Y ∪Dom with
σ(t˜i) :=
{
uX ∈ Dom, if t˜i = X and X ∈X
t˜i, if t˜i ∈ Y or t˜i ∈ Dom
substituting each variable X ∈X occurring in prem (Γ ) and in concl (Γ ) with
a constant symbol uX ∈ Dom, i.e., σ(X) = uX . Then,
(i) prem (Γ )[σ] := R(σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)) is the premise of the dependency Γ
under the constant substitution σ and
(ii) concl (Γ )[σ] := (∃Y )R(σ(t¯1), . . . , σ(t¯n)) is the conclusion of the depen-
dency Γ under the constant substitution σ.
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For the sake of convenience, a constant substitution σ – which actually aims at
substituting the (originally universally quantified) variables of X with constant
symbols of Dom – is also applicable for constant symbols of Dom and variables of
Y by simply mapping each u ∈ Dom and each Y ∈ Y to itself, i.e., σ(u) = u and
σ(Y ) = Y . This guarantees that σ is applicable for each term t˜i of a premise and
a conclusion of a single premise tuple generating dependency without distincting
which type of term t˜i actually is.
Similarly to the observation that DB-Implication can be decided efficiently for
existentially quantified atoms (cf. Lemma 2.1), it is also easy to decide whether
there is a constant substitution under which a given existentially quantified atom
implies another existentially quantified atom under DB-Semantics. As shown in
the following, this (extended) implication problem can again be reduced to an
efficiently decidable pattern matching problem.
Lemma 5.1: DB-Implication under Constant Substitution
Suppose that the existentially quantified atoms (∃X)(∃Y )R(t1, . . . , tn) and
(∃Z)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) are given. There is a constant substitution σ substituting
the variables of X with constant symbols of Dom (and mapping variables of
Y and constants of Dom to themselves) such that the DB-Implication
(∃Y )R(σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)) |=DB (∃Z)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n)
holds, if and only if for each term t¯i, which is a constant symbol of Dom,
the (unsubstituted) term ti is either a variable of X or a constant symbol of
Dom such that ti = t¯i.
Proof. To start with the only-if-part, consider the given existentially quantified
atoms (∃X)(∃Y )R(t1, . . . , tn) and (∃Z)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) and suppose that for each
term t¯i, which is a constant symbol of Dom, the (unsubstituted) term ti is either a
variable of X or a constant symbol of Dom such that ti = t¯i. Moreover, consider
the constant substitution σ : X ∪ Y ∪Dom → Y ∪Dom with
σ(ti) :=

t¯i, if ti ∈X and t¯i ∈ Dom
ui ∈ Dom, if ti ∈X and t¯i ∈ Z
ti, if ti ∈ Y or ti ∈ Dom
substituting each variable X ∈ X of the sentence (∃X)(∃Y )R(t1, . . . , tn) with a
constant symbol of Dom. As a direct consequence of the construction of σ, for
each term t¯i, which is a constant symbol of Dom, the (substituted) term σ(ti)
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now is a constant symbol of Dom such that σ(ti) = t¯i. Hence, the DB-Implication
(∃Y )R(σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)) |=DB (∃Z)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) holds under the constructed con-
stant substitution σ according to Lemma 2.1.
To now prove the if-part by contraposition, again consider the given existentially
quantified atoms (∃X)(∃Y )R(t1, . . . , tn) and (∃Z)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) and suppose that
there is an m ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that t¯m is a constant symbol of Dom and the
(unsubstituted) term tm is neither a variable of X nor a constant symbol of Dom
with tm = t¯m. Hence, tm is either a variable of Y or a constant symbol of Dom
with tm 6= t¯m. As the constant substitution σ is supposed to map variables of Y
and constants of Dom to themselves, σ(tm) = tm is supposed to hold under each
possible constant substitution σ. Thus, considering the sentences
(∃Y )R(σ(t1), . . . , σ(tm), . . . , σ(tn)) and (∃Z)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯m, . . . , t¯n)
under an arbitrary constant substitution σ, the term t¯m is a constant symbol of
Dom and the (substituted) term σ(tm) is either a variable of Y or a constant
symbol of Dom with σ(tm) 6= t¯m. Therefore, by again applying Lemma 2.1, the
DB-Implication (∃Y )R(σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)) |=DB (∃Z)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) does not hold
under each possible constant substitution σ. ♠
5.2 Adapting the Clustering of Confidentiality Policies
Now that an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior is supposed to contain some
knowledge in the form of single premise tuple generating dependencies, it is to
analyze if and to what extent an adversary might employ this additional knowl-
edge to compromise a confidentiality policy with the help of logical reasoning.
This analysis should lead to the development of counter measures provably dis-
abling these harmful additional reasoning capabilities by suitably restricting the
knowledge, which a weakened view reveals to an adversary.
5.2.1 Confidentiality Compromising Interferences
As each dependency declared for a database schema imposes restrictions on the
structure of database instances over this schema, an adversary might exploit his
knowledge about these restrictions to exclude some alternative database instances
not obeying these restrictions from being the original database instance of his
interest, which is publicly known to obey these restrictions – although these alter-
native instances seem (from the adversary’s point of view) to be indistinguishable
from a considered original database instance when neglecting the knowledge about
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these restrictions valid database instances must obey. If all remaining credible
(alternative) database instances then satisfy a certain piece of knowledge, whose
validity is to be kept secret according to a confidentiality policy, the adversary
finally succeeds in compromising this confidentiality policy (cf. [7]).
As a first example of harmful a priori knowledge, suppose that prior contains a
single premise tuple generating dependency
Γ = (∀X) [R(X, b, c)⇒ R(d, e,X) ] ,
whose existentially quantified premise prem (Γ ) = (∃X)R(X, b, c) is implied by a
potential secret Ψ1, i.e., Ψ1 |=DB prem (Γ ), of a confidentiality policy psec with
psec = {Ψ1 = R(a, b, c), Ψ2 = R(a, b, d) } .
Further, suppose that the released weakened view contains the sequences
• weak (r, psec)+ = ∅ and
• weak (r, psec)∨ = {R(a, b, c) ∨R(a, b, d) }.
If the potential secret Ψ2 = R(a, b, d) is chosen to be protected, an alternative
instance rΨ2 constructed to obey Ψ2 must not contain the tuple (a, b, d). Other-
wise, IrΨ2 |=M Ψ2 would hold and the alternative instance rΨ2 would not obey Ψ2.
To further guarantee IrΨ2 |=M Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2, the alternative instance rΨ2 must contain
the tuple (a, b, c) to satisfy Ψ1. Moreover, other tuples different from (a, b, c) and
(a, b, d) can not be in rΨ2 as otherwise the property of indistinguishability would
be violated due to weak (r, psec)+ = ∅ 6= weak (rΨ2 , psec)+. Hence, neglecting the
adversary’s a priori knowledge prior for now, rΨ2 = { (a, b, c) } is the only possi-
bility to construct an alternative instance obeying Ψ2 from the adversary’s point
of view. But taking his a priori knowledge prior into account, the adversary can
exclude rΨ2 from being the “real” original instance of his interest: the validity of
IrΨ2 |=M Γ does not hold because of IrΨ2 |=M prem (Γ )[σ] under a constant sub-
stitution σ with σ(X) = a and because of further IrΨ2 6|=M concl (Γ )[σ] under this
constant substitution. Hence, the adversary’s knowledge is sufficient to conclude
that the original instance r of his interest must contain the tuple (a, b, d) and to
thereby violate the confidentiality policy.
To give a second example of harmful a priori knowledge, suppose that prior again
contains the single premise tuple generating dependency
Γ = (∀X) [R(X, b, c)⇒ R(d, e,X) ] ,
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for which the implication concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψ1 now holds under a constant substi-
tution σ with σ(X) = a for a potential secret Ψ1 stemming from the policy
psec = {Ψ1 = (∃X)R(d,X, a), Ψ2 = (∃X)R(d,X, b) } .
Further, suppose that the released weakened view contains the sequences
• weak (r, psec)+ = {R(a, b, c) } and
• weak (r, psec)∨ = { (∃X)R(d,X, a) ∨ (∃X)R(d,X, b) }.
If the potential secret Ψ1 = (∃X)R(d,X, a) is chosen to be protected, the alter-
native instance rΨ1 constructed to obey Ψ1 must not contain any tuple c ∈ Domn
which induces a DB-Interpretation Ic with Ic(R) = {c} satisfying Ψ1. As the
sentence R(a, b, c) is in weak (r, psec)+, this sentence R(a, b, c) must also be in
weak (rΨ1 , psec)+ to preserve indistinguishability from the adversary’s point of
view. The corresponding database tuple (a, b, c) must hence be in each alternative
instance rΨ1 and as a consequence IrΨ1 satisfies prem (Γ )[σ] under a constant sub-
stitution σ with σ(X) = a. So, IrΨ1 |=M concl (Γ )[σ] must hold, too, to guarantee
IrΨ1 |=M Γ . But adding the tuple concl (Γ )[σ] = (d, e, a) to rΨ1 immediately re-
sults in IrΨ1 |=M Ψ1. Consequently, the adversary can conclude that each database
instance satisfying both weak (r, psec) and prior – and hence also the original in-
stance r of his interest – must contain the tuple (d, e, a), thereby violating the
potential secret Ψ1.
More generally, each of the two example setups above enables an adversary to
infer sensitive knowledge, as the considered dependency of prior interferes with
a potential secret of a disjunction Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2 due to a corresponding implication
relationship. In general, the purpose of this disjunction Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2 is to weaken
sensitive knowledge of the original instance to such an extent that a larger set of
(alternative) databases instances with different truth values for both Ψ1 and Ψ2
becomes credible from an adversary’s point of view. But due to the interference
with the dependency of prior , the adversary is nonetheless able to infer the “real”
truth values of some elements the considered confidentiality policy by excluding
a specific subset of alternative instances from being credible, which is actually
needed to protect these compromised policy elements.
In a scenario without a priori knowledge, the inference-proofness of each weak-
ened view weak (r, psec) is essentially achieved by strictly isolating the disjunctive
knowledge of weak (r, psec)∨ – which aims at not revealing the real truth values of
the disjuncts of weak (r, psec)∨ to an adversary – from the definite knowledge an
adversary can gain about the original database instance (cf. Section 3.2). This
isolation follows the goal that the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of a disjunct of
weak (r, psec)∨ can not be concluded based on the satisfaction or non-satisfaction
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of a piece of definite knowledge the adversary is aware of. But as soon as a priori
knowledge in the form of single premise tuple generating dependencies interfering
with disjuncts of weak (r, psec)∨ is additionally considered, this isolation can be
broken up in the sense that a dependency bridges the gap between a piece of defi-
nite knowledge and a certain disjunct and thereby allows for reasoning about the
satisfaction or non-satisfaction of this disjunct.
Both examples discussed above deal with interference due to implication relation-
ships. But the conclusion of a single premise tuple generating dependency can even
harmfully interfere with a potential secret in scenarios without such an implication
relationship. Actually, the existence of a so-called common constant unifier – in-
spired by the concept of unifiers known from first-order logic [76, 88] – may be
sufficient for harmful interferences.
Definition 5.3: Common Constant Unifier
Consider two existentially quantified atoms Φ and Ψ both constructed over
the same predicate symbol R of arity n. These sentences Φ and Ψ share a
common constant unifier c, if there is a constant combination c ∈ Domn such
that the induced DB-Interpretation Ic with Ic(R) = {c} satisfies both Φ and
Ψ , i.e., Ic |=M Φ and Ic |=M Ψ .
Note that this definition of a common constant unifier, which is based on the sat-
isfaction of sentences, slightly deviates from commonly found definitions of (most
general) unifiers known from literature on first-order logic, which are based on the
substitution of variables – such as in [76, 88], for example. But considering com-
monly used definitions of satisfaction of first-order logic, this difference vanishes
considerably: a common constant unifier c = (c1, . . . , cn) for two existentially
quantified atoms Φ = (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) and Ψ = (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) induces a
DB-Interpretation Ic satisfying both Φ and Ψ . Taking moreover into account that
Ic |=M Φ (and Ic |=M Ψ , respectively) only holds, if each variable ti with ti ∈ X
can be substituted by the constant ci of c (analogously for each t¯i ∈ Y ), a com-
mon constant unifier induces a possible substitution of variables in the sense of
commonly found definitions of (most general) unifiers.
To now give an example that harmful interference is also possible, if the conclusion
of a single premise tuple generating dependency just shares a common constant
unifier with a potential secret of a confidentiality policy, consider the following
example setup, which only slightly deviates from the second example setup in the
given single premise tuple generating dependency:
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• Γ = (∀X) [R(X, b, c)⇒ (∃Y )R(Y, e,X) ] is a dependency of prior ,
• psec = {Ψ1 = (∃X)R(d,X, a), Ψ2 = (∃X)R(d,X, b) } is the policy, and
• the weakened view weak (r, psec) contains the sequences
– weak (r, psec)+ = {R(a, b, c) } and
– weak (r, psec)∨ = { (∃X)R(d,X, a) ∨ (∃X)R(d,X, b) }.
Obviously, there is neither an implication relationship between prem (Γ )[σ] and
a policy element of psec under an arbitrary constant substitution σ, nor an im-
plication relationship between concl (Γ )[σ] and a policy element of psec under
an arbitrary constant substitution σ. Instead, concl (Γ ) and Ψ1 just share the
common constant unifier (d, e, a).
If the potential secret Ψ1 = (∃X)R(d,X, a) is chosen to be protected, the alter-
native instance rΨ1 constructed to obey Ψ1 must not contain the tuple (d, e, a),
which induces a DB-Interpretation satisfying Ψ1. As known from the second ex-
ample, the tuple (a, b, c) must be in each alternative instance rΨ1 protecting Ψ1
to preserve indistinguishability and as a consequence IrΨ1 satisfies prem (Γ )[σ]
under a constant substitution σ with σ(X) = a. But adding an arbitrary tuple
to rΨ1 , which induces a DB-Interpretation satisfying concl (Γ )[σ], either results
in adding the tuple (d, e, a) satisfying Ψ1 or in adding a tuple c ∈ Domn with
both Ic |=M concl (Γ )[σ] and Ic 6|=M Ψ1, which violates indistinguishability be-
cause of both R(c) ∈ weak (rΨ1 , psec)+ and R(c) /∈ weak (r, psec)+. Consequently,
the adversary can again conclude that each database instance satisfying both
weak (r, psec) and prior – and hence also the original instance r of his interest –
must contain the tuple (d, e, a), thereby violating the potential secret Ψ1.
To be able to efficiently decide on the existence of common constant unifiers on the
operational level, the following insight is of importance. Similar to the implication
problems considered in Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 5.1, the existence of a common
constant unifier can be decided with the help of an efficiently decidable pattern
matching problem.
Lemma 5.2: Existence of Common Constant Unifiers
Suppose that both (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) and (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) are existentially
quantified atoms. These sentences share a common constant unifier, if and
only if the equality ti = t¯i holds for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with both ti ∈ Dom
and t¯i ∈ Dom.
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Proof. To start with the only-if-part, consider the given existentially quantified
atoms (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) and (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) and suppose that the equality
ti = t¯i holds for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with both ti ∈ Dom and t¯i ∈ Dom. Next,
consider the constant combination c = (c1, . . . , cn) with
• ci = ti = t¯i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with both ti ∈ Dom and t¯i ∈ Dom,
• ci = ti for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with ti ∈ Dom and t¯i ∈ Y ,
• ci = t¯i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with ti ∈X and t¯i ∈ Dom, and
• ci ∈ Dom (arbitrarily) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with ti ∈X and t¯i ∈ Y .
This constant combination c can always be constructed as ti = t¯i is supposed to
hold for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with both ti ∈ Dom and t¯i ∈ Dom and the induced
DB-Interpretation Ic with Ic(R) = {c} obviously satisfies both (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn)
and (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n).
To now prove the if-part by contraposition, again consider the given existentially
quantified atoms (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) and (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) and assume that there
is an index m ∈ {1, . . . , n} with
tm ∈ Dom and t¯m ∈ Dom and with further tm 6= t¯m .
The construction of a DB-Interpretation Ic with Ic(R) = {c} satisfying both of
the existentially quantified atoms (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) and (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) can
only be succeeded, if there is constant combination c = (c1, . . . , cn) with both
cm = tm and cm = t¯m. But such a constant combination c can not be found as
tm 6= t¯m is supposed to hold. ♠
Reconsidering the above given examples of how confidentiality requirements can
be breached on the basis of single premise tuple generating dependencies inter-
fering with confidentiality policies, a formal definition of interference between an
adversary’s a priori knowledge and a confidentiality policy is now provided. While
the conditions (i) and (iii) of this definition are clearly motivated by the examples
presented above, the reason for condition (ii) will become clear when later proving
a property of a so-called partitioning of an adversary’s a priori knowledge, which
is captured in Lemma 5.3 and needed for the final proof of inference-proofness of
an extended version of the weakening algorithm.
Moreover, note that the definition of DB-Implication guarantees that existentially
quantified atoms always share a common constant unifier, if there is an implication
relationship between them. Hence, the above mentioned case of interference due to
an implication relationship between the conclusion of a dependency and a potential
secret is covered by condition (iii) of the following definition.
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Definition 5.4: Interference
Let psec be a confidentiality policy and let prior be an adversary’s a priori
knowledge consisting of single premise tuple generating dependencies. A de-
pendency Γ ∈ prior interferes with the policy psec, if there is a potential
secret Ψ ∈ psec such that
(i) the implication Ψ |=DB prem (Γ ) holds,
(ii) the implication Ψ [σ¯] |=DB prem (Γ ) holds under an arbitrary constant
substitution σ¯, provided that there is a dependency Γ¯ ∈ prior with
Ψ = concl (Γ¯ ), or
(iii) Ψ and concl (Γ ) share a common constant unifier.
An adversary’s a priori knowledge prior is said to interfere with a confiden-
tiality policy psec, if there is a dependency Γ ∈ prior interfering with psec.
Note that interference between a dependency and a confidentiality policy does not
necessarily mean that this confidentiality policy can actually be compromised. To
exemplify this, suppose that Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3 and Ψ4 are ground atoms over the same
predicate symbol R and that
• prior = {Ψ1 ⇒ Ψ2 } is an adversary’s a priori knowledge and
• psec = {Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3, Ψ4 } is a given confidentiality policy.
For now, further suppose that the clustering algorithm pairs the potential secrets
Ψ1 and Ψ2 to one cluster and the potential secrets Ψ3 and Ψ4 to another cluster
and that the released weakened view weak (r, psec) contains the sequences
• weak (r, psec)+ = ∅ and
• weak (r, psec)∨ = {Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2, Ψ3 ∨ Ψ4 } and
• the negative knowledge weak (r, psec)− reveals that all knowledge different
from Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3 and Ψ4 is not satisfied by the original instance r.
If the potential secret Ψ2 is chosen to be protected, each alternative instance rΨ2
obeying Ψ2 must not satisfy Ψ2 and must hence satisfy Ψ1 to satisfy the disjunction
Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2. As a consequence of this construction, the dependency Ψ1 ⇒ Ψ2 of the
adversary’s a priori knowledge prior is not satisfied by IrΨ2 . This allows the
adversary to exclude each alternative instance obeying Ψ2 from being real and
to thereby compromise the confidentiality policy by concluding that Ψ2 must be
satisfied by the considered original instance.
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Now assuming that the original instance r underlying the example does neither sat-
isfy Ψ1 nor Ψ2, the released weakened view weak (r, psec) contains the sequences
• weak (r, psec)+ = ∅ and
• weak (r, psec)∨ = {Ψ3 ∨ Ψ4 } and
• the negative knowledge weak (r, psec)− reveals that all knowledge different
from Ψ3 and Ψ4 is not satisfied by the original instance r.
Under this modified setup alternative database instances, which protect an ar-
bitrary element of the given confidentiality policy psec and which are moreover
consistent with both weak (r, psec) and prior , can easily be constructed: such an
instance must satisfy one of the potential secrets Ψ3 and Ψ4 (in accordance with the
potential secret to be protected) and must not satisfy any further knowledge.
If the clustering stage of the algorithm instead chooses to pair the potential secrets
Ψ1 and Ψ3 to one cluster and the potential secrets Ψ2 and Ψ4 to another cluster,
this different clustering might lead to a weakened view weak (r, psec) containing
the sequences
• weak (r, psec)+ = ∅ and
• weak (r, psec)∨ = {Ψ1 ∨ Ψ3, Ψ2 ∨ Ψ4 } and
• the negative knowledge weak (r, psec)− reveals that all knowledge different
from Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3 and Ψ4 is not satisfied by the original instance r.
Under this setup alternative database instances achieving consistency with both
weak (r, psec) and prior can again easily be constructed:
• to protect Ψ1 such an instance must satisfy Ψ3 and at least one of the dis-
juncts Ψ2 and Ψ4 and must not satisfy any further knowledge;
• to protect Ψ2 such an instance must satisfy Ψ4 and Ψ3 and must not satisfy
any further knowledge;
• to protect Ψ3 such an instance must satisfy Ψ1 and Ψ2 and must not satisfy
any further knowledge except for Ψ4;
• to protect Ψ4 such an instance must satisfy Ψ2 and at least one of the dis-
juncts Ψ1 and Ψ3 and must not satisfy any further knowledge.
Hence, the given definition of interference is not precise enough to decide whether
confidential knowledge can actually be inferred by an adversary exploiting his
a priori knowledge. An interference between a given dependency and a given
confidentiality policy instead only indicates that such an inference-channel might
possibly exist under certain (extended) clusterings of the confidentiality policy
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and under certain original database instances. The given definition of interference
can hence not serve as a basis for an algorithm distorting only actually harmful
knowledge – thereby achieving best availability – but might still provide a basis
for the construction of reasonable heuristic solutions.
5.2.2 Extending the Confidentiality Policy
Considering a single premise tuple generating dependency Γ of an adversary’s a
priori knowledge prior , which interferes with a confidentiality policy psec, the next
obvious question is how to limit this adversary’s knowledge such that the depen-
dency Γ does not possibly enable him to compromise the confidentiality policy. A
first obvious idea is to extend the confidentiality policy psec by the potential secret
Ψprem := prem (Γ ) to be able to weaken knowledge, which satisfies the premise of
Γ and thereby imposes the additional requirement that the conclusion of Γ must
also be satisfied under the constant substitution(s) satisfying prem (Γ ).
As this weakening of the introduced potential secret Ψprem should be enforced with
the help of a disjunction Ψprem∨ Ψ pairing Ψprem with another (possibly additional)
potential secret Ψ , the construction of an alternative instance rΨ obeying this other
potential secret Ψ must generally be possible. But such an alternative instance
rΨ has to satisfy Ψprem instead of Ψ to satisfy the disjunction Ψprem ∨ Ψ . Thus,
as a consequence of so-called forward chaining, this alternative instance must also
satisfy the conclusion of Γ under the constant substitution(s) satisfying prem (Γ ) –
even if the considered original instance does neither satisfy the premise nor the
conclusion of Γ . To be always able to construct an alternative instance consistent
with Γ without making this alternative instance (from an adversary’s point of
view) distinguishable from the original instance, the confidentiality policy psec
should also be extended by the potential secret Ψconcl = concl (Γ ) to be able to
add database tuples to an alternative instance, which do not stem from the original
instance but induce DB-Interpretations satisfying the conclusion of Γ .
Another idea to mitigate the impact of Γ is to extend the confidentiality policy psec
by only adding the potential secret Ψconcl := concl (Γ ) to be able to consistently
add database tuples to satisfy the conclusion of Γ . But if this potential secret
Ψconcl is to be obeyed by an alternative instance, this instance must not satisfy
the conclusion of Γ . Thus, as a consequence of so-called backward chaining, the
premise of Γ must not be satisfied by this instance, either – even if it is satisfied
by the original instance. To be again able to construct an alternative instance
consistent with Γ , the confidentiality policy psec should also be extended by the
potential secret Ψprem = prem (Γ ) to be also able to suitably weaken the knowledge
about a possible satisfaction of Ψprem.
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Summing up these insights, it is generally not sufficient to extend a confidentiality
policy psec by only one of the potential secrets prem (Γ ) and concl (Γ ) to prevent
an adversary from drawing harmful inferences by exploiting a dependency Γ of his
a priori knowledge, which interferes with the policy psec. Instead, the confiden-
tiality policy psec should be extended by both of these potential secrets prem (Γ )
and concl (Γ ).
Considering an adversary’s a priori knowledge containing multiple single premise
tuple generating dependencies, such an extension of a confidentiality policy can of
course lead to new interferences between the dependencies of this a priori knowl-
edge and the extended part of the confidentiality policy. For instance, suppose
that the adversary’s a priori knowledge prior contains the dependencies
• Γ1 = (∀X) [R(X, a, b)⇒ R(a, b,X) ] and
• Γ2 = (∀X) [R(a,X, c)⇒ R(a,X, d) ]
and further suppose that the (non-extended) policy is psec = {R(a, a, b) }. Obvi-
ously, the dependency Γ1 interferes with psec because of R(a, a, b) |=DB prem (Γ1)
and the dependency Γ2 does not interfere with psec because of the non-implication
R(a, a, b) 6|=DB prem (Γ2) and the absence of a common constant unifier between
R(a, a, b) and concl (Γ2). The extended confidentiality policy psecprior then still
contains the potential secret R(a, a, b) stemming from the (non-extended) original
confidentiality policy psec and additionally contains the potential secrets prem (Γ1)
and concl (Γ1), i.e.,
psecprior = {R(a, a, b), (∃X)R(X, a, b), (∃X)R(a, b,X) } .
Now, the dependency Γ2 interferes with this extended policy psecprior because
concl (Γ2) and the potential secret (∃X)R(a, b,X) of psecprior share the common
constant unifier (a, b, d). As a consequence, the already extended confidentiality
policy psecprior must again be extended by adding the potential secrets prem (Γ2)
and concl (Γ2) to psecprior , i.e.,
psecprior = { R(a, a, b),
(∃X)R(X, a, b), (∃X)R(a, b,X),
(∃X)R(a,X, c), (∃X)R(a,X, d) } .
As a consequence of this insight that extensions of a confidentiality policy can lead
to new interferences, an algorithm extending a confidentiality policy must hence
iteratively extend this possibly already (partly) extended policy with respect to the
given a priori knowledge until a fixpoint is reached and hence no further extension
of this policy is possible.
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This is captured in the following operational definition of an extended confiden-
tiality policy, which employs the temporary variable psec′prior to check within each
iteration of the policy extension, whether a fixpoint is reached.
Definition 5.5: Extended Confidentiality Policy
Let psec be a confidentiality policy and let prior be an adversary’s a priori
knowledge consisting of single premise tuple generating dependencies.
The extended confidentiality policy psecprior , which is an extension of psec
with respect to prior , is constructed by
(i) initially setting psecprior := psec and psec′prior := ∅ and
(ii) then, as long as psecprior 6= psec′prior holds, by repeatedly computing
(a) psec′prior := psecprior and
(b) psecprior := psecprior ∪ { prem (Γ ), concl (Γ ) } for each dependency
Γ stemming from prior and interfering with psec′prior .
After a confidentiality policy is extended with respect to an adversary’s a priori
knowledge, it can be cleaned as known from Section 3.1.2. Reconsidering the
extended policy psecprior given above, the corresponding extended and cleaned
confidentiality policy is
p̂secprior = { (∃X)R(X, a, b), (∃X)R(a, b,X),
(∃X)R(a,X, c), (∃X)R(a,X, d) } .
Although the (only) original policy element R(a, a, b) of psec is not contained in
the extended and cleaned policy p̂secprior any more, it is still implicitly protected
by the weaker element (∃X)R(X, a, b) ∈ p̂secprior as known from Lemma 3.1.
5.2.3 Enforcing the Satisfaction of Dependencies
Now that an extended and cleaned confidentiality policy p̂secprior contains both a
potential secret Ψprem with prem (Γ ) |=DB Ψprem and a potential secret Ψconcl with
concl (Γ ) |=DB Ψconcl for each dependency Γ of an adversary’s a priori knowledge
prior interfering with the extended policy psecprior , it is to discuss how the knowl-
edge revealed to an adversary can be weakened in such a way that this adversary
is not able to exploit his a priori knowledge harmfully.
97
5 Introducing A Priori Knowledge
Considering solely one single dependency Γ ∈ prior for now, knowledge satisfying
the potential secret Ψprem can in general be suitably weakened by replacing it
with a disjunction Ψprem ∨ Ψ pairing Ψprem with another (possibly additional)
potential secret Ψ . This disjunctive knowledge does not imply the potential secret
Ψprem and does hence – as a consequence of Lemma 3.1 – not imply the (stronger)
sentence prem (Γ ), either. But if prem (Γ ) and Ψprem are semantically equivalent,
additional care must be taken to ensure that this other potential secret Ψ is not
semantically equivalent to Ψconcl.4 Otherwise, the knowledge Ψprem ∨ Ψconcl is
introduced and there is hence no alternative instance obeying Ψconcl: such an
instance not satisfying Ψconcl must instead satisfy Ψprem (and hence also prem (Γ ))
to satisfy Ψprem∨ Ψconcl and thus the satisfaction of the premise of Γ immediately
leads to the requirement that the conclusion of Γ must also be satisfied.
The potential secret concl (Γ ) has been added to the extended policy psecprior with
the idea in mind that it should be possible to consistently add database tuples to
an alternative instance, which make this alternative instance satisfy the conclusion
of Γ (cf. Section 5.2.2). But according to the semantics of potential secrets, the
potential secret concl (Γ ) should just prevent an adversary from getting to know
that an original instance satisfies concl (Γ ). If an original instance does not satisfy
concl (Γ ), this knowledge may instead be revealed to an adversary. Accordingly,
the approach developed so far only constructs disjunctions for clusters having
at least one potential secret satisfied by a considered original instance. For all
other clusters, the non-satisfaction of their potential secrets is revealed, as this
knowledge is not protected by the confidentiality policy and as the construction
of corresponding disjunctions would even result in knowledge not consistent with
the original instance. Hence, a possible non-satisfaction of the conclusion of Γ
might still be revealed to an adversary.
As a first obvious solution to this problem one could try to add the negated sen-
tence ¬concl (Γ ) instead of concl (Γ ) to the extended confidentiality policy. But
the sentence ¬concl (Γ ) is not a feasible policy element, as confidentiality policies
are supposed to consist of only (non-negated) existentially quantified atoms ac-
cording to Definition 2.4 to be able to decide on the validity of DB-Implications
between these existentially quantified atoms with the help of an efficiently decid-
able pattern matching problem (cf. Lemma 2.1).
Another idea is to prevent the construction of a not satisfied disjunction template
containing the policy element Ψconcl of p̂secprior , independent of whether a consid-
ered original database instance actually satisfies a disjunct of this disjunction or
4 Considering the below mentioned result that potential secrets semantically equivalent to Ψconcl
must not occur in regular disjunctions, this scenario can actually not occur, but is nonetheless
presented to provide a comprehensive insight into the problem of weakening Ψprem.
98
5.2 Adapting the Clustering of Confidentiality Policies
not to keep the clustering stage of the weakening algorithm instance-independent
(cf. Section 3.1.1). This requirement of instance-independent satisfaction – to-
gether with the requirement that weakened views should contain only true knowl-
edge – immediately leads to the construction of a disjunction pairing Ψconcl with
tautological knowledge, i.e., a disjunction semantically equivalent to Ψconcl ∨ true.
Such a disjunction leads to a maximum weakening (or generalization) of Ψconcl and
hence corresponds to the complete refusal of Ψconcl, i.e., no knowledge about the
satisfaction or non-satisfaction of the sentence Ψconcl is revealed at all.
Then, neglecting other elements of the confidentiality policy p̂secprior for now,
the sentence concl (Γ )[σ] can be satisfied under any possible constant substitu-
tion σ. Due to the assumed validity of the implication concl (Γ ) |=DB Ψconcl the
stronger sentence concl (Γ )[σ] with concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB concl (Γ ) also implies Ψconcl,
i.e., concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψconcl. Hence, the definition of DB-Implication guarantees
the existence of a database tuple, which induces a DB-Interpretation satisfying
both concl (Γ )[σ] and Ψconcl. Such a database tuple can be added consistently to
an alternative database instance, as all knowledge about possible non-existences
of original database tuples satisfying Ψconcl is refused.
But now considering that an extended and cleaned confidentiality policy p̂secprior
usually contains multiple potential secrets, the consistency of an alternative in-
stance may still get lost. For instance, suppose that p̂secprior also contains a
potential secret Ψ with Ψ 6= Ψconcl, for which the implication concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψ
is supposed to hold under a certain constant substitution σ. Moreover, suppose
that Ψ is in a cluster containing only potential secrets not satisfied by a consid-
ered original instance. Hence, this non-satisfaction of Ψ is revealed to an adver-
sary. If then concl (Γ )[σ] needs to be satisfied by an alternative instance – due
to prem (Γ )[σ] being satisfied – the implication concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψ would require
that Ψ is satisfied by this alternative instance, too – in contradiction to the ad-
versary’s knowledge that Ψ is not satisfied by the original instance. To mitigate
this inference-channel, Ψ needs to be refused just as Ψconcl.
To exemplify that those potential secrets of p̂secprior , which are only implied by
a conclusion of a dependency under a certain constant substitution of this con-
clusion – and not under “normal” DB-Implication – actually need to be refused,
consider the original database instance
r = { (a, c, a) } ,
an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior consisting of the dependencies
• Γ1 = (∀X) [R(a, b,X)⇒ R(d, e, c) ] and
• Γ2 = (∀X) [R(d, e,X)⇒ R(X, b, a) ]
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and the (already) extended and cleaned confidentiality policy
p̂secprior = { (∃X)R(a, c,X), (∃X)R(a, b,X), (∃X)R(d, e,X),
(∃X)R(X, b, a), (∃X)R(c, b,X), (∃X)R(c, d,X) } .
Now, assume that only those potential secrets of p̂secprior , which are implied by
an existentially quantified conclusion of one of the dependencies Γ1 and Γ2 in the
sense of “normal” DB-Implication, are actually refused. Then,
• (∃X)R(d, e,X) is to be refused due to concl (Γ1) |=DB (∃X)R(d, e,X) and
• (∃X)R(X, b, a) is to be refused due to concl (Γ2) |=DB (∃X)R(X, b, a),
but in particular (∃X)R(c, b,X) does not need to be refused because of both
• concl (Γ1) 6|=DB (∃X)R(c, b,X) and
• concl (Γ2) 6|=DB (∃X)R(c, b,X).
This potential secret (∃X)R(c, b,X) is hence clustered and might be grouped to-
gether with (∃X)R(c, d,X). But as both of these potential secrets are not satisfied
by the original instance r, both of these non-satisfactions are revealed. Further,
suppose that the potential secret (∃X)R(a, c,X) is paired with (∃X)R(a, b,X)
such that the knowledge about the satisfaction of (∃X)R(a, c,X) is weakened by
the corresponding disjunction (∃X)R(a, b,X) ∨ (∃X)R(a, c,X).
Now, assume that the potential secret Ψ = (∃X)R(a, c,X) is chosen to be pro-
tected. As an alternative instance rΨ obeying this policy element must not satisfy
Ψ , this alternative instance must instead satisfy (∃X)R(a, b,X) to nonetheless
satisfy the disjunction (∃X)R(a, b,X) ∨ (∃X)R(a, c,X). Hence, rΨ must contain
a tuple (a, b,) with an arbitrary constant symbol  ∈ Dom. To satisfy the de-
pendency Γ1, whose premise is satisfied by rΨ due to (a, b,) ∈ rΨ , this alternative
instance rΨ must further contain the tuple (d, e, c) to also satisfy the conclusion
of Γ1. Analogously, the tuple (c, b, a) now needs to be added to rΨ to guarantee
that rΨ satisfies Γ2. As a direct consequence, the potential secret (∃X)R(c, b,X)
is now also satisfied by rΨ in contradiction to the adversary’s knowledge that the
original instance r does not satisfy (∃X)R(c, b,X). This enables the adversary to
exclude each alternative instance protecting (∃X)R(a, c,X) from being the “real”
instance r of his interest.
To identify those potential secrets of an extended and cleaned confidentiality policy
p̂secprior , which need to be refused completely because of being implied by the
conclusion of a dependency under an arbitrary constant substitution, the following
subset concl (p̂secprior , prior) of p̂secprior is created.
100
5.2 Adapting the Clustering of Confidentiality Policies
Definition 5.6: Potential Secrets to be Refused Completely
Let prior be an adversary’s a priori knowledge consisting of single premise
tuple generating dependencies and let p̂secprior be a confidentiality policy,
which has first been extended with respect to prior and then been cleaned.
Then, concl (p̂secprior , prior) is the subset
{Ψ ∈ p̂secprior | there is a Γ ∈ prior , for which concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψ
holds under an arbitrary constant substitution σ }
of potential secrets of p̂secprior .
Considering an arbitrary dependency Γ of an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior
and the set p̂secprior \ concl (p̂secprior , prior) of those potential secrets, which are
not implied by the conclusion of a dependency of prior under an arbitrary con-
stant substitution, it is possible to construct a database tuple, which induces a
DB-Interpretation satisfying concl (Γ )[σ] under an arbitrary constant substitution
σ without satisfying any potential secret Ψ of p̂secprior \ concl (p̂secprior , prior).
Thereby, the existence of such a database tuple is essentially guaranteed by the
non-implication concl (Γ )[σ] 6|=DB Ψ holding due to Ψ /∈ concl (p̂secprior , prior).
5.2.4 Confidentiality Compromising Disjunctions
When considering confidentiality policies containing multiple single premise tuple
generating dependencies, another harmful inference-channel may be provided, if
the conclusions of different dependencies imply the same potential secret of a
confidentiality policy. For instance, consider an adversary’s a priori knowledge
prior = { Γ1 = R(a, b, c)⇒ (∃Y )R(g, h, Y ),
Γ2 = R(b, b, c)⇒ (∃Y )R(g, Y, h) }
and further suppose that the extended and cleaned confidentiality policy is
p̂secprior = {R(a, b, c), R(b, b, c), (∃X1)(∃X2)R(g,X1, X2) } .
As R(a, b, c) and R(b, b, c) are not in the set concl (p̂secprior , prior) of those poten-
tial secrets, which are to be refused because of being implied by the conclusion of
a dependency under an arbitrary constant substitution, the disjunction
R(a, b, c) ∨R(b, b, c)
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might be constructed to weaken the knowledge about the satisfaction of (at least)
one of the potential secrets R(a, b, c) and R(b, b, c) by an original database in-
stance. Then, the adversary exploiting his a priori knowledge knows that this
original instance must satisfy at least one of the conclusions (∃Y )R(g, h, Y ) and
(∃Y )R(g, Y, h), too, as at least one of the premises of the dependencies Γ1 and
Γ2 is satisfied by this original instance, which is known to satisfy the disjunction
R(a, b, c) ∨R(b, b, c). So, because of both
• (∃Y )R(g, h, Y ) |=DB (∃X1)(∃X2)R(g,X1, X2) and
• (∃Y )R(g, Y, h) |=DB (∃X1)(∃X2)R(g,X1, X2) ,
the adversary can conclude that the potential secret (∃X1)(∃X2)R(g,X1, X2) is
also satisfied by the original instance, thereby violating the confidentiality policy.
More generally, this kind of inference-channel occurs, if there is a subset of sin-
gle premise tuple generating dependencies, whose conclusions all imply the same
potential secret Ψ (under certain constant substitutions), and each disjunct of a
disjunction revealed to an adversary implies the validity of a premise of one of
these dependencies (under the considered constant substitutions). Then, an al-
ternative instance obeying the potential secret Ψ can not be constructed, as this
alternative instance needs to satisfy this disjunction, which implies the validity of
Ψ when also considering the adversary’s a priori knowledge.
This kind of inference-channel can also occur in combination with transitive chains
of dependencies. Then, the conclusion of a dependency, whose premise is satis-
fied (directly or transitively) by a disjunct under a certain constant substitution,
implies the satisfaction of the premise of another dependency under this constant
substitution. For instance, suppose that the above given example is modified such
that the adversary’s a priori knowledge now is
prior = { Γ1 = R(b, a, a)⇒ R(c, b, b),
Γ2 = (∀X) [R(X, b, b)⇒ R(a, b,X) ],
Γ3 = R(a, b, c)⇒ (∃Y )R(g, h, Y ),
Γ4 = R(b, b, a)⇒ (∃Y )R(g, Y, h) }
and the extended and cleaned confidentiality policy p̂secprior now contains (among
others) the potential secrets
R(b, a, a), R(b, b, a) and (∃X1)(∃X2)R(g,X1, X2) .
Then, the disjunction R(b, a, a) ∨ R(b, b, a) might be constructed to weaken the
knowledge about the satisfaction of (at least) one of the potential secrets R(b, a, a)
and R(b, b, a) by a considered original database instance and implies the potential
secret (∃X1)(∃X2)R(g,X1, X2):
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• under the assumption that R(b, a, a) is satisfied by an alternative instance,
the transitive chain of the dependencies Γ1, Γ2 and Γ3 requires that the
conclusion of Γ3 must be satisfied, i.e., the sentence (∃Y )R(g, h, Y ) implying
the potential secret (∃X1)(∃X2)R(g,X1, X2);
• if R(b, b, a) is instead satisfied by an alternative instance, the conclusion
of Γ4 must be satisfied, i.e., the sentence (∃Y )R(g, Y, h) also implying the
potential secret (∃X1)(∃X2)R(g,X1, X2).
To prevent the construction of disjunctions, which are confidentiality compromis-
ing in combination with an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior , a disjunction
must not only consist of disjuncts all implying the satisfaction of the same poten-
tial secret with the help of dependencies of prior . In a scenario without a priori
knowledge, there is no pair of disjuncts implying the same potential secret: each
disjunct is a potential secret stemming from a cleaned confidentiality policy guar-
anteeing the isolation property that there is no implication relationship between
each pair of different potential secrets of this policy. But dependencies of prior in-
terfering with potential secrets might break this isolation up by bridging the gaps
between pairs of different potential secrets of a cleaned confidentiality policy and
might thereby allow for reasoning about the satisfaction of one potential secret
based on the satisfaction of (a set of) other potential secrets.
When neglecting transitive chains of dependencies for now, a sufficient idea to
identify those disjunction templates constructed over an extended and cleaned
confidentiality policy p̂secprior , which are possibly harmful in combination with
an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior , is to partition the dependencies of prior
with respect to p̂secprior as follows: each pair Γ, Γ¯ ∈ prior is to be in the same
partition Pi of prior , if there is a potential secret Ψ of p̂secprior implied by the
conclusions of both of these dependencies Γ and Γ¯ under arbitrary constant sub-
stitutions. Then, a disjunction template Φ is possibly harmful, if there is a single
partition Pi of dependencies such that each of the disjuncts of Φ implies a premise
of a dependency of Pi. If the construction of these possibly harmful disjunction
templates is avoided, an additional isolation property guaranteeing that for each
potential secret Ψ ∈ p̂secprior each constructed disjunction template contains at
least one disjunct not implying Ψ is established.
When also considering transitive chains of dependencies, the partitioning of prior
must moreover reflect that an adversary might infer the satisfaction of a potential
secret by employing such a transitive chain. A sufficient condition to achieve this
is to additionally guarantee that a pair Γ, Γ¯ of dependencies of prior is also in the
same partition Pi, if the conclusion of Γ implies the premise of Γ¯ under an arbitrary
constant substitution. As a consequence, each pair of possible transitive chains of
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dependencies both implying the same potential secret is completely contained in
one partition of dependencies.
Summing up the ideas discussed above, a partitioning of an adversary’s a priori
knowledge prior allowing for the detection of disjunction templates, which are
possibly harmful in combination with prior , is defined as follows:
Definition 5.7: Partitioning of A Priori Knowledge
Let prior be an adversary’s a priori knowledge consisting of single premise
tuple generating dependencies and let p̂secprior be a confidentiality policy,
which has first been extended with respect to prior and then been cleaned.
Then, P is a partitioning of prior with respect to p̂secprior , if
(i) P := P1 ∪˙ . . . ∪˙ Pq is an ordinary partitioning of prior , i.e.,
(a) Pi 6= ∅ and Pi ⊆ prior for each Pi ∈ P,
(b) Pi ∩ Pj = ∅ for all pairs of different partitions Pi, Pj ∈ P,
(c) ⋃Pi∈P Pi = prior ,
(ii) for each pair of different dependencies Γ, Γ¯ ∈ prior , for which there
is a potential secret Ψ ∈ p̂secprior with both concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψ and
concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯] |=DB Ψ under arbitrary constant substitutions σ and σ¯,
there is a single partition Pi ∈ P with both Γ ∈ Pi and Γ¯ ∈ Pi,
(iii) for each pair of different dependencies Γ, Γ¯ ∈ prior , for which the im-
plication concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB prem (Γ¯ ) holds under an arbitrary constant
substitution σ, there is a single partition Pi ∈ P with both Γ ∈ Pi and
Γ¯ ∈ Pi, and
(iv) q (and hence the number of partitions) is maximum.
Without the additional requirement that the number of partitions is to be max-
imized, a trivial but feasible partitioning can always be found by constructing
only one single partition containing each dependency of prior . Of course, such
a solution should be avoided (if possible), as it might unnecessarily forbid the
construction of admissible disjunction templates, which can actually not enable
an adversary exploiting his a priori knowledge to draw harmful inferences.
One way to algorithmically determine a partitioning P of an adversary’s a priori
knowledge prior is to first create a so-called partitioning graph in the form of
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an undirected graph G = (V,E), whose set V of vertices contains exactly one
vertex vΓ for each dependency Γ ∈ prior . Two different vertices vΓ1 , vΓ2 ∈ V
are then neighbored by introducing the (undirected) edge {vΓ1 , vΓ2} ∈ E, if and
only if their corresponding dependencies Γ1 and Γ2 need to be in the same par-
tition according to requirement (ii) or requirement (iii) of Definition 5.7. After
that, the wanted partitioning P of prior can be determined by decomposing the
graph G into its connected components [65, 67]. Then, for each connected com-
ponent Ci = {vΓi1 , . . . , vΓik} of G the corresponding partition Pi = {Γi1 , . . . , Γik}
of dependencies of prior is added to the initially empty partitioning P.
As different connected components of a graph are always pairwise vertex-disjoint
and as the constructed graph is supposed to contain exactly one vertex vΓ for each
dependency Γ ∈ prior , the algorithm sketched above is guaranteed to construct
an ordinary partitioning of prior and thereby satisfies requirement (i) of Defini-
tion 5.7. Moreover, the definition of connected components guarantees that neigh-
bored vertices of a graph are in the same connected component. The constructed
partitioning P hence satisfies the requirements (ii) and (iii) of Definition 5.7 due
to the construction of the edges of a partitioning graph.
Under the assumption that the algorithm returns a set P of partitions, which is
not maximum according to requirement (iv) of Definition 5.7, there is at least
one non-singleton partition Pi = {Γi1 , . . . , Γik}, which can be safely split up into
two partitions Pi1 and Pi2 with Pi1 6= ∅ and Pi2 6= ∅ and with Pi1 ∪˙ Pi2 = Pi
without violating any of the requirements (i), (ii) and (iii) of Definition 5.7. By
construction of the algorithm, the partitioning graph G then contains the con-
nected component Ci = {vΓi1 , . . . , vΓik} inducing the considered partition Pi. But
due to the definition of connected components, the partitioning graph G contains
a path between each pair of vertices of Ci and according to the construction of
the edges of G all dependencies corresponding to the vertices of Ci need to be in
the same partition according the requirements (ii) and (iii) to Definition 5.7.
5.2.5 Reconsidering the Construction of Clusterings
Now that disjunction templates, which might possibly be harmful in combination
with an adversary’s a priori knowledge, can be identified, care must be taken
to ensure that all disjunction templates induced by a clustering are not possibly
harmful. As proposed in Section 4.1, a clustering with clusters of size 2 can be
constructed for the availability-maximizing weakening approach on the basis of
a maximum matching computed on an indistinguishability graph, each of whose
edges represents an admissible cluster, which might be chosen for the final dis-
joint clustering. To prevent such a maximum matching algorithm from choosing
105
5 Introducing A Priori Knowledge
clusters, which correspond to possibly harmful disjunction templates, each ad-
missible edge is from now on only added to an indistinguishability graph, if its
corresponding disjunction template is not classified as possibly harmful.
Reconsidering Section 5.2.3, disjunction templates must further not contain any
potential secrets, which need to be refused completely because of being implied by
the conclusion of a dependency of an adversary’s a priori knowledge. To actually
prevent a maximum matching algorithm from constructing clusters containing
these potential secrets to be refused, the set of vertices of an indistinguishability
graph is now restricted to those potential secrets of an extended and cleaned
confidentiality policy p̂secprior , which are not to be refused.
Definition 5.8: Indistinguishability Graph (Extended)
Let p̂secprior be a confidentiality policy, which has first been extended with
respect to an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior of single premise tuple gen-
erating dependencies and which has then been cleaned. Moreover, let P be the
partitioning of prior with respect to p̂secprior and let concl (p̂secprior , prior)
be the subset of those potential secrets of p̂secprior , which are to be refused.
Finally, suppose that a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities is given,
which induces a set Ca of admissible clusters of size 2 over p̂secprior .
An indistinguishability graph extended for dealing with single premise tuple
generating dependencies is an undirected graph G = (V,E) such that
(i) V := p̂secprior \ concl (p̂secprior , prior) is the set of vertices of G and
(ii) each (unordered) pair {Ψ1, Ψ2} with Ψ1, Ψ2 ∈ V and Ψ1 6= Ψ2 constitutes
an undirected edge of E, if
(a) {Ψ1, Ψ2} is in the set Ca of admissible clusters over p̂secprior and
(b) there is no single partition Pi ∈ P containing dependencies Γ1 ∈ Pi
and Γ2 ∈ Pi (with possibly Γ1 = Γ2) such that both implications
Ψ1 |=DB prem (Γ1) and Ψ2 |=DB prem (Γ2) hold.
Although the computation of a maximum matching on an indistinguishability
graph is a straightforward approach to determine a disjoint clustering inducing a
set of pairwise disjoint disjunction templates of length 2, it is known from Sec-
tion 4.1.2 that such a maximum matching does not necessarily cover each element
of a given confidentiality policy. Within the weakening approach not handling a
priori knowledge, which only allows for the enforcement of policy elements with
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the help of suitable weakening disjunctions, this observation immediately leads
to the need of constructing a so-called matching extension in the sense of Defini-
tion 4.3 – which essentially requires that each uncovered policy element must be
paired with an (artificial) additional potential secret – to guarantee that there is
always such a suitable weakening disjunction for each policy element.
But within the extended weakening approach, which is able to handle single
premise tuple generating dependencies as a priori knowledge, there is actually
more freedom to distort confidential knowledge: as known from Section 5.2.3,
there may be the need to refuse the knowledge embodied in certain potential se-
crets completely to be able to guarantee the constructibility of credible alternative
instances. So, in contrast to the non-extended weakening approach, there is no
inevitable need to weaken all confidential knowledge with the help of suitable dis-
junctions and thus potential secrets uncovered by a maximum matching can in
principle also be refused by the weakening algorithm.
As a consequence of these extended possibilities to distort confidential knowledge,
employed notions of admissible indistinguishabilities do not necessarily need to be
well-defined. Within the non-extended approach, which is only capable of weak-
ening knowledge, the well-definedness of these notions is of crucial importance
to guarantee that an admissible disjunction template can actually be determined
for each element of a confidentiality policy despite the restrictions such a notion
imposes on the construction of admissible disjunction templates. But within the
extended approach, which can employ both weakening disjunctions and refusals,
those potential secrets, for which a considered notion of admissible indistinguisha-
bilities does not allow for the construction of a suitable disjunction template,
can still be enforced by refusing them – although the weakening of confidential
knowledge should still be the method of choice in terms of availability.
As a further consequence of these possible refusals of uncovered policy elements,
the notion of a matching extension given in Definition 4.3 needs to be relaxed.
While this notion obviously makes sense for the non-extended weakening approach
to guarantee the existence of a weakening disjunction for each policy element, its
requirement that each policy element should be in an (extended) cluster of size 2
does obviously not make sense for potential secrets enforced by refusals. Such a
relaxed notion of a matching extension is in the following referred to as a partly
extended matching.
Similar to Definition 4.3 of a matching extension, the following definition of a
partly extended matching also relies on an extended clustering according to Def-
inition 3.3. But in contrast to a matching extension M∗, which is supposed to
be an extended clustering of all potential secrets of a given confidentiality policy,
a partly extended matching M+ only needs to be an extended clustering of the
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subset of those potential secrets of a given confidentiality policy, which actually
occur in a cluster of M+. The remaining policy elements, which are not covered
by this partly extended matching M+, do instead not need to be a part of this
extended clustering.
Definition 5.9: Partly Extended Matching
Let p̂secprior be an extended and cleaned confidentiality policy and suppose
thatM is a maximum matching on the indistinguishability graph correspond-
ing to the set of admissible clusters over p̂secprior , which is induced by a given
notion of admissible indistinguishabilities.
A partly extended matching M+ of the maximum matching M and the policy
p̂secprior under the given notion of admissible indistinguishabilities
(i) contains each matching edge of M , i.e., M ⊆M+, and
(ii) can possibly contain a cluster {Ψ, ΨA} ∈ M+ for each potential secret
Ψ ∈ p̂secprior not covered by M such that
• ΨA is an additional potential secret not occurring in p̂secprior and
• M+ is an extended clustering of the set ⋃{Ψ1, Ψ2}∈M+ {Ψ1, Ψ2} of
all (possibly additional) potential secrets of M+ with clusters of
size 2 according to Definition 3.3, which obeys the given notion of
admissible indistinguishabilities.
Moreover, such a partly extended matching M+ covers a potential secret
Ψ ∈ p̂secprior , if there is a cluster {Ψ1, Ψ2} ∈M+ with Ψ ∈ {Ψ1, Ψ2}.
Although this definition of a partly extended clustering does not explicitly require
that potential secrets uncovered by a computed maximum matching should be en-
forced with the help of a corresponding weakening disjunction whenever possible,
the construction goals of the weakening algorithm postulated in Section 1.3 – aim-
ing at cooperativeness in terms of availability – suggest to do so. As this results in
the construction of additional potential secrets, care must be taken to ensure that
the set of all constructed additional potential secrets does not enable an adversary
to compromise the confidentiality policy.
Hence, similar to the discussion in Section 3.1.2 that the sets of all non-additional
potential secrets and of all additional potential secrets should together form a
cleaned set to preserve the isolation property of non-implication, the set of all
additional potential secrets of a partly extended clustering should not violate any
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isolation property of the extended weakening algorithm. The resulting require-
ments for an admissible set of additional potential secrets are captured in the fol-
lowing definition, which (similar to Definition 3.5) implements the purely generic
requirement an extended clustering (and hence also a partly extended matching)
has to satisfy according to condition (v) of Definition 3.3.
Definition 5.10: Admissible Additional Potential Secrets (Ext.)
Consider an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior consisting of single premise
tuple generating dependencies and a confidentiality policy p̂secprior , which is
extended with respect to prior and which is cleaned.
A set p̂secAprior of additional potential secrets is admissible with respect to
p̂secprior and prior , if
(i) the union p̂secprior ∪ p̂secAprior is a cleaned set,
(ii) prior does not interfere with p̂secAprior and
(iii) the non-implication Γ 6|=DB ΨA holds for each dependency Γ ∈ prior
and each additional potential secret ΨA ∈ p̂secAprior .
Requirement (ii) of this definition guarantees that a constructed additional poten-
tial secret can occur in a disjunction and does not need to be refused completely
because of being implied by the conclusion of dependency. Moreover, this require-
ment takes care that the construction of an additional potential secret does not
lead to any new interferences between dependencies of the a priori knowledge and
the extended policy possibly leading to the need to additionally refuse other po-
tential secrets completely. As another consequence of this non-interference, which
in particular requires that a constructed additional potential secret does not imply
the premise of any dependency, each disjunction containing an additional poten-
tial secret contains at least one disjunct not enabling the adversary to conclude
any (positive) knowledge with the help of his a priori knowledge.
5.3 Adapting the Construction of Weakened Views
Now that the clustering of confidentiality policies has been adapted to eliminate
inference-channels, which might occur due to an adversary’s a priori knowledge
consisting of single premise tuple generating dependencies, the construction of a
weakened view on a considered original database instance is again the next step
109
5 Introducing A Priori Knowledge
to follow. Similar to the construction of weakened views described in Section 3.2,
a weakened view should again distort all confidential knowledge effectively. But,
in contrast to the non-extended weakening algorithm not handling a priori knowl-
edge – which enforces all specified confidentiality requirements solely on the basis
of weakening disjunctions – a weakened view must now additionally be capable
of refusing any knowledge about those potential secrets of a considered (extended
and cleaned) confidentiality policy, which do not occur in disjunction templates
induced by a partly extended matching for this policy.
Conceptually, weakened views as known from Definition 3.7 can be extended to be
capable of refusing potential secrets by ensuring that a weakened view does neither
reveal the satisfaction nor the non-satisfaction of a potential secret not occurring
in any disjunction template. In particular, additional care has to be taken that no
ground atom of the positive knowledge of a weakened view implies the satisfaction
of such a potential secret to be refused and that the completeness sentence of
a weakened view does not reveal the non-satisfaction of such a potential secret.
Then, the validity status of a potential secret to be refused remains completely
unknown, as the isolation properties established for extended and cleaned con-
fidentiality policies further guarantee that the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of
such a potential secret can not be concluded on the basis of weakening disjunctions
or negated disjunctions revealed by a weakened view.
Following these ideas, the subset of all refused potential secrets is easy to identify
from an adversary’s point of view: an adversary is supposed to be aware of a
considered extended and cleaned confidentiality policy and each potential secret of
such a policy, which does neither occur in a weakening disjunction nor in a negated
disjunction, is known to be refused according to the construction of weakened
views. However, following the design guidelines developed in Section 1.3, it seems
worthwhile to list all refused policy elements explicitly within a weakened view
to make these distortions readily identifiable. But then, the way these sentences
of the refused knowledge of a weakened view are to be interpreted differs from
all other sentences of such a weakened view: while each sentence occurring in
the positive knowledge, the disjunctive knowledge or the negative knowledge of a
weakened view is known to be satisfied by a considered original database instance
(cf. Section 3.2), a weakened view does not reveal any information about the
validity status of each sentence listed as refused knowledge.
These insights lead to the following construction of weakened views, which are
extended to be also capable of handling refused knowledge. Thereby, a weakened
view is again supposed to consist of ordered sequences of sentences to prevent
an adversary from drawing harmful meta-inferences on the basis of the syntactic
appearance of weakened views.
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Definition 5.11: Weakened View (Possibly with Refusals)
Let r be a complete database instance over a database schema 〈R|AR|SCR〉
with SCR being a subset of an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior consisting
of single premise tuple generating dependencies. Further, suppose that M+r
is the subset of those clusters of a partly extended matching M+, which is
constructed for an extended and cleaned confidentiality policy p̂secprior , such
that Ir |=M ∨Ψ∈C Ψ holds for each cluster C ∈M+r .
Then, the weakened view weak (r, psec, prior) on r consists of the following
totally ordered sequences of sentences of the first-order language L :
(i) Positive knowledge weak (r, psec, prior)+: Each tuple c ∈ r, for which
the non-implication R(c) 6|=DB Ψ holds for
• each (possibly additional) potential secret Ψ ∈ ⋃C∈M+r C and
• each potential secret Ψ ∈
(
p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C
)
not occurring in
any cluster of M+ (and hence to be refused),
is modeled as the ground atom R(c).
(ii) Disjunctive knowledge weak (r, psec, prior)∨: For each cluster C ∈ M+r
the disjunction ∨Ψ∈C Ψ is constructed.
(iii) Refused knowledge weak (r, psec, prior)?: For each potential secret Ψ ∈(
p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C
)
the sentence Ψ is marked as refused knowledge.
(iv) Negative knowledge weak (r, psec, prior)−: For each C ∈ (M+ \M+r ) the
negated disjunction ¬ [∨Ψ∈C Ψ ] is constructed. Moreover, a (partial)
completeness sentence having a universally quantified variable Xj for
each attribute Aj ∈ AR is built. This sentence is supposed to contain a
disjunct (∧i∈{1,...,n} with ti∈Dom Xi ≡ ti ) for
• each ground atom R(t1, . . . , tn) of weak (r, psec, prior)+,
• each sentence (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) of weak (r, psec, prior)? and
• each disjunct (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) occurring in weak (r, psec, prior)∨
and finally contains ¬R(X1, . . . , Xn) as its last disjunct.
Under the supposition that there is a total order on the set of those (constant
and variable) symbols, which might appear as terms of sentences of a weakened
view, a total order on the sentences actually occurring within a weakened view
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weak (r, psec, prior) can for example – by suitably adapting the ideas proposed in
Section 3.2 – be established as follows:
• the presentation of the weakened view starts with all ground atoms of the
positive knowledge weak (r, psec, prior)+ and the sequence of these ground
atoms is sorted lexicographically according to the order on their constant
symbols;
• then, all disjunctions of the disjunctive knowledge weak (r, psec, prior)∨ fol-
low such that first within each of these disjunctions the sequence of its dis-
juncts is sorted lexicographically according to the order on their terms and
subsequently the sequence of all of these disjunctions is sorted lexicograph-
ically according to the order on their terms;
• after that all potential secrets of weak (r, psec, prior)? are exposed as refused
knowledge and the sequence of these sentences is sorted lexicographically
according to the order on their terms;
• subsequently all negated disjunctions occurring in the negative knowledge
weak (r, psec, prior)− are presented and the sequence of (and within) these
sentences is ordered just as the disjunctions of weak (r, psec, prior)∨;
• and finally, the (partial) completeness sentence of the negative knowledge
weak (r, psec, prior)− is given and normalized as follows: first, within each
of its disjuncts of the form (∧i∈{1,...,n} with ti∈Dom Xi ≡ ti ) the sequence of
the conjuncts of the form Xi ≡ ti is sorted lexicographically according to
the order on the variable symbols Xi and after that the sequence of these
disjuncts is sorted lexicographically according to the order on their terms;
then, ¬R(X1, . . . , Xn) is finally appended as the last disjunct.
Now that all basic subroutines needed for the construction of an extended weak-
ening algorithm, which is capable of handling an adversary’s a priori knowledge
in the form of single premise tuple generating dependencies, are developed, the
overall extended weakening algorithm can be specified. Thereby, all of these basic
subroutines, except for the construction of an indistinguishability graph and the
computation of a partly extended matching, whose algorithmic instantiation cru-
cially depend on the employed notion of admissible indistinguishabilities, are spec-
ified on the operational level. Similar to Section 4.1.3, the developed weakening
algorithm is availability-maximizing in the sense that it aims at the construction
of weakening disjunctions of length 2, which are the shortest possible non-trivial
disjunctions and guarantee the existence of only one secure alternative instance
for both of their elements.
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Algorithm 5.1: Inference-Proof Weakening (Extended)
Let r be a complete database instance over a database schema 〈R|AR|SCR〉,
let psec be a confidentiality policy of existentially quantified atoms and sup-
pose that a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities is given. Moreover,
assume that an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior (with SCR ⊆ prior)
consisting of single premise tuple generating dependencies is given such that
Ir |=M prior holds and prior 6|=DB Ψ is valid for each Ψ ∈ psec.
Then, a weakened view weak (r, psec, prior) on r is created as follows:
• Stage 1 (independent of r): Disjoint clustering of potential secrets
(i) Create the extended confidentiality policy psecprior (Def. 5.5)
(ii) Construct the cleaned set p̂secprior based on psecprior (Def. 3.4)
(iii) Identify the complete refusals of concl (p̂secprior , prior) (Def. 5.6)
(iv) Determine the partitioning P of prior w.r.t. p̂secprior (Def. 5.7)
(v) Generate the indistinguishability graph G = (V,E) (Def. 5.8)
(vi) Compute a maximum matching M on G (Def. 4.2)
(vii) Create a partly extended matching M+ (Def. 5.9)
• Stage 2 (dependent on r): Creation of weakened view
(viii) Create the subsetM+r := {C ∈M+ | Ir |=M
∨
Ψ∈C Ψ } of clusters
containing a potential secret satisfied by Ir
(ix) Create the weakened view weak (r, psec, prior) on r (Def. 5.11)
As already mentioned in Section 5.1, it might be worthwhile to require that at
least one term of the premise and at least one term of the conclusion of each
considered single premise tuple generating dependency of an adversary’s a priori
knowledge is a constant symbol of Dom. Otherwise, there might be a dependency
Γ in an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior having an existentially quantified
premise prem (Γ ) or an existentially quantified conclusion concl (Γ ), which is se-
mantically equivalent to the weakest possible existentially quantified atom of the
form (∃X)R(X). This dependency Γ then interferes with each non-empty con-
fidentiality policy psec: if prem (Γ ) is semantically equivalent to (∃X)R(X), the
implication Ψ |=DB prem (Γ ) holds for each potential secret Ψ ∈ psec, and if
concl (Γ ) is semantically equivalent to (∃X)R(X), each Ψ ∈ psec and concl (Γ )
share a common constant unifier.
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Considering an arbitrary non-empty confidentiality policy psec, the correspond-
ing extended confidentiality policy psecprior contains both prem (Γ ) and concl (Γ )
because of the above described interference and thus also a weakest possible ex-
istentially quantified atom of the form (∃X)R(X). As each other element of
the extended policy psecprior implies (∃X)R(X), the corresponding cleaned con-
fidentiality policy p̂secprior consists of solely one remaining element semantically
equivalent to (∃X)R(X), which is moreover implied by concl (Γ ). This single
remaining potential secret of the form (∃X)R(X) is hence to be refused com-
pletely and, as an immediate consequence, this leads to a complete refusal of all
knowledge about a considered original database instance.
Of course, this worst-case scenario in terms of availability also occurs, if a weak-
est possible potential secret of the form (∃X)R(X) is contained in a considered
confidentiality policy psec. It hence makes sense to avoid the construction of con-
fidentiality policies containing such a potential secret whenever possible, although
such policies are – in contrast to the non-extended weakening approach enforcing
confidentiality policies solely on the basis of weakening disjunctions – perfectly
decent from a formal point of view.
To now give an overall example of the extended availability-maximizing instantia-
tion of the weakening algorithm, consider the input instances given in Figure 5.1.
Thereby, both the original database instance r of Figure 5.1(a) and the confi-
dentiality policy psec of Figure 5.1(c) are taken over from the example of the
(non-extended) weakening algorithm known from Figure 4.4 and are further com-
plemented by the a priori knowledge prior given in Figure 5.1(b). One can easily
see that the considered database instance r complies with the considered a priori
knowledge prior , as the DB-Interpretation Ir induced by r satisfies prior .
Within the first step of Stage 1 of Algorithm 5.1 the given confidentiality policy
psec is extended with respect to the given a priori knowledge prior . Thereby, the
dependencies Γ1, Γ2, Γ3 and Γ5 immediately interfere with psec, leading to the
(partly) extended confidentiality policy
psecprior = psec ∪ { (∃X)R(a,X, c), (∃X)R(X, d, f), (∃X)R(X, a, e),
(∃X)R(a,X, d), (∃X)R(X, b, e), (∃X)R(a,X, a),
(∃X)(∃Y )R(X, e, Y ) } .
After this extension of the policy, the dependency Γ4 now also interferes with
psecprior because of concl (Γ4) = (∃X)R(g, e,X) sharing a common constant uni-
fier with (∃X)(∃Y )R(X, e, Y ) ∈ psecprior . As a consequence, the (already partly)
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r = { (a, b, c), (a, f, g), (b, a, e), (b, b, d), (b, d, f), (g, e, i), (g, h, i) }
(a) Original database instance r (complying with prior)
prior = { Γ1 = (∀X) [R(a,X, c)⇒ R(X, d, f) ]
Γ2 = (∀X) [R(X, d, f)⇒ R(X, a, e) ]
Γ3 = (∀X) [R(a,X, d)⇒ R(X, b, e) ]
Γ4 = (∀X) [R(g, h,X)⇒ R(g, e,X) ]
Γ5 = (∀X) [R(a,X, a)⇒ (∃Y )R(X, e, Y ) ] }
(b) Adversary’s a priori knowledge prior
psec = { R(a, a, a), R(a, b, a), R(a, b, c), R(a, b, d), R(a, b, e), R(a, c, a),
(∃X)R(a, e,X), (∃X)R(b, e,X), (∃X)R(c, e,X), (∃X)R(b,X, e) }
(c) Confidentiality policy psec
Figure 5.1: Possible input instances for Algorithm 5.1
extended policy psecprior is again extended to
psecprior = psec ∪ { (∃X)R(a,X, c), (∃X)R(X, d, f), (∃X)R(X, a, e),
(∃X)R(a,X, d), (∃X)R(X, b, e), (∃X)R(a,X, a),
(∃X)(∃Y )R(X, e, Y ) } ∪
{ (∃X)R(g, h,X), (∃X)R(g, e,X) } .
Now that the extension of the confidentiality policy is completed, this extended
policy psecprior is cleaned within the next step of the weakening algorithm and
hence reduced to the maximum “core” subset of its weakest sentences. During
this process, all elements of the original policy psec except for the potential secret
(∃X)R(b,X, e) are removed, as each of these sentences implies another (weaker)
sentence of psecprior . Moreover, the sentence (∃X)R(g, e,X) of psecprior is also
removed because of (∃X)R(g, e,X) |=DB (∃X)(∃Y )R(X, e, Y ). This finally leads
to the extended and cleaned confidentiality policy
p̂secprior = { (∃X)R(b,X, e), (∃X)R(a,X, c), (∃X)R(X, d, f),
(∃X)R(X, a, e), (∃X)R(a,X, d), (∃X)R(X, b, e),
(∃X)R(a,X, a), (∃X)(∃Y )R(X, e, Y ), (∃X)R(g, h,X) } .
To next determine the subset concl (p̂secprior , prior) of those potential secrets of
p̂secprior , which are to be refused completely, note that all elements of p̂secprior
corresponding to an existentially quantified conclusion of a dependency of prior
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always need to be refused. Further, the policy element (∃X)R(b,X, e) of the ex-
tended and cleaned policy p̂secprior also needs to be refused completely, as the
implication concl (Γ2)[σ] |=DB (∃X)R(b,X, e) holds under each constant substitu-
tion σ with σ(X) = b. This finally results in
concl (p̂secprior , prior) = { (∃X)R(b,X, e), (∃X)R(X, d, f),
(∃X)R(X, a, e), (∃X)R(X, b, e),
(∃X)(∃Y )R(X, e, Y ) } .
As a next step, Stage 1 of the algorithm requires that the given a priori knowledge
prior is partitioned with respect to p̂secprior . Thereby, the dependencies Γ1 and
Γ2 obviously need to be in the same partition, as the existentially quantified
conclusion of Γ1 implies the existentially quantified premise of Γ2. Further, the
dependency Γ3 also needs to be in this partition, because there is the potential
secret (∃X)R(b,X, e) ∈ p̂secprior , for which both implications
• concl (Γ2)[σ2] |=DB (∃X)R(b,X, e) and
• concl (Γ3)[σ3] |=DB (∃X)R(b,X, e)
hold under constant substitutions σ2 and σ3 with σ2(X) = σ3(X) = b.
Similarly, the dependencies Γ4 and Γ5 need to be in the same partition, as the
policy p̂secprior contains the potential secret (∃X)(∃Y )R(X, e, Y ) with both
• concl (Γ4)[σ4] |=DB (∃X)(∃Y )R(X, e, Y ) and
• concl (Γ5)[σ5] |=DB (∃X)(∃Y )R(X, e, Y )
under arbitrary constant substitutions σ4 and σ5.
As a consequence, the algorithm creates the partitioning P = {P1, P2} with
P1 = { Γ1 = (∀X) [R(a,X, c)⇒ R(X, d, f) ],
Γ2 = (∀X) [R(X, d, f)⇒ R(X, a, e) ],
Γ3 = (∀X) [R(a,X, d)⇒ R(X, b, e) ] } and
P2 = { Γ4 = (∀X) [R(g, h,X)⇒ R(g, e,X) ],
Γ5 = (∀X) [R(a,X, a)⇒ (∃Y )R(X, e, Y ) ] } .
As the next step of Stage 1, the indistinguishability graph is constructed over
the set p̂secprior \ concl (p̂secprior , prior) of those potential secrets, which should
be weakened by disjunctions whenever possible. Again employing interchange-
ability (cf. Definition 4.5) as the notion of admissible indistinguishabilities, which
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(∃X)R(a,X, a)
(∃X)R(a,X, c)
(∃X)R(a,X, d) (∃X)R(g, h,X)
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Figure 5.2: Indistinguishability graph with maximum matching
induces all edges of this graph, the resulting indistinguishability graph is depicted
in Figure 5.2. Although the potential secrets (∃X)R(a,X, c) and (∃X)R(a,X, d)
are obviously interchangeable, the indistinguishability graph does not contain an
edge connecting the corresponding vertices of the graph, as both of these poten-
tial secrets imply an existentially quantified premise of the partition P1 due to
prem (Γ1) = (∃X)R(a,X, c) and prem (Γ3) = (∃X)R(a,X, d) and the disjunction
(∃X)R(a,X, c)∨ (∃X)R(a,X, d) might hence enable an adversary to compromise
the confidentiality policy.
To actually compute a partly extended matching, the algorithm first determines
a maximum matching
M = { { (∃X)R(a,X, a), (∃X)R(a,X, c) } }
on the considered indistinguishability graph. Then, this matching is partly ex-
tended to
M+ = { { (∃X)R(a,X, a), (∃X)R(a,X, c) },
{ (∃X)R(g, h,X), (∃X)R(g, c,X)A } }
by pairing the uncovered potential secret (∃X)R(g, h,X) with the (admissible)
additional potential secret (∃X)R(g, c,X).
Note that the potential secret (∃X)R(a,X, d) still remains uncovered by the partly
extended matching M+. Each interchangeable additional potential secret must
differ from (∃X)R(a,X, d) either in the constant symbol at first position or in the
constant symbol at the third position and in both of these cases the dependency
Γ5 of prior would interfere with the resulting additional potential secret due to a
common constant unifier. Accordingly, an admissible additional potential secret
can not be constructed for (∃X)R(a,X, d) and the only possibility to enforce this
potential secret under the employed notion of interchangeability is to refuse it.
Now that the instance-independent Stage 1 of Algorithm 5.1 is completed, this
algorithm continues with the instance-dependent Stage 2 finally returning the
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R(a, f, g)
R(b, b, d)
(∃X)R(a,X, a) ∨ (∃X)R(a,X, c)
(∃X)R(g, c,X) ∨ (∃X)R(g, h,X)
Refused: { (∃X)R(X, a, e),
(∃X)R(X, b, e),
(∃X)R(X, d, f),
(∃X)(∃Y )R(X, e, Y ),
(∃X)R(a,X, d),
(∃X)R(b,X, e) }
(∀X)(∀Y )(∀Z) [
( Y ≡ a ∧ Z ≡ e ) ∨
( Y ≡ b ∧ Z ≡ e ) ∨
( Y ≡ d ∧ Z ≡ f ) ∨
( Y ≡ e ) ∨
(X ≡ a ∧ Z ≡ a ) ∨
(X ≡ a ∧ Z ≡ c ) ∨
(X ≡ a ∧ Z ≡ d ) ∨
(X ≡ a ∧ Y ≡ f ∧ Z ≡ g ) ∨
(X ≡ b ∧ Z ≡ e ) ∨
(X ≡ b ∧ Y ≡ b ∧ Z ≡ d ) ∨
(X ≡ g ∧ Y ≡ c ) ∨
(X ≡ g ∧ Y ≡ h ) ∨
¬R(X,Y, Z) ]
Figure 5.3: Inference-proof weakened view for inputs of Figure 5.1
inference-proof weakened view given in Figure 5.3. Therefore, the algorithm first
discovers that both disjunction templates corresponding to the extended clusters
of M+ are satisfied by the original database instance r given in Figure 5.1(a) and
then constructs the weakened view as required by Definition 5.11.
5.4 Interchangeability Revisited
As demonstrated in the above given example of the extended weakening algo-
rithm, the interchangeability criterion, which is introduced in Definition 4.5 as an
example of a concrete notion of admissible indistinguishabilities, might not allow
for the construction of an admissible additional potential secret for some potential
secrets of a considered extended and cleaned confidentiality policy p̂secprior . More
specifically, an admissible additional potential secret can not be constructed for
a potential secret Ψ ∈ p̂secprior according to Definition 5.10, if each additional
potential secret for Ψ , which is constructible according to interchangeability, in-
terferes with a dependency Γ of a considered adversary’s a priori knowledge prior
due to Ψ and concl (Γ ) sharing a common constant unifier.
The following theorem gives a both sufficient and necessary condition for the
constructibility of additional potential secrets, which are both interchangeable and
admissible. Thereby, the proof of this theorem is constructive in the sense that it
sketches an efficient as well as easy to implement algorithm for the construction
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of interchangeable and admissible additional potential secrets, provided that such
an additional potential secret is constructible.
Theorem 5.1: Interchangeable Additional Potential Secrets
Consider an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior consisting of single premise
tuple generating dependencies and a confidentiality policy p̂secprior , which
is extended with respect to prior and which is cleaned. Moreover, suppose
that p̂secAprior is a set of additional potential secrets, which is admissible with
respect to p̂secprior and prior according to Definition 5.10.
A further interchangeable additional potential secret ΨA can be constructed
for a potential secret Ψ of p̂secprior such that the set p̂secAprior ∪ {ΨA} is still
admissible with respect to p̂secprior and prior , if and only if there is a term
tm of Ψ = (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) with tm ∈ Dom such that for each dependency
Γ of prior with concl (Γ ) = (∃Y )R(t′1, . . . , t′n)
• the term t′m of concl (Γ ) is a constant symbol, i.e., t′m ∈ Dom, or
• Ψ and concl (Γ ) have at least one differing constant position different
from m, i.e., there is an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {m} such that both ti and t′i
are constant symbols of Dom and ti 6= t′i holds.
Proof. To start with the only-if-part, consider a potential secret Ψ of p̂secprior such
that for each constant term tm of Ψ = (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) with tm ∈ Dom there is
a dependency Γ of prior with concl (Γ ) = (∃Y )R(t′1, . . . , t′n) and with both
• t′m of concl (Γ ) being a variable of Y and
• ti = t′i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {m} such that both ti and t′i are constant
symbols of Dom.
As ti = t′i obviously also holds for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the existentially quantified
atoms Ψ and concl (Γ ) share a common constant unifier according to Lemma 5.2
and as an immediate consequence the set p̂secAprior ∪ {ΨA} is not admissible ac-
cording to Definition 5.10 due to prior interfering with p̂secAprior ∪ {ΨA}.
To now continue with the if-part, consider a potential secret Ψ of p̂secprior having
a constant term tm of Ψ = (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) with tm ∈ Dom such that for each
dependency Γ of prior with concl (Γ ) = (∃Y )R(t′1, . . . , t′n)
• the term t′m of concl (Γ ) is a constant symbol, i.e., t′m ∈ Dom, or
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• there is an i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{m} such that both ti and t′i are constant symbols
of Dom and ti 6= t′i holds.
Then, an interchangeable additional potential secret ΨA = (∃X)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) can
be constructed for the potential secret Ψ = (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) as follows:
• set t¯j := tj for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {m} and
• choose t¯m to be a constant symbol of Dom such that t¯m 6= t˜m holds for
– each (∃Z)R(t˜1, . . . , t˜n) ∈ p̂secprior ∪ p̂secAprior with t˜m ∈ Dom,
– each concl (Γ ) = (∃Z)R(t˜1, . . . , t˜n) of prior with t˜m ∈ Dom and
– each prem (Γ ) = (∃Z)R(t˜1, . . . , t˜n) of prior with t˜m ∈ Dom.
To start the proof that p̂secAprior ∪ {ΨA} is still admissible, first of all consider that
no dependency Γ ∈ prior interferes with ΨA = (∃X)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n), as required by
condition (ii) of Definition 5.10. For that purpose, consider an arbitrary depen-
dency Γ of prior with concl (Γ ) = (∃Z)R(t˜1, . . . , t˜n). Then, t¯m 6= t˜m is supposed
to hold due to the construction of ΨA, if t˜m is a constant symbol of Dom. Oth-
erwise, if t˜m is a variable, there is an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {m} such that both ti and
t′i are constant symbols of Dom and ti 6= t′i holds. Hence, in both of these cases
there is an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that both ti and t′i are constant symbols of Dom
and ti 6= t′i holds and as an immediate consequence ΨA and concl (Γ ) do not share
a common constant unifier according to Lemma 5.2.
To now show that there is also no interference due to ΨA 6|=DB prem (Γ ), assume
that ΨA |=DB prem (Γ ) holds for prem (Γ ) = (∃Z)R(t˜1, . . . , t˜n). As t¯m 6= t˜m
is supposed to hold according to the construction of ΨA = (∃X)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n),
the implication ΨA |=DB prem (Γ ) can only hold, if the term t˜m of prem (Γ )
is a variable of Z. But then, the potential secret Ψ = (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) of
p̂secprior , for which ΨA is constructed as an additional potential secret, also implies
prem (Γ ), i.e., Ψ |=DB prem (Γ ), as t¯j = tj holds according to the constructing
of ΨA for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {m}. Reconsidering that p̂secprior is supposed
to be extended and cleaned, this interference between Γ and p̂secprior due to
Ψ |=DB prem (Γ ) guarantees that there is a potential secret Ψprem ∈ p̂secprior with
prem (Γ ) |=DB Ψprem, leading to
Ψ |=DB prem (Γ ) |=DB Ψprem
by transitivity. But then, Ψ and Ψprem – and hence also Ψ and prem (Γ ) – must be
semantically equivalent: otherwise, it is not possible that both Ψ and Ψprem are in
p̂secprior due to p̂secprior being a cleaned set. However, this semantic equivalence
between Ψ = (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) and prem (Γ ) = (∃Z)R(t˜1, . . . , t˜n) is obviously
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in contradiction to the assumption that tm is a constant symbol of Dom and
that t˜m is a variable of Y and accordingly ΨA 6|=DB prem (Γ ) holds. Moreover,
considering that an interference relationship according to case (ii) of Definition 5.4
is not possible, as ΨA is not an existentially quantified conclusion of prior , the
considered dependency Γ does not interfere with ΨA.
Beside the non-interference between prior and p̂secAprior ∪ {ΨA}, the definition of
admissible additional potential secrets also requires p̂secprior ∪ p̂secAprior ∪ {ΨA}
to be a cleaned set. This follows from p̂secprior ∪ p̂secAprior being a cleaned set
and by constructing ΨA = (∃X)R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) such that t¯m 6= t˜m holds for each
(∃Z)R(t˜1, . . . , t˜n) ∈ p̂secprior ∪ p̂secAprior with t˜m ∈ Dom, as shown in the proof of
Theorem 4.1 that interchangeability is well-defined.
Last but not least, requirement (iii) of Definition 5.10 – that the non-implication
Γ 6|=DB ΨA should hold for each Γ ∈ prior – is always satisfied: each Γ ∈ prior in
the form of a single premise tuple generating dependency is satisfied by an empty
DB-Interpretation, but such an empty DB-Interpretation does not satisfy ΨA in
the form of an existentially quantified atom. ♠
5.5 Inference-Proofness of the Adapted Approach
Now that the extended weakening algorithm – which is capable of handling an
adversary’s a priori knowledge in the form of single premise tuple generating de-
pendencies – is formalized, its inference-proofness in the sense of Controlled Inter-
action Execution is also shown in a formal way. For that purpose, two preparing
results are presented in the following as a preliminary step, and then the final
proof relying on these preparing results is provided.
5.5.1 Preparing Results
For the first of these preparing results a partitioning P of an adversary’s a priori
knowledge prior is considered, which is constructed according to Definition 5.7
with respect to a considered confidentiality policy psecprior , which is extended
with respect to prior . Thereby, it is essentially shown that one can be sure that
all dependencies of a partition Pi ∈ P interfere with the extended confidentiality
policy psecprior , if at least one dependency of this partition Pi is known to inter-
fere with psecprior . As a consequence of this insight, the corresponding cleaned
confidentiality policy p̂secprior contains potential secrets Ψprem ∈ p̂secprior and
Ψconcl ∈ p̂secprior with prem (Γ ) |=DB Ψprem and concl (Γ ) |=DB Ψconcl for each
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dependency Γ of a partition Pi ∈ P, if this partition Pi – and hence at least one
of its dependencies – interferes with p̂secprior .
Lemma 5.3: Completely Protected Partitions
Consider an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior consisting of single premise
tuple generating dependencies and a confidentiality policy psecprior , which
is extended with respect to prior . Moreover, suppose that p̂secprior is the
cleaned policy of psecprior and further suppose that P is a partitioning of
prior with respect to p̂secprior according to Definition 5.7.
If a partition Pi ∈ P interferes with p̂secprior , then for each dependency
Γ ∈ Pi there are potential secrets Ψprem ∈ p̂secprior and Ψconcl ∈ p̂secprior
with prem (Γ ) |=DB Ψprem and concl (Γ ) |=DB Ψconcl.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary partition Pi ∈ P interfering with p̂secprior . To estab-
lish the proof by induction, consider the sets Sj with j ∈ {0, . . . , `} and suppose
that each such set Sj contains each dependency Γ ∈ Pi, for which the existence of
potential secrets Ψprem ∈ p̂secprior and Ψconcl ∈ p̂secprior with prem (Γ ) |=DB Ψprem
and concl (Γ ) |=DB Ψconcl is proved after the j-th iteration of induction.
To start with the base clause, consider the set S0: as the considered partition
Pi is supposed to interfere with the cleaned policy p̂secprior , there is at least one
dependency Γ ∈ Pi that interferes with p̂secprior . Then, this dependency Γ also
interferes with the non-cleaned policy psecprior , which is a superset of the cleaned
policy p̂secprior . Additionally considering that the non-cleaned policy psecprior
is extended with respect to prior according to Definition 5.5, this non-cleaned
policy psecprior is guaranteed to contain both prem (Γ ) and concl (Γ ) as potential
secrets. Hence, due to the properties of a cleaned set according to Definition 3.4,
the cleaned confidentiality policy p̂secprior contains the (possibly weaker) potential
secrets Ψprem ∈ p̂secprior and Ψconcl ∈ p̂secprior with prem (Γ ) |=DB Ψprem and
concl (Γ ) |=DB Ψconcl. As a direct consequence, each such dependency Γ ∈ Pi that
interferes with p̂secprior is in the set S0.
To prepare the induction step, the induction hypothesis is established as follows:
for each j ∈ {0, . . . , `−1} the set Sj contains each Γ ∈ Pi, for which the existence of
potential secrets Ψprem ∈ p̂secprior and Ψconcl ∈ p̂secprior with prem (Γ ) |=DB Ψprem
and concl (Γ ) |=DB Ψconcl is proved after the j-th iteration of induction.
To now perform the induction step, consider an arbitrary j ∈ {0, . . . , ` − 1}. By
construction of the partitioning P and because of j < ` there are dependencies
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Γ¯ ∈ Sj ⊆ Pi and Γ ∈ Pi with Γ /∈ Sj such that
(a) there is a potential secret Ψ ∈ p̂secprior with both concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯] |=DB Ψ and
concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψ under arbitrary constant substitutions σ¯ and σ,
(b) the implication concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯] |=DB prem (Γ ) holds under an arbitrary constant
substitution σ¯ or
(c) the implication concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB prem (Γ¯ ) holds under an arbitrary constant
substitution σ.
Case (a) relies on the assumption that there is a potential secret Ψ in the cleaned
confidentiality policy p̂secprior with concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψ under an arbitrary con-
stant substitution σ. So, according to the definition of DB-Implication, this poten-
tial secret Ψ and concl (Γ ) share a common constant unifier and hence Γ interferes
with the non-cleaned policy psecprior , which also contains Ψ due to being a super-
set of the cleaned policy p̂secprior .
Considering case (b), the induction hypothesis guarantees that there is a potential
secret Ψ¯concl ∈ p̂secprior with concl (Γ¯ ) |=DB Ψ¯concl because of Γ¯ ∈ Sj . Hence, the
non-cleaned confidentiality policy psecprior also contains Ψ¯concl due to being a su-
perset of the cleaned policy p̂secprior . As this non-cleaned policy psecprior is more-
over extended with respect to prior according to Definition 5.5, it is guaranteed
to contain concl (Γ¯ ) as a potential secret because of the interference established
by concl (Γ¯ ) and Ψ¯concl ∈ psecprior , which share a common constant unifier due to
the implication concl (Γ¯ ) |=DB Ψ¯concl. By further considering that the implication
concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯] |=DB prem (Γ ) is supposed to hold in this case under an arbitrary con-
stant substitution σ¯, there is a potential secret Ψ¯ = concl (Γ¯ ) in the non-cleaned
confidentiality policy psecprior for which the implication Ψ¯ [σ¯] |=DB prem (Γ ) holds
under σ¯ and as a consequence the dependency Γ interferes with the non-cleaned
policy psecprior according to case (ii) of Definition 5.4.
Considering case (c), the induction hypothesis guarantees that there is a potential
secret Ψ¯prem ∈ p̂secprior with prem (Γ¯ ) |=DB Ψ¯prem because of Γ¯ ∈ Sj . Hence,
the non-cleaned confidentiality policy psecprior also contains Ψ¯prem due to being a
superset of the cleaned policy p̂secprior . By further considering that the implication
concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB prem (Γ¯ ) is supposed to hold in this case under the constant
substitution σ, the implication concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψ¯prem holds by transitivity and
hence the definition of DB-Implication guarantees that concl (Γ ) and Ψ¯prem share
a common constant unifier. As a direct consequence, the dependency Γ interferes
with the non-cleaned policy psecprior containing Ψ¯prem.
In each of the cases discussed above the dependency Γ interferes with the non-
cleaned confidentiality policy psecprior . Again considering that the non-cleaned
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policy psecprior is extended with respect to prior according to Definition 5.5,
this non-cleaned policy psecprior is guaranteed to contain both prem (Γ ) and
concl (Γ ) as potential secrets. Hence, due to the properties of a cleaned set ac-
cording to Definition 3.4, the cleaned confidentiality policy p̂secprior contains the
(possibly weaker) potential secrets Ψprem ∈ p̂secprior and Ψconcl ∈ p̂secprior with
prem (Γ ) |=DB Ψprem and concl (Γ ) |=DB Ψconcl. As a direct consequence, each
such dependency Γ is in the set Sj+1 in addition to all dependencies of Sj . ♠
In Section 3.3 the inference-proofness of the generic weakening algorithm is verified
by providing a generic method to construct confidentiality preserving alternative
database instances on the basis of a so-called ground operator, which essentially
generates database tuples inducing DB-Interpretations that satisfy exactly one
sentence of a cleaned set of existentially quantified atoms. To verify the inference-
proofness of the extended weakening algorithm, confidentiality preserving alter-
native database instances are similarly constructed on the basis of the following
extension of this ground operator.
Definition 5.12: Extended Ground Operator
Consider an existentially quantified atom Φ constructed over a predicate sym-
bol R of arity n and a finite set S of existentially quantified atoms all con-
structed over this predicate symbol R. Moreover, suppose that a non-empty
but finite subset
Dom∗ ⊂ Dom \ { ti | (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ S and ti ∈ Dom and 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
of constant symbols of Dom is given, i.e., a non-empty but finite subset of
constant symbols which is not contained in the active domain of S.
The (extended) ground operator grnd (Φ,S,Dom∗) deterministically returns
a constant combination c ∈ Domn such that the induced DB-Interpretation
Ic with Ic(R) = {c}
(i) contains only constant symbols occurring in Φ and in Dom∗,
(ii) satisfies the sentence Φ, i.e., Ic |=M Φ, and
(iii) does not satisfy any sentence Φ¯ of the set
S(Φ) := { Φ¯ ∈ S | Φ 6|=DB Φ¯ } ,
i.e., Ic 6|=M Φ¯ for each Φ¯ ∈ S(Φ).
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Similar to the ground operator known from Definition 3.8, this extended ground
operator also constructs database tuples, which induce DB-Interpretations satis-
fying a sentence Φ without (accidentally) satisfying certain other sentences, which
are not implied by Φ and which do hence – according to the definition of DB-
Implication – not necessarily need to be satisfied, if Φ is satisfied. Thereby, all
fresh constant symbols of a database tuple constructed to satisfy a sentence Φ
stem from a certain finite subset of constant symbols of the infinite domain Dom
to guarantee that the active domains of alternative database instances constructed
on the basis of the extended ground operator are limited to certain finite subsets
of constant symbols of Dom.
As known from Section 3.3, it is now formally verified that this extended ground
operator is well-defined to be able to rely on this operator within the main proof.
Lemma 5.4: Well-Defined Extended Ground Operator
Let Φ be an existentially quantified atom constructed over a predicate symbol
R of arity n and let S be a finite set of existentially quantified atoms all
constructed over this predicate symbol R. Moreover, let
Dom∗ ⊂ Dom \ { ti | (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ S and ti ∈ Dom and 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
be a non-empty but finite subset of constant symbols of Dom. Then, the
ground operator grnd (Φ,S,Dom∗) is able to return a constant combination
c ∈ Domn as required by Definition 5.12.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary existentially quantified atom Φ = (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn)
and an arbitrary finite set S of existentially quantified atoms over predicate symbol
R. To construct the constant combination c = (c1, . . . , cn) to be returned by
grnd (Φ,S,Dom∗), set ci := ti for each i with ti ∈ Dom. Then, for each i with
ti ∈ X deterministically choose ci from the non-empty subset Dom∗ of constant
symbols of Dom, which is not contained in the active domain of S.
Obviously, this construction of c guarantees that each ci is either a constant sym-
bol occurring in Φ or a constant symbol of Dom∗ and that the induced DB-
Interpretation Ic with Ic(R) = {c} satisfies the existentially quantified atom Φ,
i.e., Ic |=M Φ. To moreover assure that this DB-Interpretation Ic does not sat-
isfy any existentially quantified atom of the set S(Φ), assume that there is such
a sentence Φ¯ = (∃Y )R(t¯1, . . . , t¯n) in S(Φ) with Ic |=M Φ¯. Then, for each i with
ti ∈ Dom either t¯i = ci = ti or t¯i ∈ Y holds and for each i with ti ∈ X the term
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t¯i must be a variable of Y because of choosing ci from the subset Dom∗ of con-
stant symbols not containing any constant symbol occurring in a sentence of S(Φ).
Hence, by applying Lemma 2.1, the implication Φ |=DB Φ¯ holds in contradiction
to the construction of the set S(Φ) := { Φ¯ ∈ S | Φ 6|=DB Φ¯ }. ♠
5.5.2 Establishing the Main Result
Now, the inference-proofness of the extended weakening algorithm is formally
verified. Similar to the proof developed for the generic weakening algorithm in
Section 3.3, a generic method for the construction of alternative database instances
is provided, which are both indistinguishable from a considered original database
instance from an adversary’s point of view and do not satisfy a particular potential
secret of a considered confidentiality policy. Such an alternative instance hence
serves as a witness that the considered potential secret does not necessarily need
to be satisfied from an adversary’s point of view.
Theorem 5.2: Inference-Proofness under A Priori Knowledge
Let r be a complete database instance over a database schema 〈R|AR|SCR〉,
let psec be a confidentiality policy of existentially quantified atoms and sup-
pose that a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities is given. Moreover,
assume that an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior (with SCR ⊆ prior)
consisting of single premise tuple generating dependencies is given such that
Ir |=M prior holds and prior 6|=DB Ψ is valid for each Ψ ∈ psec.
Algorithm 5.1 then creates a weakened view weak (r, psec, prior) on the given
database instance r, which is inference-proof in the sense that for each poten-
tial secret Ψ ∈ psec the existence of a complete alternative instance rΨ over
schema 〈R|AR|SCR〉 is guaranteed. This alternative instance rΨ
(i) obeys the potential secret Ψ , i.e., IrΨ 6|=M Ψ ,
(ii) satisfies the adversary’s a priori knowledge, i.e., IrΨ |=M prior , and
(iii) the weakened view weak (rΨ , psec, prior) on the alternative instance rΨ
is indistinguishable from the weakened view weak (r, psec, prior) on the
original instance r, i.e., weak (rΨ , psec, prior) = weak (r, psec, prior).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary potential secret Ψ˜ ∈ psec to be protected and suppose
that Stage 1 of Algorithm 5.1 – which does not depend on the original instance r at
all – finished successfully with the generation of a partly extended matching M+
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consisting of pairwise disjoint clusters, each of which is of size 2. By construction
of the extended and cleaned confidentiality policy p̂secprior there is a (weakest)
potential secret Ψˆ ∈ p̂secprior such that the implication Ψ˜ |=DB Ψˆ holds.
If the potential secret Ψˆ is not satisfied by the original instance r, i.e., Ir 6|=M Ψˆ , the
complete alternative instance rΨˆ protecting Ψˆ is simply r itself, i.e., rΨˆ := r. This
construction of rΨˆ directly implies I
rΨˆ
6|=M Ψˆ and consequently the constructed
alternative instance rΨˆ obeys Ψˆ , i.e., I
rΨˆ
6|=M Ψˆ . Hence, by Ψ˜ |=DB Ψˆ and by
applying Lemma 3.1, the alternative instance rΨˆ also obeys Ψ˜ , i.e., I
rΨˆ
6|=M Ψ˜ .
Moreover, rΨˆ satisfies the adversary’s a priori knowledge prior , i.e., I
rΨˆ
|=M prior ,
because of both rΨˆ = r and Ir |=M prior and the property of indistinguishability,
i.e., weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior) = weak (r, psec, prior), is a direct consequence of rΨˆ = r.
If the potential secret Ψˆ is satisfied by the original instance r, i.e., Ir |=M Ψˆ , a
complete alternative instance rΨˆ protecting Ψˆ can be constructed with the help of
the (extended) ground operator introduced in Definition 5.12. But as a prepro-
cessing step, it is to check first, whether there is a partition Pi ∈ P containing a
dependency Γ ∈ Pi, for which the implication concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψˆ holds under an
arbitrary constant substitution σ. If this is the case, set m := i. Otherwise, this
variable m is supposed to be undefined. Next, the finite set SΨˆ containing
• the (possibly additional) potential secrets of each cluster C ∈M+,
• the (non-additional) refused potential secrets of p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C not
occurring in any cluster of M+,
• the existentially quantified premise prem (Γ ) and the existentially quantified
conclusion concl (Γ ) of each dependency Γ being in the partition Pm, if the
variable m is defined, and
• the existentially quantified premise prem (Γ ) of each dependency Γ being in
a partition Pj ∈ P not interfering with p̂secprior
is constructed as the set of all existentially quantified atoms not to be satisfied (if
possible) by the ground operator.
To further prepare the construction of the alternative instance rΨˆ with the help of
the (extended) ground operator, consider an arbitrary non-empty but finite subset
Dom∗ ⊂ Dom \ { ti | (∃X)R(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ SΨˆ and ti ∈ Dom and 1 ≤ i ≤ n }
of constant symbols of Dom, i.e., a non-empty but finite subset of “fresh” constant
symbols, which is not contained in the active domain of the set SΨˆ constructed
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above. This construction is always possible as Dom is supposed to be an infinite set
of constant symbols while the set SΨˆ only contains a finite number of existentially
quantified atoms each of which is of finite arity.
Finally, the complete alternative instance rΨˆ protecting the potential secret Ψˆ can
be constructed by adding
(i) the tuple c for each ground atom R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec, prior)+,
(ii) the tuple grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) for each dependency Γ ∈ Pi of each
partition Pi ∈ P with5 i 6= m, which moreover interferes with p̂secprior , under
each possible constant substitution σ substituting the universally quantified
variables of Γ with constant symbols of
• the (possibly additional) potential secrets of the clusters of M+,
• the dependencies of the adversary’s a priori knowledge prior , and
• the fresh constant symbols of the set Dom∗, and
(iii) the tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) for an arbitrary (possibly additional) potential
secret Ψ of each cluster C ∈M+r such that
• Ψ 6= Ψˆ and
• Ψ 6|=DB prem (Γ ) and Ψ 6|=DB concl (Γ ) for each Γ ∈ Pm, if the variable
m is defined,
to this initially empty database instance rΨˆ . Note that the sequence in which
these tuples are added to rΨˆ is not of importance, as the ground operator only
depends on inputs which remain unchanged during the construction of rΨˆ . In
particular, the clustering stage of Algorithm 5.1 does not depend at all on the
database instance considered and the considered original instance r – and hence
also the set M+r of all clusters, whose corresponding disjunctions are satisfied by
r – is not affected by the construction of the alternative instance rΨˆ .
To show: I
rΨˆ
6|=M Ψ˜
By the above given construction of the alternative instance rΨˆ , the induced DB-
Interpretation I
rΨˆ
does not satisfy the potential secret Ψˆ , i.e., there is no single
tuple c ∈ rΨˆ inducing a DB-Interpretation satisfying Ψˆ . First of all, each tuple
c ∈ rΨˆ stemming from a ground atom R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec, prior)+ according to
construction rule (i) does not induce such a DB-Interpretation: considering the
5 If m is undefined, i 6= m is supposed to hold for each Pi ∈ P.
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assumption Ir |=M Ψˆ , the potential secret Ψˆ is either in a cluster C ∈M+r or in the
set of all refused potential secrets of p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C not occurring in any clus-
ter ofM+ and in both of these cases the construction of weak (r, psec, prior)+ guar-
antees that the non-implication R(c) 6|=DB Ψˆ holds according to Definition 5.11.
Moreover, each tuple grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ , which is constructed for
a dependency Γ ∈ Pi of a partition Pi ∈ P with i 6= m according to construction
rule (ii), does not induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying the potential secret Ψˆ . If
the variable m is undefined, there is no partition Pi ∈ P containing a dependency
Γ ∈ Pi with concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψˆ under an arbitrary constant substitution σ.
Hence, as the potential secret Ψˆ of p̂secprior is further contained in the set SΨˆ
of all existentially quantified atoms not to be satisfied (if possible) by the ground
operator because of either Ψˆ ∈ ⋃C∈M+ C or Ψˆ ∈ (p̂secprior \ ⋃C∈M+ C), each tuple
grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ does not induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying
Ψˆ by construction of the ground operator according to Lemma 5.4.
If m is defined and there hence is a partition Pm ∈ P containing a dependency
Γ¯ ∈ Pm with concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯] |=DB Ψˆ under an arbitrary constant substitution σ¯, for
none of the dependencies Γ ∈ Pm a tuple grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) is added to
rΨˆ according to construction rule (ii). Furthermore, each other partition Pi ∈ P
with i 6= m does not contain such a dependency Γ with concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψˆ
under an arbitrary constant substitution σ: otherwise, i 6= m can not hold as all
partitions of prior are supposed to be pairwise disjoint and as the partitioning of
prior would moreover require that the (different) dependencies Γ of Pi and Γ¯ of
Pm are in the same partition of P because of concl (Γ )[σ] and concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯] both
implying the same potential secret Ψˆ of p̂secprior . Hence, again considering that
Ψˆ is in the set SΨˆ , each tuple grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ does not induce
a DB-Interpretation satisfying Ψˆ according to Lemma 5.4.
Each tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ , which is constructed for a (possibly addi-
tional) potential secret Ψ of a cluster C ∈M+r according to construction rule (iii),
does not induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying the potential secret Ψˆ , either. A
tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) is only added to rΨˆ for a potential secret Ψ with Ψ 6= Ψˆ .
If Ψ is a non-additional potential secret of the cleaned policy p̂secprior , which also
contains Ψˆ , the non-implication Ψ 6|=DB Ψˆ is guaranteed by the properties of a
cleaned set. If Ψ is an additional potential secret, the non-implication Ψ 6|=DB Ψˆ
is guaranteed by the requirement that the set of all additional potential secrets
occurring in a partly extended matching must be admissible in the sense of Def-
inition 5.10, according to which the union of all additional potential secrets and
all non-additional potential secrets must again be a cleaned set. Hence, because
of Ψˆ being in the set SΨˆ of all existentially quantified atoms not to be satisfied
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(if possible) by the ground operator, each tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) added to rΨˆ
does not induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying Ψˆ by construction of the ground
operator according to Lemma 5.4.
Summing up the above presented results, the proof of I
rΨˆ
6|=M Ψˆ is achieved. By
furthermore considering Ψ˜ |=DB Ψˆ and Lemma 3.1, the constructed alternative
instance rΨˆ also obeys the potential secret Ψ˜ to be protected, i.e., I
rΨˆ
6|=M Ψ˜ .
To show: weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior) = weak (r, psec, prior)
Next, it is to show that the weakened view weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior) on the con-
structed complete alternative instance rΨˆ is indistinguishable from the weakened
view weak (r, psec, prior) on the original instance r from an adversary’s point of
view. As a first step, weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)∨ = weak (r, psec, prior)∨ is proved now.
Subcase: weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)∨ = weak (r, psec, prior)∨
For this subcase consider an arbitrary (extended) cluster C ∈ M+ and suppose
that the original instance r satisfies the corresponding disjunction ∨Ψ∈C Ψ , i.e.,
Ir |=M ∨Ψ∈C Ψ . By this assumption, the cluster C is in the set M+r of all clusters
satisfied by r and by rule (iii) of the construction of the alternative instance rΨˆ
a tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) is added to rΨˆ for an arbitrary (possibly additional)
potential secret Ψ of the cluster C with Ψ 6= Ψˆ and, if the variable m is defined,
with further Ψ 6|=DB prem (Γ ) and Ψ 6|=DB concl (Γ ) for each Γ ∈ Pm. Hence,
according to Lemma 5.4, the alternative instance rΨˆ also satisfies the disjunction∨
Ψ∈C Ψ , i.e., IrΨˆ |=M
∨
Ψ∈C Ψ , provided that the existence of such a (possibly
additional) potential secret Ψ ∈ C as required above is guaranteed.
• If the variable m is undefined, there is such a potential secret Ψ ∈ C with
Ψ 6= Ψˆ due to the properties of a partly extended matching guaranteeing
that C contains 2 semantically different potential secrets.
• If the variable m is defined and the cluster C does not contain an addi-
tional potential secret, the construction of the indistinguishability graph
G = (V,E) ensures that for the edge C = {Ψ, Ψ ′} ∈ E of this graph – which
corresponds to the cluster C – there is no single partition Pi ∈ P containing
dependencies Γ1 ∈ Pi and Γ2 ∈ Pi (with possibly Γ1 = Γ2) such that both
implications Ψ |=DB prem (Γ1) and Ψ ′ |=DB prem (Γ2) hold. As a conse-
quence, at least one of the potential secrets of the cluster C does not imply
the existentially quantified premise of any dependency Γ ∈ Pm.
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Moreover, for both potential secrets Ψ and Ψ ′ of this cluster C the non-
implications Ψ 6|=DB concl (Γ ) and Ψ ′ 6|=DB concl (Γ ) hold for each depen-
dency Γ ∈ Pm. Otherwise, if there is such a dependency Γ ∈ Pm with
Ψ¯ |=DB concl (Γ ) for a potential secret Ψ¯ ∈ C, this dependency Γ inter-
feres with p̂secprior due to Ψ¯ and concl (Γ ) sharing a common constant uni-
fier according to the definition of DB-Implication. Hence, the extended
and cleaned policy p̂secprior also contains a potential secret Ψconcl with
concl (Γ ) |=DB Ψconcl and the implication Ψ¯ |=DB Ψconcl holds by transitiv-
ity. Further, the sentences Ψ¯ and Ψconcl can not be semantically equivalent
because of concl (Γ ) |=DB Ψconcl and because of concl (Γ ) 6|=DB Ψ¯ due to
Ψ¯ ∈ C and considering that all non-additional potential secrets of clusters
of M+ stem from the subset p̂secprior \ concl (p̂secprior , prior) of potential
secrets, which serves as the set of vertices of an indistinguishability graph
(cf. Definition 5.8 and Definition 5.6). As an immediate consequence, the
properties of a cleaned set guarantee that the (stronger) potential secret Ψ¯
can – in contradiction to the assumption – not be in the cleaned set p̂secprior
as long as the (weaker) potential secret Ψconcl also is in p̂secprior .
So, there is at least one potential secret Ψ ∈ C with both Ψ 6|=DB prem (Γ )
and Ψ 6|=DB concl (Γ ) for each Γ ∈ Pm. As m is supposed to be defined,
there is a dependency Γ ∈ Pm with concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψˆ under an arbitrary
constant substitution σ. Consequently, the potential secret Ψˆ is in the set
concl (p̂secprior , prior). But, again considering that all non-additional po-
tential secrets of clusters of M+ stem from p̂secprior \ concl (p̂secprior , prior),
the potential secret Ψˆ can not be in the cluster C consisting only of non-
additional potential secrets. Hence, Ψ 6= Ψˆ is an immediate consequence.
• If the variable m is defined and the (extended) cluster C contains an addi-
tional potential secret ΨA, the construction of admissible additional potential
secrets according to Definition 5.10 guarantees that each dependency Γ of
the partition Pm does not interfere with ΨA. Hence, both non-implications
ΨA 6|=DB prem (Γ ) and ΨA 6|=DB concl (Γ ) hold for each Γ ∈ Pm by the
properties of this non-interference. The construction of admissible addi-
tional potential secrets moreover guarantees the inequality ΨA 6= Ψˆ , as the
union of all additional potential secrets (such as ΨA) and all non-additional
potential secrets (such as Ψˆ) must be a cleaned set.
For each (extended) cluster C ∈M+, whose corresponding disjunction ∨Ψ∈C Ψ is
not satisfied by the original instance r, this corresponding disjunction ∨Ψ∈C Ψ is
not satisfied by the constructed alternative instance rΨˆ , either. Hence, there is no
single tuple c ∈ rΨˆ inducing a DB-Interpretation satisfying a (possibly additional)
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potential secret Ψ of the cluster C. First of all, each tuple c ∈ rΨˆ stemming from a
ground atom R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec, prior)+ according to construction rule (i) does
not induce such a DB-Interpretation: the assumption Ir 6|=M ∨Ψ∈C Ψ guarantees
that each tuple of the original instance r does not induce a DB-Interpretation
satisfying a potential secret Ψ of the cluster C and for each ground atom R(c) ∈
weak (r, psec, prior)+ the tuple c stems from this original instance r.
Moreover, each tuple grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ , which is constructed for
a dependency Γ ∈ Pi of a partition Pi ∈ P according to construction rule (ii),
does not induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying the disjunction ∨Ψ∈C Ψ . For each
non-additional potential secret Ψ of the considered cluster C, the non-implication
concl (Γ )[σ] 6|=DB Ψ holds under each constant substitution σ – otherwise Ψ would
be in the set concl (p̂secprior , prior) and could hence not be in a cluster of M+.
For each additional potential secret ΨA of the cluster C, the validity of the non-
implication concl (Γ )[σ] 6|=DB ΨA is guaranteed under each constant substitution
σ by the construction of admissible additional potential secrets ensuring that each
dependency Γ ∈ prior does not interfere with an additional potential secret. As
hence the non-implication concl (Γ )[σ] 6|=DB Ψ holds for each (possibly additional)
potential secret Ψ ∈ C under each constant substitution σ and as each (possibly
additional) potential secret of a cluster of M+ is contained in the set SΨˆ of all
existentially quantified atoms not to be satisfied (if possible) by the ground oper-
ator, Lemma 5.4 guarantees that such a tuple grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) does
not induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying the disjunction ∨Ψ∈C Ψ .
There is also no tuple grnd (Ψ¯ ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ constructed for a (possibly addi-
tional) potential secret Ψ¯ of a cluster C¯ ∈M+r according to construction rule (iii),
which induces a DB-Interpretation satisfying the disjunction ∨Ψ∈C Ψ . The as-
sumption Ir 6|=M ∨Ψ∈C Ψ guarantees that the considered cluster C is not contained
in the set M+r of those clusters, whose corresponding disjunctions are satisfied by
the original instance r. As moreover each potential secret Ψ¯ of a cluster C¯ ∈M+r
is not contained in the (different) cluster C /∈ M+r due to the disjoint clustering,
there is no tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) added to rΨˆ for a potential secret Ψ ∈ C.
For all (possibly additional) potential secrets Ψ¯ of a cluster C¯ ∈ M+r , for which
a tuple grnd (Ψ¯ ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) is added to rΨˆ , the non-implication Ψ¯ 6|=DB Ψ is en-
sured for each (possibly additional) potential secret Ψ ∈ C by the properties of
the cleaned set p̂secprior and by the construction of admissible additional potential
secrets according to Definition 5.10. As each (possibly additional) potential secret
of a cluster of M+ is in the set SΨˆ of all existentially quantified atoms not to be
satisfied (if possible) by the ground operator, Lemma 5.4 again guarantees that a
tuple grnd (Ψ¯ ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) constructed for a potential secret Ψ¯ of a cluster C¯ ∈M+r
does not induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying the disjunction ∨Ψ∈C Ψ .
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Summing up the results proved above, a disjunction ∨Ψ∈C Ψ corresponding to a
cluster C ∈ M+ is satisfied by the alternative instance rΨˆ if and only if it is
satisfied by the original instance r. So, the validity of M+
rΨˆ
= M+r and hence also
weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)∨ = weak (r, psec, prior)∨ is a direct consequence.
Subcase: weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)+ = weak (r, psec, prior)+
To next start with the subcase of weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)+ = weak (r, psec, prior)+,
consider an arbitrary ground atom R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec, prior)+. The construc-
tion of weak (r, psec, prior)+ guarantees the non-implication R(c) 6|=DB Ψ for each
(possibly additional) potential secret Ψ of a cluster of M+r and for each (non-
additional) potential secret Ψ of p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C not occurring in any cluster
ofM+. According to rule (i) of the construction of rΨˆ , the tuple c corresponding to
the ground atom R(c) is contained in the alternative instance rΨˆ . Hence, by con-
struction of a weakened view according to Definition 5.11, the ground atom R(c) is
in weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)+, as the non-implication R(c) 6|=DB Ψ also holds for each
(possibly additional) potential secret of a cluster of M+
rΨˆ
because of M+
rΨˆ
= M+r
(as proved above) and for each potential secret Ψ of the set p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C,
whose construction does not depend at all on the database instance considered.
For each tuple grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ , which is constructed accord-
ing to construction rule (ii) for a dependency Γ ∈ Pi of a partition Pi ∈ P
interfering with the extended and cleaned confidentiality policy p̂secprior , the
corresponding ground atom R(grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗)) is not contained in
weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)+. As the partition Pi interferes with the policy p̂secprior ,
Lemma 5.3 guarantees the existence of a potential secret Ψconcl ∈ p̂secprior with
concl (Γ ) |=DB Ψconcl. Hence, there is also a constant substitution σ under which
the implication concl (Γ )[σ] |=DB Ψconcl holds. As a consequence, the poten-
tial secret Ψconcl is in the set concl (p̂secprior , prior) of potential secrets to be
refused (cf. Definition 5.6) and hence also in the set p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C of
policy elements not occurring in any cluster of M+. As moreover the implication
R(grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗)) |=DB Ψconcl holds because of both
• R(grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗)) |=DB concl (Γ ) and
• concl (Γ ) |=DB Ψconcl,
the ground atom R(grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗)) corresponding to the database
tuple grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ is not qualified for being in the positive
knowledge weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)+ according to Definition 5.11.
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Similarly, for each tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ , which is constructed for a (pos-
sibly additional) potential secret Ψ of a cluster C ∈M+r according to construction
rule (iii), the corresponding ground atom R(grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗)) is not contained
in weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)+, either. Because of M+
rΨˆ
= M+r (as proved above), the
considered cluster C ofM+r is also inM+rΨˆ . As there hence is the potential secret Ψ
of the cluster C of M+
rΨˆ
, for which the implication R(grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗)) |=DB Ψ
holds, the considered ground atom R(grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗)) is not qualified for be-
ing in weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)+ according to Definition 5.11. This finally results in
weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)+ = weak (r, psec, prior)+.
Completing: weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior) = weak (r, psec, prior)
According to Definition 5.11, the construction of the refused knowledge of a weak-
ened view is only based on the subset p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C of those policy elements
of p̂secprior not occurring in any cluster ofM+. As the construction of the extended
and cleaned confidentiality policy p̂secprior and the construction of the partly ex-
tended matching M+ do both not depend on the considered database instance at
all, the validity of weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)? = weak (r, psec, prior)? is guaranteed.
Reconsidering the construction of the negative knowledge of a weakened view
according to Definition 5.11 – which consists of a sequence of negated disjunctions
and a (partial) completeness sentence – the validity of
• weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)+ = weak (r, psec, prior)+,
• weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)∨ = weak (r, psec, prior)∨ and
• weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)? = weak (r, psec, prior)? as well as
• M+ \M+
rΨˆ
= M+ \M+r (due to M+rΨˆ = M
+
r )
leads to weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior)− = weak (r, psec, prior)−. Hence, indistinguishabil-
ity is achieved because of weak (rΨˆ , psec, prior) = weak (r, psec, prior), provided
that the sentences of both of these sequences are arranged in the same order.
To show: I
rΨˆ
|=M prior
Finally, it is to show that the constructed alternative instance rΨˆ satisfies the
adversary’s a priori knowledge prior , i.e., I
rΨˆ
|=M prior . As a first step towards
this goal, consider an arbitrary dependency Γ ∈ prior and suppose that Γ is in a
partition Pj ∈ P, which does not interfere with the confidentiality policy p̂secprior .
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Subcase: Γ of a partition Pj ∈ P, which does not interfere with p̂secprior
If the alternative instance rΨˆ does not satisfy prem (Γ )[σ] under any constant
substitution σ, i.e., I
rΨˆ
6|=M prem (Γ )[σ], the validity of IrΨˆ |=M Γ is a direct
consequence. If the alternative instance rΨˆ instead satisfies prem (Γ )[σ] under
a constant substitution σ, i.e., I
rΨˆ
|=M prem (Γ )[σ], it needs to be shown that
I
rΨˆ
|=M concl (Γ )[σ] holds under this constant substitution σ, too.
The assumption I
rΨˆ
|=M prem (Γ )[σ] guarantees that there is a tuple c ∈ rΨˆ in-
ducing a DB-Interpretation satisfying prem (Γ )[σ]. This tuple c is not equal to a
tuple grnd (concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ , which is constructed according to con-
struction rule (ii) for a dependency Γ¯ ∈ Pi of a partition Pi ∈ P interfering with
p̂secprior . Because of Γ being in the partition Pj , which does not interfere with
p̂secprior , and because of Γ¯ being in the partition Pi, which interferes with p̂secprior ,
the partition Pi is not equal to the partition Pj . Hence, the non-implication
concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯] 6|=DB prem (Γ ) must hold under each constant substitution σ¯ by con-
struction of the partitioning P. As prem (Γ ) is furthermore contained in the set SΨˆ
of all existentially quantified atoms not to be satisfied (if possible) by the ground
operator, Lemma 5.4 guarantees that the tuple grnd (concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) does
not induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying prem (Γ ). As a consequence, this tuple
grnd (concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) does not induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying the
stronger sentence prem (Γ )[σ], either.
Moreover, the tuple c ∈ rΨˆ inducing a DB-Interpretation satisfying prem (Γ )[σ] is
not equal to a tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ , which is constructed for a (possibly
additional) potential secret Ψ of a cluster C ∈ M+r according to construction
rule (iii), either. If Ψ is a non-additional potential secret of p̂secprior , the non-
implication Ψ 6|=DB prem (Γ ) is guaranteed as Γ is supposed to be in the partition
Pj , which does not interfere with p̂secprior . If Ψ is an additional potential secret,
the validity of Ψ 6|=DB prem (Γ ) is a direct consequence of the construction of
admissible additional potential secrets ensuring that each dependency of prior
does not interfere with an additional potential secret (cf. Definition 5.10). So,
again considering that prem (Γ ) is contained in the set SΨˆ , Lemma 5.4 guarantees
that the tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) does not induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying
prem (Γ ). As a consequence, this tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) does not induce a
DB-Interpretation satisfying the stronger sentence prem (Γ )[σ], either.
Now, having excluded that the tuple c ∈ rΨˆ inducing a DB-Interpretation sat-
isfying prem (Γ )[σ] stems from rule (ii) or rule (iii) of the construction of the
alternative instance rΨˆ , the only possibility left is that c stems from construction
rule (i). So, there is the ground atom R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec, prior)+ and hence the
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original instance r also satisfies prem (Γ )[σ], i.e., Ir |=M prem (Γ )[σ], because of
c ∈ r. As Ir |=M Γ is supposed to hold due to the precondition Ir |=M prior ,
there is also a tuple d ∈ r inducing a DB-Interpretation satisfying concl (Γ )[σ].
Because of Γ being in the partition Pj not interfering with the policy p̂secprior ,
there is no non-additional potential secret Ψ ∈ p̂secprior , which shares a common
constant unifier with concl (Γ ). Consequently, there is also no such non-additional
potential secret Ψ in a cluster C of M+r or in the subset p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C of
those non-additional potential secrets not occurring in any cluster of M+. More-
over, the construction of admissible additional potential secrets according to Def-
inition 5.10 – ensuring that each dependency of prior does not interfere with an
additional potential secret – guarantees that concl (Γ ) does not share a common
constant unifier with any additional potential secret ΨA of a cluster C of M+r .
By further considering that R(d) and concl (Γ ) share the common constant uni-
fier d because of R(d) |=DB concl (Γ ), the non-implication R(d) 6|=DB Ψ must
hold for each (possibly additional) potential secret Ψ of a cluster C ∈ M+r and
for each (non-additional) potential secret Ψ of p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C. Otherwise,
R(d) and Ψ and hence also Ψ and concl (Γ ) would share the common constant
unifier d, in contradiction with the insights gained above. According to Defini-
tion 5.11, this non-implication R(d) 6|=DB Ψ for each Ψ of a cluster of M+r and
for each Ψ of p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C guarantees that the ground atom R(d) is in
weak (r, psec, prior)+. Hence, the tuple d is in the alternative instance rΨˆ due to
construction rule (i) and this instance rΨˆ accordingly satisfies concl (Γ )[σ].
Subcase: Γ of the partition Pm, which interferes with p̂secprior
To continue the proof of I
rΨˆ
|=M prior , suppose that m is defined and consider
an arbitrary dependency Γ ∈ prior , which is in the partition Pm ∈ P. This
partition Pm interferes with the policy p̂secprior , as the existence of a dependency
Γ¯ ∈ Pm with concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯] |=DB Ψˆ is guaranteed under a constant substitution
σ¯ because of m being defined. Hence, Lemma 5.3 guarantees the existence of a
non-additional potential secret Ψprem ∈ p̂secprior with prem (Γ ) |=DB Ψprem. For
each tuple c ∈ rΨˆ , which stems from a ground atom R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec, prior)+
according to construction rule (i), this ground atom R(c) does not imply the
potential secret Ψprem considered:
• if Ψprem is in a cluster C ∈M+r or in the set p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C of refused
potential secrets, the non-implication R(c) 6|=DB Ψprem is guaranteed by the
construction of the positive knowledge weak (r, psec, prior)+ of a weakened
view according to Definition 5.11;
136
5.5 Inference-Proofness of the Adapted Approach
• if Ψprem is neither in a cluster of M+r nor in the set p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C
of refused potential secrets, then Ψprem /∈ (p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C) guarantees
that Ψprem is in a cluster C¯ ∈ M+ and Ψprem /∈ ⋃C∈M+r C additionally
guarantees Ir 6|=M ∨Ψ¯∈C¯ Ψ¯ and hence also Ir 6|=M Ψprem. Consequently, the
non-implication R(c) 6|=DB Ψprem holds because of c ∈ r and Ir 6|=M Ψprem.
Hence, as each such tuple c ∈ rΨˆ stemming from construction rule (i) does not
induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying the (weaker) potential secret Ψprem, it does
not induce a DB-Interpretation satisfying the (stronger) sentence prem (Γ ), either,
according to Lemma 3.1.
Next, consider an arbitrary tuple grnd (concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ , which is con-
structed for a dependency Γ¯ ∈ Pi of a partition Pi ∈ P with i 6= m according
to construction rule (ii). Because of Γ ∈ Pm, Γ¯ ∈ Pi and i 6= m and by con-
struction of the partitioning P, the non-implication concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯] 6|=DB prem (Γ )
holds under the considered constant substitution σ¯. As prem (Γ ) is moreover in
the set SΨˆ of all existentially quantified atoms not to be satisfied (if possible) by
the ground operator, the tuple grnd (concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯],SΨˆ ,Dom∗) does not induce a
DB-Interpretation satisfying prem (Γ ) according to Lemma 5.4.
Similarly, consider a tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) ∈ rΨˆ , which is constructed for a
(possibly additional) potential secret Ψ of a cluster C ∈M+r with Ψ 6|=DB prem (Γ )
according to construction rule (iii). Due to Ψ 6|=DB prem (Γ ) and by again consid-
ering that prem (Γ ) is in the set SΨˆ , the tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗) does not induce
a DB-Interpretation satisfying prem (Γ ) according to Lemma 5.4.
Summing up, there is no tuple c ∈ rΨˆ , which induces a DB-Interpretation satis-
fying the existentially quantified premise prem (Γ ) of a dependency Γ ∈ Pm. Ac-
cordingly, the constructed alternative instance rΨˆ satisfies each such dependency
Γ of the considered partition Pm.
Subcase: Γ of a partition Pi ∈ P with i 6= m, which interferes with p̂secprior
To finish the proof of I
rΨˆ
|=M prior , consider an arbitrary dependency Γ ∈ prior
and suppose that Γ is in a partition Pi ∈ P with i 6= m, which interferes with the
extended and cleaned confidentiality policy p̂secprior . If the alternative instance
rΨˆ does not satisfy prem (Γ )[σ] under any constant substitution σ, the validity of
I
rΨˆ
|=M Γ is a direct consequence. If the alternative instance rΨˆ instead satisfies
prem (Γ )[σ] under a constant substitution σ, i.e., I
rΨˆ
|=M prem (Γ )[σ], there is a
tuple c ∈ rΨˆ , which induces a DB-Interpretation satisfying prem (Γ )[σ].
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Now, assume that c stems from a ground atom R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec, prior)+, which
is constructed according to rule (i) of the construction of rΨˆ . As the partition Pi
is supposed to interfere with p̂secprior , Lemma 5.3 guarantees the existence of a
potential secret Ψprem ∈ p̂secprior with prem (Γ ) |=DB Ψprem. Considering that
R(c) |=DB prem (Γ )[σ] is supposed to hold due to the assumption that c induces a
DB-Interpretation satisfying prem (Γ )[σ], the implication R(c) |=DB Ψprem holds
by transitivity because of
R(c) |=DB prem (Γ )[σ] |=DB prem (Γ ) |=DB Ψprem .
But the potential secret Ψprem of the policy p̂secprior , which is implied by R(c), is
either in the set p̂secprior \
⋃
C∈M+ C of refused potential secrets or in a cluster
C ∈ M+r , whose corresponding disjunction
∨
Ψ∈C Ψ is satisfied by the original in-
stance r, as the assumption R(c) ∈ weak (r, psec, prior)+ guarantees that c is in
this instance r. Thus, the ground atom R(c) is – in contradiction to the assump-
tion – not qualified for being in the positive knowledge weak (r, psec, prior)+ of a
weakened view according to Definition 5.11.
As the considered tuple c ∈ rΨˆ – which is supposed to induce a DB-Interpretation
satisfying prem (Γ )[σ] – does not stem from construction rule (i), this tuple c is
• a tuple grnd (concl (Γ¯ )[σ¯],SΨˆ ,Dom∗), which is constructed according to con-
struction rule (ii) under a constant substitution σ¯ substituting the univer-
sally quantified variables of the dependency Γ¯ with constants stemming from
– (possibly additional) potential secrets of clusters of M+,
– dependencies of the adversary’s a priori knowledge prior , and
– fresh constant symbols of the set Dom∗, or
• a tuple grnd (Ψ,SΨˆ ,Dom∗), which is constructed for a (possibly additional)
potential secret Ψ of a cluster C ∈M+r according to construction rule (iii).
In both of these cases the tuple c = (c1, . . . , cn) is constructed with the help of the
(extended) ground operator and Lemma 5.4 hence guarantees that each constant
symbol ci of this tuple c stems from
• a (possibly additional) potential secret of a cluster of M+,
• a dependency of the adversary’s a priori knowledge prior , or
• the fresh constant symbols of the set Dom∗.
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Reconsidering that the DB-Interpretation induced by the constant combination
c is supposed to satisfy prem (Γ )[σ], the constant substitution σ substitutes each
variable of the existentially quantified premise prem (Γ ) with a constant symbol
ci of c. As the dependency Γ is supposed to be in a partition Pi ∈ P with
i 6= m, which interferes with the policy p̂secprior , rule (ii) of the construction of
the alternative instance rΨˆ guarantees that the tuple grnd (concl (Γ )[σ],SΨˆ ,Dom∗)
is in rΨˆ – with σ being the above mentioned constant substitution induced by c –
and thus the alternative instance rΨˆ satisfies concl (Γ )[σ]. This guarantees that
rΨˆ also satisfies the dependency Γ , i.e., I
rΨˆ
|=M Γ . ♠
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CHAPTER 6
Efficiency of the Weakening Algorithm
After the development of a generic algorithm computing weakened views on orig-
inal database instances in order to provably enforce a considered confidentiality
policy, an availability-maximizing instantiation of this approach has been pro-
posed. This availability-maximizing instantiation has then even been extended
to be also able to handle an adversary’s a priori knowledge in the form of single
premise tuple generating dependencies without losing its inference-proofness.
To demonstrate the practical efficiency these availability-maximizing weakening
approaches can actually achieve, a prototype implementation has been developed
and evaluated under different experiment setups. Each of these experiment setups
systematically varies one of the parameters for an essentially random generation
of input instances, which has a crucial impact on the runtime of the prototype
implementation and possibly also on the generation of weakened views.
6.1 The Prototype Implementation
As known from the previous chapters, both the availability-maximizing weakening
approach captured in Algorithm 4.1 as well as its extension handling a priori
knowledge, which is formalized in Algorithm 5.1, still need to be instantiated with
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a concrete implementation of a so-called notion of admissible indistinguishabilities
to be fully specified. Thereby, such a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities
essentially determines the structure disjunctions of weakened views should have.
More precisely, such a concrete notion should induce algorithms determining the
set of all admissible clusters over a given confidentiality policy (cf. Section 3.1.3) –
which is essentially needed to construct the edges of an indistinguishability graph
within the availability-maximizing approaches – as well as algorithms possibly
(partly, within the extended approach) extending a maximum matching by pairing
policy elements uncovered by this matching with admissible additional potential
secrets (cf. Section 4.1.2 and Section 5.2.5).
Within the prototype implementation the notion of interchangeability, which is in-
troduced in Section 4.2.1 and proved to be well-defined in case of the non-extended
weakening approach according to Theorem 4.1, is employed as a concrete notion
of admissible indistinguishabilities. Thereby, this proof that interchangeability is
well-defined in case of the non-extended weakening approach also specifies an effi-
cient and easy to implement algorithm for the construction of matching extensions,
which comply with interchangeability. In case of the extended weakening approach
a both sufficient and necessary condition for the constructibility of interchangeable
and admissible additional potential secrets is provided by Theorem 5.1. The proof
of this theorem is constructive in the sense that it sketches an efficient and easy to
implement algorithm for the construction of interchangeable and admissible addi-
tional potential secrets whenever possible. Moreover, the declarative definition of
interchangeability provided by Definition 4.5 naturally induces a straightforward
algorithm to determine the set of all admissible clusters of size 2 over a given con-
fidentiality policy in the spirit of a nested loop (self-)join algorithm known from
relational databases [1, 75, 78].
During a preliminary experimental evaluation it turned out that for those (ex-
tended) confidentiality policies, which do not shrink much during the process of
cleaning, the corresponding cleaned policies usually contain a quite large pro-
portion of ground atoms. As a ground atom and a non-ground atom – i.e., an
existentially quantified atom actually containing variables – can further not be
interchangeable according to Definition 4.5, a cleaned confidentiality policy can
first be partitioned into one subset containing all ground atoms of this policy and
another subset containing all non-ground atoms of this policy. Subsequently, for
both of these subsets all admissible clusters can be determined independently from
the other subset without losing any admissible cluster to be constructed over the
considered cleaned confidentiality policy. It hences makes sense to develop an im-
proved algorithm for the construction of admissible clusters, which is specifically
tailored to the characteristics of interchangeable ground atoms and which is there-
fore more efficient than the above mentioned naturally induced algorithm. Then,
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this improved (more efficient) algorithm is used for the subset of all ground atoms
of the cleaned policy and the naturally induced (less efficient, but applicable)
algorithm is used for the remaining subset of all non-ground atoms.
This improved algorithm for the construction of all interchangeable pairs of ground
atoms considers each possible single differing positionm ∈ {1, . . . , n} of the ground
atoms of arity n exactly once and for each m ∈ {1, . . . , n} the considered ground
atoms are sorted lexicographically according to the order on their constant sym-
bols, thereby neglecting the constant symbols at the m-th positions for this lexi-
cographic order. Within such a (partially) ordered sequence the elements of each
subset of pairwise interchangeable ground atoms – all only differing from each
other in their m-th constant positions – follow one another consecutively. Thus,
these subsets of pairwise interchangeable ground atoms are easy to identify within
such a (partially) ordered sequence with a technique similar to the interleaved
linear scans employed for the well-known sort-merge join algorithm [1, 75, 78].
In a worst-case scenario all ground atoms of an (extended and cleaned) confiden-
tiality policy are pairwise interchangeable and hence form only one (sub-)set of
pairwise interchangeable ground atoms. Then, for each pair of ground atoms an
admissible cluster needs to be constructed and hence the runtime of this improved
algorithm is – just as the runtime of the naturally induced algorithm – quadratic
in the number of the considered ground atoms. But in typical scenarios the num-
ber of subsets of pairwise interchangeable ground atoms is significantly higher and
hence only each pair of ground atoms, both of whose elements stem from the same
of any of these (correspondingly smaller) subsets, needs to be considered. All
other possible pairs of ground atoms, which do not form an admissible cluster,
are instead not even considered by the improved algorithm and hence the run-
time of this improved algorithm is usually significantly better than its quadratic
worst-case complexity.
Moreover, a further optimization has been implemented for the cleaning of (ex-
tended) confidentiality policies consisting solely of ground atoms. While the gen-
eral algorithm for cleaning a confidentiality policy proposed in Section 3.1.2 es-
sentially aims at checking each pair of different potential secrets of such a policy
for implication relationships, the cleaning of a policy solely consisting of ground
atoms can be reduced to a removal of duplicate (i.e., semantically equivalent)
policy elements, as there can not be any implication relationships within a set
of pairwise (semantically) non-equivalent ground atoms (cf. Lemma 2.1). After
sorting a considered set of ground atoms lexicographically, duplicates can be found
easily as they follow one another consecutively within the ordered sequence.
Similarly, within Stage 2 of the weakening algorithm(s) the construction of the
subset of those clusters, whose corresponding disjunctions are satisfied by a con-
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sidered original database instance, also profits from an optimization for ground
atoms: if a potential secret of a cluster is a ground atom, binary search can be
employed within the sorted set of all ground atoms representing this database
instance to decide on the satisfaction of this potential secret. After that, within
the final construction of a weakened view, the search for those database tuples
not implying the satisfaction of a weakening disjunction or a policy element to be
refused – and hence occurring in the positive knowledge of this weakened view – is
also optimized for ground atoms: if a database tuple (or, more precisely, its ground
atom) can be found within the (sorted) list of those potential secrets it should not
imply to occur in the positive knowledge, this tuple can immediately be excluded
from the set of those database tuples qualified for being in the positive knowledge
without employing an exhaustive search for implications.
To actually compute a (non-extended) clustering of policy elements on the basis
of a maximum matching (cf. [50, 67, 77, 80]) determined on an indistinguisha-
bility graph, which represents a set of admissible clusters, the prototype benefits
from an implementation of a maximum matching algorithm provided by the well-
known “Boost”-library [41]. Although a maximum matching on a general (i.e.,
not necessarily bipartite) graph G = (V,E) can be computed asymptotically best
in O(
√|V | · |E|) as known from [73, 89], common implementations of maximum
matching algorithms as provided by the commercial “LEDA”-library [72] or the
free “Boost”-library [41] prefer an algorithm performing in O(|V | · |E| ·α(|E|, |V |))
with α(|E|, |V |) ≤ 4 for any input of feasible size.
If an even faster matching computation is needed, the matching heuristic intro-
duced in [71], which improves the seminal ideas proposed in [64] and performs in
a time linear to the size of the graph, can be employed within the prototype. Al-
though this matching heuristic guarantees the construction of a valid matching, it
does not guarantee that this matching is actually maximum. Accordingly, the (ex-
tended) weakening algorithm might – in comparison with a maximum matching –
need to construct more additional potential secrets to pair more policy elements
uncovered by the resulting matching or might alternatively need to introduce more
complete refusals to enforce these additionally uncovered policy elements. In both
of these cases, this results in a loss of availability. But as evaluated in [71] (and
confirmed by the experiments in Section 6.3), the employed matching heuristic
usually loses only a negligible number of matching edges in relation to a maxi-
mum matching. Correspondingly, the usage of this heuristic within the prototype
usually results only in a slight loss of availability.
To determine a partitioning P of an adversary’s a priori knowledge prior within
the extended weakening approach, the prototype uses an optimized variant of
the algorithm proposed in Section 5.2.4. This (non-optimized) algorithm first
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creates a partitioning graph G = (V,E), whose edges essentially connect a pair of
dependencies of prior , if and only if these dependencies need to be in the same
partition. After that, each connected component of this partitioning graph G
immediately induces a partition of P.
Thereby, the construction of the edges of this partitioning graph is most costly in
terms of runtime: to decide whether an edge between a pair of dependencies is to
be constructed according to requirement (ii) of Definition 5.7, it is to be checked
exhaustively whether both of these dependencies imply the same (arbitrary) po-
tential secret of a considered extended and cleaned confidentiality policy under
arbitrary constant substitutions. Although this check is, of course, only necessary
for those pairs of dependencies, which are not already neighbored by an edge due
to (the computationally less costly) requirement (iii) of Definition 5.7, it usually
still needs to be performed for many possible pairs of dependencies.
However, the optimized variant of this partitioning algorithm – which is imple-
mented within the prototype – tries to reduce the number of these costly checks
considerably. Therefore, it takes into account that the results of potentially many
of these costly checks might actually not affect the computed partitioning at all:
if the partitioning graph already contains a path (of several edges) between a pair
of dependencies, these dependencies are – due to the nature of connected compo-
nents [65, 67] – guaranteed to be in the same connected component – and hence
also in the same partition – anyway, independent of whether an edge directly con-
necting these dependencies is additionally added to the graph or not. Thereby,
the problem of deciding on the existence of a path between a pair of vertices (de-
pendencies) within a graph can be solved efficiently with the help of a so-called
breadth-first search algorithm [65, 67] scanning all vertices of this graph, which
can be reached from a specific vertex. In particular for input instances with large
confidentiality policies and large sets of dependencies, which furthermore lead to
partitioning graphs with large connected components, this optimization of the
partitioning algorithm achieves considerable speedups.
All other basic subroutines of the prototype implementation are either explicitly
specified in the course of the development of the weakening algorithm(s) or are nat-
urally induced by the given (usually declarative) definitions of these subroutines.
As all of the employed subroutines – including the above mentioned ones – obvi-
ously have a polynomial worst case complexity, both the non-extended as well as
the extended availability-maximizing weakening algorithm also have a polynomial
worst case complexity, provided that – just as interchangeability – the employed
notion of admissible indistinguishabilities allows for the construction of efficient
algorithms computing the set of all admissible clusters and efficient algorithms
(partly) extending a computed maximum matching.
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During a preliminary experimental evaluation of the prototype implementation
the algorithms used for
• cleaning a confidentiality policy (not solely consisting of ground atoms),
• constructing a partitioning graph (to partition a priori knowledge),
• determining the subset of satisfied disjunction templates and
• creating the positive knowledge of a weakened view
turned out to be most costly in terms of runtime. As each of these algorithms – ex-
cept for some optimizations – essentially relies on an exhaustive search for certain
implication relationships, whose validities can be checked largely independent from
each other, and as write accesses to common underlying data structures are typ-
ically rare, a natural approach to increase the performance of these algorithms
with the help of modern hardware – usually offering multiple CPU cores – is to
parallelize them. Although write accesses to common data structures are typically
rare, care must nonetheless be taken to ensure that different threads running in
parallel can write to these common data structures only in a synchronized way to
avoid corruption of data and to moreover ensure that changes of data made by
one thread are propagated to all other threads properly [63].
Although a parallelized implementation of a maximum matching algorithm would
also be worthwhile for input instances leading to large indistinguishability graphs,
such an implementation does not seem to be available for general (i.e., not neces-
sarily bipartite) graphs. But for those input instances, for which the computation
of a maximum matching is most costly in terms of runtime, one can still resort to
the above mentioned matching heuristic to handle even large input instances.
6.2 The Experimental Setup
The prototype is implemented in Java 8, except for the above mentioned C++
implementation of the employed maximum matching algorithm provided by the
“Boost”-library. All experiments were run under Ubuntu 14.04 on a machine with
2 CPU sockets, each of which is equipped with an “Intel Xeon E5-2690” CPU
with 8 physical cores running at 2.9GHz. Hence, a total number of 16 native
CPU cores is available and – as each of these CPU cores can logically handle two
threads simultaneously due to hyperthreading – the machine has a total number
of 32 logical CPU cores. Although this machine is equipped with 64GB of main
memory, less than 10% of this available memory is actually needed to run the
experiments sketched in the following.
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For the experimental evaluation of the prototype implementation 5 different ex-
periment setups are considered, each of which systematically varies the value of
one of the parameters for an essentially random generation of input instances. To
increase the significance of the experimental results, a total number of 100 input
instances is generated for each considered instantiation of the generation parame-
ters for these input instances. Correspondingly, each value of these experimental
results is based on the average results of 100 repetitions of an experiment.
For each of the considered experiment setups database instances are generated over
a database schema with 5 attributes, all ranging over a (fixed) domain with a total
number of 20 constant symbols. Thereby, for each input instance instantiating the
prototype implementation for a single run, an individual original database instance
consisting of 1 000 000 (pairwise different) random database tuples is created over
this database schema. But – despite this random creation of database instances –
within those experiment setups also considering an adversary’s a priori knowledge
care is taken that each created database instance complies with each single premise
tuple generating dependency of this a priori knowledge.
This compliance can be achieved by suitably adapting the well-known chase algo-
rithm [1] in the sense that it is exhaustively checked which additional knowledge
can be derived with the help of the given dependencies each time a new database
tuple is added to a database instance under construction. For that purpose each
dependency Γ of the given a priori knowledge, whose premise prem (Γ )[σ] is satis-
fied by such a newly added database tuple under a constant substitution σ of the
universally quantified variables of Γ , is considered. If the conclusion concl (Γ )[σ]
of this dependency is not satisfied by the database instance under the consid-
ered constant substitution σ of the universally quantified variables, a database
tuple satisfying concl (Γ )[σ] is constructed and additionally added to the database
instance. Of course, such an additional tuple might then again be employed to de-
rive further knowledge with the help of the considered dependencies. Hence, this
chasing for additional database tuples by exhaustive forward chaining is repeated
until the database instance under construction is consistent with all dependencies
of the considered a priori knowledge. As a direct consequence, database instances
constructed for experiment setups with a priori knowledge might have slightly
more tuples than the target number of 1 000 000 database tuples.
Beside a database instance, each input instance instantiating the prototype im-
plementation also contains a fully random confidentiality policy. Thereby, each
experiment is evaluated under confidentiality policies of different sizes: the small-
est of these policies consists of 10 000 (semantically) pairwise different potential
secrets, after that the size of this policy is increased to 40 000 and then to 70 000
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elements, and finally even a confidentiality policy with 100 000 pairwise different
potential secrets is considered.
For the construction of these policy elements usually a subset of 12 constant sym-
bols of the domain, over which the database instances are constructed, is available.
This number of available constant symbols only deviates within Experiment 2, in
which the number of available constant symbols is systematically varied from 10
to 22, thereby employing additional constant symbols not occurring in database
tuples for those policies constructed over more than 20 constant symbols. The
probability that a term of a potential secret is an existentially quantified variable
(instead of a constant symbol) is usually 5% per term of a potential secret. Only
within Experiment 1 this probability is systematically varied from 0% to 12%.
Thereby, a probability of 0% leads to confidentiality policies consisting solely of
ground atoms. During the construction of confidentiality policies not solely con-
sisting of ground atoms, potential secrets not containing at least one constant
symbol are discarded – to avoid the construction of weakest possible potential
secrets, which are not feasible for the non-extended weakening approach (cf. Sec-
tion 3.1.2) and usually undesirable (but generally feasible) for the extended weak-
ening approach (cf. Section 5.3) – and a new random try for the construction of
a valid potential secret is made.
At first glance, database tuples of arity 5, which are constructed over only 20 con-
stant symbols, and corresponding confidentiality policies, whose active domain
has a cardinality between 10 and 22, might look like “toy examples”. But due to
the nature of the employed interchangeability criterion, a suitably high number
of admissible disjunction templates is only provided, if a considered confiden-
tiality policy contains a lot of potential secrets structurally not differing much
from each other. To achieve this under a fully random construction of potential
secrets, both the arity of potential secrets (and hence also the arity of database tu-
ples) as well as the number of available constant symbols is deliberately left low.
To moreover guarantee that a suitably high number of database tuples induce
DB-Interpretations satisfying a policy element, the number of available constant
symbols for database tuples is correspondingly also left deliberately low.
Within each of the Experiments 3, 4 and 5 each input instance instantiating the
extended weakening algorithm also contains an adversary’s a priori knowledge,
which usually consists of 1200 single premise tuple generating dependencies ran-
domly constructed over the same domain of constant symbols as the database
instances. Only in Experiment 3 this number of dependencies is systematically
increased from 100 to 2500 in steps of 200 dependencies.
The probability that a term of a premise of a dependency is a universally quan-
tified variable (instead of a constant symbol) is usually 15% per term of such a
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premise, as tuple generating dependencies often have quite a high proportion of
variables. Similarly, the probability that a term of a conclusion of a dependency
is a (randomly chosen) universally quantified variable of the premise of this de-
pendency is usually 10% per term of such a conclusion. Thereby, care is taken
that the conclusion of such a dependency can not contain a higher number of
universally quantified variables than the premise of this dependency, as each of
these variables can occur only once in the premise and in the conclusion of a single
premise tuple generating dependency (cf. Definition 5.1). Similarly to the con-
struction of potential secrets, both the premise and the conclusion of a dependency
must moreover contain at least one constant symbol to avoid the construction of
extended confidentiality policies (cf. Definition 5.5) containing a weakest possible
potential secret. In case that a randomly constructed dependency violates one of
these requirements, this dependency is discarded and a new random try for the
construction of a valid dependency is made.
Deviating from the above mentioned probabilities, within Experiment 4 the prob-
ability that a term of a premise of a dependency is a universally quantified variable
ranges from 5% to 29% in steps of 2 percentage points and the probability that a
term of a conclusion of a dependency is a (randomly chosen) universally quanti-
fied variable of the premise of this dependency is 5 percentage points less than the
probability that a term of the premise of this dependency is a universally quanti-
fied variable. Without any exceptions, the probability that a term of a conclusion
of a dependency is an existentially quantified variable – if it is not already chosen
to be a universally quantified variable – is always 5% per term.
As some subroutines of the weakening algorithm(s) are parallelized as documented
in Section 6.1, the prototype should also be instantiated with the number of
threads to run in parallel. If this number is not explicitly set, the prototype
follows the widely used rule of thumb that the number of threads should be twice
the number of available CPU cores – in the hope that each CPU core can still be
fully utilized, even if some threads need to wait until others release locks on some
resources (cf. [63, 87]), without increasing the costs arising due to CPU context
switches (cf. [87]) too much. On the above described machine with a total number
of 32 logical CPU cores this rule of thumb leads to a default value of 64 threads
to run in parallel. Unless otherwise stated, this default value is used for each ex-
periment setup except for Experiment 5: this last experiment aims at evaluating
the effectiveness of parallelization and therefore systematically varies the number
of threads to run in parallel from 1 to 25 in steps of 2 threads.
For convenience, the parameters used to generate the input instances for the differ-
ent experiment setups are summarized in the table given in Figure 6.1. Thereby,
for each experiment its systematically varied parameter is printed in boldface.
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6.3 Experimental Evaluation
In the following, each of the above mentioned experiment setups is evaluated in
detail. For that purpose, selected curves are presented for each experiment setup
and then interpreted against the background of the prototype implementation.
Experiment 1. Within Experiment 1 the probability that a term of a potential
secret of a confidentiality policy is an existentially quantified variable is system-
atically varied from 0% to 12% per term to measure the impact of existential
quantification of policy elements on the runtime of the prototype implementation.
For confidentiality policies consisting solely of ground atoms – i.e., the probability
for existential quantification is 0% – the results depicted in Figure 6.2 indicate that
the computation of maximum matchings, whose runtime is given in Figure 6.2(e),
clearly dominates the overall runtime given in Figure 6.2(a).
But when considering confidentiality policies not solely consisting of ground atoms,
the runtime for the computation of maximum matchings on indistinguishability
graphs strongly declines with an increasing probability for existential quantifi-
cation within the elements of a confidentiality policy. The reason for this is
documented in Figure 6.2(c) and in Figure 6.2(f): an increasing number of ex-
istentially quantified variables occurring in policy elements results in a shrinking
of cleaned confidentiality policies, over which indistinguishability graphs are con-
structed. This in turn results in considerably smaller – and thus much faster to
solve – input instances for the maximum matching algorithm.
In contrast to the computation of maximum matchings, the runtime for the clean-
ing of confidentiality policies given in Figure 6.2(b) and the runtime for Stage 2 of
the weakening algorithm – i.e., determining those clusters, whose corresponding
disjunctions are satisfied by a considered database instance, and the construction
of a weakened view – given in Figure 6.2(g) both rise sharply with the introduction
of existential quantification within confidentiality policies. While the runtimes of
these subroutines strongly benefit from optimizations implemented for the special
case of ground atoms (cf. Section 6.1), the benefit of these optimizations decreases
considerably in the case of Stage 2 of the weakening algorithm and vanishes com-
pletely in the case of cleaning a confidentiality policy with the introduction of ex-
istential quantification. Similar, but less severe effects related to optimizations for
ground atoms can be observed for the construction of indistinguishability graphs,
whose runtime is depicted in Figure 6.2(d).
But in general the runtimes of all of these subroutines nonetheless tend to decrease
with an increasing probability for existential quantification, which obviously re-
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Figure 6.2: Experiment 1: Varying number of variables in policies
sults in an increasing number of implication relationships between pairs of policy
elements. In case of the algorithm cleaning a confidentiality policy such a higher
number of implication relationships leads to more policy elements to be removed
in early iterations of this cleaning algorithm and each of these removed policy
elements does not need to be considered in subsequent iterations of this algorithm
any more. The resulting decrease of the cardinalities of cleaned confidentiality
policies (cf. Figure 6.2(c)) then naturally leads to faster constructions of indis-
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Figure 6.3: Experiment 1 with matching heuristic
tinguishability graphs (cf. Figure 6.2(d)) and to smaller matching extensions (cf.
Figure 6.2(h)) – whose construction time is negligible and hence not further con-
sidered in Figure 6.2. Due to these smaller matching extensions, within Stage 2 of
the weakening algorithm both the construction of the subset of those clusters of
matching extensions corresponding to satisfied disjunctions as well as the search
for those database tuples not implying the satisfaction of a weakening disjunc-
tion – and hence occurring in the positive knowledge of a weakened view – then
become less complex and hence faster (cf. Figure 6.2(g)).
As already proposed in Section 6.1, a matching heuristic can be employed instead
of an exact maximum matching solver to improve the runtime for matching com-
putations. Thus, an adaption of the prototype implementation, which relies on
this proposed matching heuristic, has also been evaluated on the basis of the in-
put instances generated for Experiment 1. As can be seen in Figure 6.3(b), this
matching heuristic improves the runtime for matching computations significantly
in comparison to the exact maximum matching solver provided by the “Boost”-
library, whose performance is shown in Figure 6.2(e).
This is in particular true for low probabilities for existential quantification within
the elements of a confidentiality policy, which lead to large indistinguishability
graphs (cf. Figure 6.2(f)), on which exact computations of maximum match-
ings are most costly in terms of runtime. As evaluated above, the time needed for
matching computations dominates the overall runtime of the prototype implemen-
tation in these scenarios and correspondingly the usage of the matching heuristic
improves this overall runtime of the prototype implementation significantly as
shown in Figure 6.3(a). Especially for confidentiality policies consisting solely of
ground atoms, for which optimizations are implemented for several subroutines of
the prototype implementation as outlined above, the usage of the matching heuris-
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tic leads to overall runtimes of less than 4 seconds – even for those input instances
with confidentiality policies of 100 000 potential secrets to be clustered.
As clarified in Section 6.1, the employed matching heuristic constructs only valid
matchings, but does not guarantee that these matchings are actually maximum.
Hence, the quality of matchings determined by this heuristic can be measured
by observing how much smaller the cardinalities of these heuristically determined
matchings are in comparison with the cardinalities of those matchings computed
by an exact matching solver on the same indistinguishability graphs. As docu-
mented in Figure 6.3(c), this loss of cardinality does not significantly exceed 0.1%
in average. Accordingly, the number of additional potential secrets, which the
weakening algorithm needs to construct to pair each policy element uncovered by
a matching, does usually not notably increase when using the matching heuristic.
Thus, the usage of this heuristic results only in a negligible loss of availability and
might hence be a great compromise for scenarios leading to large indistinguisha-
bility graphs and requiring a maximum of efficiency.
Experiment 2. To measure the impact of an increasing number of constant sym-
bols occurring in randomly constructed confidentiality policies, Experiment 2 is
set up and varies the number of available constant symbols systematically from 10
to 22. Thereby, a first look at Figure 6.4(a) seems to suggest that a higher number
of constant symbols immediately increases the overall runtime of the prototype
implementation. But a closer look at the reasons for this increase of runtime
reveals that this increase is also closely related to the random construction of
confidentiality policies.
As a first step to attain this insight, consider that in case of the larger confidential-
ity policies with 40 000, 70 000 and 100 000 elements the sizes of the corresponding
cleaned confidentiality policies increase almost proportionally with the number
of available constant symbols as shown in Figure 6.4(c). With higher numbers
of available constants the probability that randomly chosen constants occurring
at certain parameter positions of a pair of potential secrets are equal becomes
smaller and, correspondingly, the probability that there is an implication rela-
tionship between these potential secrets, which leads to a removal of one of these
policy elements during the cleaning of the policy, also decreases (cf. Lemma 2.1).
As an immediate consequence, the time needed for cleaning these confidentiality
policies increases with the number of available constant symbols as documented
in Figure 6.4(b), as each potential secret of a confidentiality policy, which remains
in this policy after one check for an implication relationship, also needs to be con-
sidered in subsequent iterations of the cleaning algorithm checking for the validity
of other implication relationships.
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Figure 6.4: Experiment 2: Varying number of constants in policy
In case of the small confidentiality policies with only 10 000 elements the increase
of the size of cleaned confidentiality policies and the corresponding increase of the
runtime for the process of cleaning are less severe. The probability for overlapping
constant symbols is – in comparison with the above considered large confidentiality
policies – already low for small domains of available constant symbols due to
choosing a comparatively small random subset of policy elements from the set of
all constructible potential secrets. Accordingly, even for these small domains of
constant symbols the number of policy elements, which are removed during the
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process of cleaning, is already comparatively low and the size of a confidentiality
policy does hence not shrink that much during this process of cleaning.
With increasing cleaned confidentiality policies the time needed for the construc-
tion of indistinguishability graphs also increases as shown in Figure 6.4(d): larger
cleaned policies lead to indistinguishability graphs with more vertices and for each
pair of these vertices the admissibility of an edge is to be examined. The number
of these admissible edges, which is captured in Figure 6.4(f), first also increases
with the number of vertices. But then, after some turning point, it steadily de-
creases, as the number of potential secrets differing from another potential secret
in only one single constant symbol – thereby inducing edges, which are admissible
according to interchangeability – decreases with an increasing number of available
constant symbols, over which potential secrets are constructed randomly. Corre-
spondingly, the runtime of the maximum matching algorithm first increases and
then decreases as documented in Figure 6.4(e), as the number of possible ways
to actually construct maximum matchings is more and more reduced due to an
increasing number of vertices in relation to a decreasing number of edges.
As a further consequence of these reduced possibilities to construct maximum
matchings, the number of original policy elements uncovered by maximum match-
ings increases with the number of available constant symbols and hence the number
of additional potential secrets needed to pair uncovered original policy elements
rises as shown in Figure 6.4(h). This additional expense for the construction of
matching extensions is also reflected in the time needed for the construction of
these matching extensions as depicted in Figure 6.4(g). As each additional poten-
tial secret requires additional knowledge to be distorted, extended matchings with
a large proportion of additional potential secrets also reduce the achieved level of
availability. Hence, the notion of interchangeability, which is responsible for this
high number of additional potential secrets under random confidentiality policies
and increasing domains of constant symbols as outlined above, does not seem to
be an appropriate notion of admissible indistinguishabilities – prudently balanc-
ing confidentiality and availability – for scenarios considering (virtually) random
confidentiality policies over larger domains.
Reconsidering the increasing cardinalities of extended matchings – due to both
higher cardinalities of cleaned confidentiality policies and higher numbers of un-
matched elements of these policies – Stage 2 of the weakening algorithm also
becomes more complex with an increasing number of available constant symbols
as shown in Figure 6.4(i): both the construction of the subset of those edges of
a matching extension corresponding to satisfied disjunctions as well as the search
for those database tuples not implying the satisfaction of a weakening disjunction
corresponding to an edge of a matching extension – and hence occurring in the
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positive knowledge of a weakened view – become more time consuming with larger
extended matchings.
Experiment 3. To also evaluate the extended weakening algorithm, an adversary
is from now on supposed to have some a priori knowledge in the form of single
premise tuple generating dependencies. In order to measure the impact of the
size of an adversary’s a priori knowledge, Experiment 3 systematically varies the
number of considered dependencies from 100 to 2500. Thereby, the graphs given
in Figure 6.5(a) immediately reveal that the overall runtime of the prototype
implementation considerably increases with the number of dependencies, but still
remains practically feasible.
The first step of the extended weakening algorithm is to extend a given confiden-
tiality policy by the existentially quantified premise and the existentially quanti-
fied conclusion of each dependency interfering with the current (possibly already
partly extended) policy until a fixpoint is reached in the sense that no further in-
terferences can be found. According to the results presented in Figure 6.5(c), this
extension leads to a linear increase of (extended) confidentiality policies in approx-
imately the size of the considered a priori knowledge. Similarly, the time needed
to extend a confidentiality policy also increases almost linearly with the number of
considered dependencies, but the gradient of this increase also depends on the size
of the considered confidentiality policy, as in a worst-case scenario each possible
combination of a policy element and a dependency needs to be considered.
With an increasing size of extended confidentiality policies, the time needed to
clean these policies also increases slightly, but remains more or less constant as
shown in Figure 6.5(d). In contrast, the sizes of cleaned confidentiality policies
sketched in Figure 6.5(e) shrink considerably: due to the quite high proportion
of universally quantified variables within dependencies, existentially quantified
premises and conclusions added to extended policies often contain a high propor-
tion of existentially quantified variables in comparison with other policy elements
and are hence often implied by quite a high number of policy elements, which are
then to be removed during the process of cleaning. This is in particular true for
confidentiality policies of large size: according to Figure 6.5(e), cleaned policies
resulting from these large (uncleaned) policies are often even smaller than cleaned
policies resulting from smaller (uncleaned) policies.
Although the time needed to determine all policy elements to be refused – because
of being implied by the conclusion of a dependency under an arbitrary constant
substitution – is negligible and hence not further considered, the number of these
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Figure 6.5: Experiment 3: Varying number of dependencies (1)
refused policy elements is of interest, as the primary goal of the developed weaken-
ing algorithm is to enforce confidentiality requirements with the help of weakening
disjunctions. As shown in Figure 6.5(f), the number of refused policy elements
grows almost proportionally with the number of considered dependencies. This
is a promising result, as for each dependency Γ interfering with a considered ex-
tended and cleaned confidentiality policy there is a potential secret in this policy,
which is implied by the (existentially quantified) conclusion of Γ – and is thus to
be refused anyway – and furthermore a substantial share of the considered depen-
dencies interferes with the considered policies (cf. Figure 6.5(c)). In comparison
with Figure 6.6(a) it becomes clear that the majority of the elements of an ex-
tended and cleaned policy (cf. Figure 6.5(e)) is still protected with the help of
weakening disjunctions under the considered experiment setup.
According to Figure 6.6(b) the time needed to determine a partitioning of an
adversary’s a priori knowledge clearly increases with the number of dependencies
contained in such an a priori knowledge. Thereby, the size of a considered (cleaned)
confidentiality policy does not influence this runtime much. Additionally consid-
ering the overall runtime of the prototype implementation given in Figure 6.5(a),
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Figure 6.6: Experiment 3: Varying number of dependencies (2)
it becomes clear that – in particular for a priori knowledges of large size – the
time needed to partition an adversary’s a priori knowledge clearly dominates the
overall runtime of the prototype implementation. The number of partitions also
grows with an increasing number of dependencies as shown in Figure 6.6(c). But
this growth is clearly below a linear increase, as a higher number of dependen-
cies increases the probability of implication relationships – between conclusions
and premises of dependencies as well as between conclusions of dependencies and
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policy elements – and hence leads to partitions of larger cardinality.
Similar to the previous experiment setups, the time needed to compute maxi-
mum matchings (cf. Figure 6.6(d)) depends on the size of the indistinguishability
graphs (cf. Figure 6.6(e)). As the graphs resulting from this experiment setup
are comparatively small due to the small cardinalities of cleaned confidentiality
policies (cf. Figure 6.5(e)), the impact of maximum matching computations on
the overall runtime of the prototype implementation is nearly negligible. In corre-
spondence with the decreasing number of edges of indistinguishability graphs (cf.
Figure 6.6(e)), the size of maximum matchings also decreases with an increasing
number of dependencies according to Figure 6.6(f). This, in turn, results in a
runtime of Stage 2 of the weakening algorithm which decreases with the size of
maximum matchings as well as depicted in Figure 6.6(g).
As known from Section 5.4, the interchangeability criterion might not allow for the
construction of an admissible additional potential secret for each policy element
uncovered by a maximum matching, as each constructible additional potential
secret might interfere with a dependency of a considered a priori knowledge due
to a common constant unifier. In this case, it is necessary to refuse such an
uncovered policy element completely. But reconsidering the construction goals of
the weakening approach postulated in Section 1.3.1, confidentiality requirements
should usually be enforced with the help of weakening disjunctions – instead of
refusals – whenever possible. A comparison of Figure 6.6(h) and Figure 6.6(i)
reveals that most of the potential secrets uncovered by a maximum matching can
indeed be enforced with the help of weakening disjunctions, as the number of
uncovered policy elements, which need to be refused, is considerably smaller than
the number of constructed additional potential secrets.
Experiment 4. To next evaluate the impact of universal quantification within
dependencies of an adversary’s a priori knowledge, Experiment 4 systematically
varies the probability that a term of a premise of a dependency is a universally
quantified variable from 5% to 29%. Moreover, the probability that a term of a
conclusion of a dependency is a universally quantified variable (also occurring in
the premise) is always 5 percentage points less than the probability that a term
of a premise is a universally quantified variable.
According to Figure 6.7(b) the time needed to determine an extended confiden-
tiality policy essentially decreases with a higher probability for universal quantifi-
cation: a higher number of universally quantified variables within a dependency
increases the probability that this dependency interferes with a potential secret
of a considered confidentiality policy and for each dependency no further checks
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Figure 6.7: Experiment 4: Varying number of “∀-variables” in prior (1)
for interference with a confidentiality policy need to be performed as soon as
an interference relationship with a single element of this confidentiality policy is
successfully found. Correspondingly, the size of extended confidentiality policies
slightly increases with a higher probability for universal quantification as doc-
umented in Figure 6.7(c), as higher probabilities for interferences lead to more
dependencies interfering with a considered confidentiality policy.
Due to this increasing number of existentially quantified premises and conclusions
of dependencies within extended confidentiality policies and due to an increas-
ing proportion of (existentially quantified) variables within these premises and
conclusions, the number of (other) policy elements implying such an existentially
quantified premise or conclusion also increases with the probability for universal
quantification. As a direct consequence, the size of cleaned and extended confi-
dentiality policies shrinks with a higher probability for universal quantification as
shown in Figure 6.7(e). Similar to Experiment 3, this is again in particular true
for confidentiality policies of large size and cleaned policies resulting from larger
(uncleaned) policies are hence often even smaller than cleaned policies resulting
from smaller (uncleaned) policies.
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Figure 6.8: Experiment 4: Varying number of “∀-variables” in prior (2)
As a further consequence of an increasing number of universally quantified vari-
ables within conclusions of dependencies, the probability that such a conclusion
implies a policy element under an arbitrary constant substitution of its universally
quantified variables also grows. As shown in Figure 6.7(f), this first leads to an
increasing number of policy elements to be refused in spite of shrinking sizes of
cleaned confidentiality policies (cf. Figure 6.7(e)), but then, after some turning
point, this growth of the number of policy elements to be refused stops and the
number of refused policy elements then decreases with the size of cleaned confi-
dentiality policies. But overall, this number of refused policy elements does again
not seem to influence the number of policy elements to be protected by weak-
ening disjunctions much: a comparison between Figure 6.7(e) and Figure 6.8(a)
immediately indicates that the number of (cleaned) policy elements to be clustered
essentially depends on the size of cleaned confidentiality policies.
Now considering that a higher number of universally quantified variables within
conclusions of dependencies also increases the probability that such a conclusion
implies – under a certain constant substitution – the premise of another depen-
dency or a (cleaned) policy element, it seems quite natural that the number of
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Figure 6.9: Experiment 4: Single-threaded vs. multi-threaded
partitions, which result from the partitioning of an adversary’s a priori knowledge
according to Definition 5.7, decreases with an increasing probability for univer-
sal quantification as shown in Figure 6.8(c). In contrast, it does not seem to be
reasonable that the runtime for the partitioning of an adversary’s a priori knowl-
edge increases with the probability for universal quantification as depicted in Fig-
ure 6.8(b), as easier (and hence usually faster) to find implication relationships of
the above mentioned kind should result in a decrease of runtime.
Considering Figure 6.9(c), such a decrease of runtime for the partitioning of an
adversary’s a priori knowledge can indeed be observed, if the prototype implemen-
tation is run single-threaded. To confirm that the above mentioned increase of
runtime is caused by a growing overhead due to synchronization effects between
different threads running in parallel, reconsider that for each found implication
relationship, which actually leads to a new edge within the partitioning graph, the
thread adding this new edge to the partitioning graph must have exclusive (write)
access to the data structure managing the graph – and all other threads wishing
to access this data structure are correspondingly blocked. Hence, an increasing
number of write accesses to the partitioning graph, which immediately results
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Figure 6.10: Experiment 5: Varying number of threads
from the construction of larger partitions of dependencies, leads to more blocking
of threads and hence results in a runtime increasing with the probability for uni-
versal quantification within dependencies. But nonetheless, both the performance
of the partitioning of an adversary’s a priori knowledge as well as the performance
of the overall algorithm still profit greatly from the merits of parallelization as
demonstrated impressively in Figure 6.9.
Similarly to the previous experiment setups, the size of cleaned confidentiality
policies (cf. Figure 6.7(e)) influences the size of indistinguishability graphs (cf.
Figure 6.8(e)), on which then the runtime for the computation of maximum match-
ings on these graphs depends. As also known from the previous experiment setups,
smaller indistinguishability graphs usually lead to smaller (partly extended) maxi-
mum matchings and hence the runtime of Stage 2 of the weakening algorithm also
decreases with the probability for universal quantification within dependencies
according to Figure 6.8(f).
Experiment 5. To finally evaluate the effectiveness of parallelization, Experi-
ment 5 systematically varies the number of threads running in parallel from 1 to
164
6.3 Experimental Evaluation
25. According to the Figures 6.10(b), 6.10(c) and 6.10(d), all parallelized subrou-
tines profit nearly optimally from an increasing number of threads, as a doubling
of the number of threads running in parallel nearly halves the runtimes of these
subroutines. Moreover, the overall runtime of the prototype implementation given
in Figure 6.10(a) behaves similarly well under an increasing number of threads,
although this overall runtime also includes the runtimes of all non-parallelized sub-
routines. This insight confirms that actually those subroutines of the weakening
algorithm(s), which have the most crucial impact on the overall runtime of the
prototype implementation, have been chosen to be parallelized.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion & Future Work
Now that the weakening approach has been developed successfully and the practi-
cal efficiency of its availability-maximizing instantiation has experimentally been
confirmed, it is finally time to conclude this thesis. To this end, the main novel
contributions of this thesis are now summarized, followed by a discussion how
future work might further extend these contributions.
7.1 Contributions of this Thesis
Motivated by the emerging challenge of confidentiality preserving data publishing,
which can not be implemented satisfactorily on the basis of those approaches
traditionally used to enforce confidentiality requirements, Chapter 1 explores how
confidentiality preserving data publishing can be realized within the framework
of Controlled Interaction Execution. In contrast to traditional approaches in the
spirit of access control, which operate on the level of raw data, this framework of
Controlled Interaction Execution aims at suitably confining an adversary’s possible
gain of information such that this adversary is provably not able to infer a piece
of knowledge to be kept confidential by employing his reasoning capabilities.
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As the exploration in Chapter 1 comes to the conclusion to develop a novel ap-
proach replacing confidentiality compromising knowledge of a considered database
instance by weaker disjunctive knowledge, Chapter 2 introduces a logic-based
framework to provide a basis for the development of this novel approach. Thereby,
this framework relies on a restricted but expressive subclass of first-order logic,
which meets the requirement that the validity of implication relationships can be
decided efficiently without costly general theorem proving. These restrictions thus
allow for the construction of a computationally efficient approach, which is able
to handle even large input instances resulting from steadily growing collections
of data. Subsequently, a first basic weakening approach is presented under the
supposition that only a simplified kind of input instances is to be processed.
Chapter 3 first discusses how to deal with confidentiality policies containing an
arbitrary number of policy elements and thereby overcomes a first simplification
assumption of the basic weakening approach developed in Chapter 2. Moreover, a
further simplification assumption requiring all policy elements to be ground atoms
is relaxed by allowing the usage of policy elements in the more expressive form
of existentially quantified atoms. This leads to the construction of an approach
that allows to vary the achieved level of confidentiality with the length of the
employed weakening disjunctions and returns an inference-proof weakened view
on an original database instance, whose knowledge does provably not enable an
adversary to compromise a considered confidentiality policy. But this approach
is still generic in the sense that a so-called clustering of the elements of a confi-
dentiality policy to weakening disjunction templates, which are both credible in
terms of confidentiality and meaningful in terms of availability with respect to a
considered application scenario, is only discussed on the declarative level.
As a formal complexity analysis of this clustering problem indicates that weak-
ening disjunction templates of a length longer than 2 can not be constructed
efficiently in general, Chapter 4 then develops a concrete algorithmic instanti-
ation of the clustering of policy elements to disjunction templates of length 2,
which lead to weakenings by the shortest possible non-trivial disjunctions and
thus maximize availability. This clustering is based on well-known and efficient
algorithms for the computation of maximum matchings on (general) graphs mod-
eling each potential secret to be clustered as a vertex and each admissible dis-
junction template of length 2 as an edge. Moreover, a concrete example of an
(again availability-maximizing) notion of admissible indistinguishabilities specify-
ing which policy elements might be possibly clustered to an admissible weakening
disjunction is presented. In general, this notion is deliberately left generic to keep
the weakening approach applicable for different application scenarios in the sense
that the structure weakening disjunctions should have can be adapted.
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To next overcome the simplification assumption that an adversary is not sup-
posed to have any further a priori knowledge, Chapter 5 extends the availability-
maximizing and efficient implementation of the generic weakening approach pro-
vided in Chapter 4 to be also confidentiality preserving under scenarios, in which
an adversary has some a priori knowledge. This a priori knowledge is supposed to
be expressible within a suitably restricted subclass of so-called Tuple Generating
Dependencies, which are well-known in the field of relational databases. Under
this extended setup an adversary’s enhanced possibilities to compromise a confi-
dentiality policy by employing his a priori knowledge are analyzed with scrutiny
and suitable counter measures are developed to disable these additional inference-
channels. This finally leads to an extended weakening approach, which provably
preserves confidentiality in the sense of Controlled Interaction Execution under
the considered subclass of a priori knowledge, but still remains computationally
efficient even for large input instances.
Chapter 6 confirms this efficiency of the (extended) weakening approach experi-
mentally with the help of a prototype implementation under different experiment
setups and input instances in the order of magnitude of
• database instances with 1 000 000 tuples,
• confidentiality policies with up to 100 000 potential secrets and
• an adversary’s a priori knowledge with up to 2500 dependencies.
For some restricted application scenarios, in which the matching computation
turns out to have by far the greatest impact on the overall runtime, a slightly
modified weakening algorithm employing a heuristic for the construction of (al-
most) maximum matchings to determine a clustering of the policy elements is
presented. This modification leads to a considerable speedup and results only in
a slight loss of availability, as also evaluated in this chapter.
7.2 Directions for Future Work
Although the generic weakening approach developed in Chapter 3 is able to employ
disjunctions of an arbitrary length ≥ 2 to weaken confidential knowledge, a con-
crete implementation of its subroutine for the computation of extended clusterings
(inducing weakening disjunction templates) is only specified for the construction of
clusters of size 2. Hence, the development of concrete algorithms grouping the el-
ements of a given confidentiality policy to (extended) clusters of a (minimum) size
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of k∗ ≥ 3 – thereby still obeying a considered notion of admissible indistinguisha-
bilities and minimizing the usage of artificial additional potential secrets – would
obviously be a first useful extension of this thesis.
According to Section 3.4 this clustering problem is NP-hard in general and can
hence not be solved efficiently in polynomial time in the size of its inputs as long
as NP 6= P is supposed to hold. As an immediate consequence, one might try
to find reasonable heuristic solutions to this clustering problem by relaxing the
optimization goal of minimizing the number of additional potential secrets to the
less strict requirement that the number of actually employed additional potential
secrets should not be “too far away” from an optimum solution. Additionally, one
might also consider restricted subclasses of the extended clustering problem, for
which reasonable heuristic solutions are easier to find or for which even optimum
solutions can be found “efficiently enough”.
Such a restricted subclass might for instance be the extended clustering problem,
whose notion of admissible indistinguishabilities is instantiated with the inter-
changeability criterion as proposed in Section 4.2.1. According to this section,
interchangeability – initially developed in Definition 4.5 for the construction of
admissible clusters of size 2 – can naturally be extended to be also applicable for
the construction of admissible clusters of a size larger than 2 and then results
in indistinguishability graphs, which can be decomposed efficiently into maximal
cliques (cf. [84, 85]) and each (subset) of these cliques consists of pairwise inter-
changeable potential secrets all sharing the same single differing position. The
remaining problem then is to decide to which clique each of the vertices occurring
in more than one clique should be uniquely assigned to obtain a set of disjoint clus-
ters, for whose extension only a minimum number of additional potential secrets
is needed. Although this problem seems to be NP-hard (cf. Section 4.2.1), too, it
might nonetheless be possible to solve this problem exactly in a reasonable time,
if most of the vertices of an indistinguishability graph are in only one clique.
After the development of algorithmic solutions to the construction of extended
clusterings with clusters of a (minimum) size of k∗ ≥ 3, one might next try to
analyze if and to what extent weakening disjunctions of a length ≥ 3 can guaran-
tee the existence of a certain minimum number of “secure” alternative database
instances for elements of a confidentiality policy, if an adversary is supposed to
have a priori knowledge in the form of single premise tuple generating dependen-
cies. For that purpose, one should first analyze, whether (and how) an adversary
might employ this kind of a priori knowledge to reduce the number of credible
alternative instances induced by sets of weakening disjunctions and should then,
if necessary, develop counter measures to disable these inference-channels. In a
next step, one could afterwards try to adapt Algorithm 5.1 – designed for handling
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only disjunction templates of length 2 – to guarantee the existence of a certain
minimum number of “secure” alternative instances and prove this property in the
spirit of Theorem 3.1.
With regard to an adversary’s a priori knowledge, another challenging question
for future work is to find further versatile classes of a priori knowledge, under
which inference-proofness can be provably guaranteed with the help of (possibly
suitably adapted versions of) the weakening approach proposed in this thesis. A
first class of such extended a priori knowledge might consist of Tuple Generat-
ing Dependencies having premises in the form of multiple conjunctively connected
atoms (cf. [1, 54]) instead of just one single atom. First of all, such an extension
raises the question which subset of atoms of the premises of a set of these depen-
dencies (all interfering with a confidentiality policy) should be distorted, as the
(non-)satisfaction of one of these atoms might influence the satisfaction-status of
several premises of these dependencies – due to implication relationships between
the atoms of the premises of (possibly different) dependencies. One should hence
try to find a minimum subset of these atoms, whose distortion allows for the con-
struction of (a sufficient number of) “secure” alternative database instances to
establish inference-proofness, to keep the number of distorted atoms of premises
as low as possible in terms of availability.
Moreover, further extensions of an adversary’s a priori knowledge might consider
other classes of a priori knowledge, such as the well-known classes of Equality Gen-
erating Dependencies [1, 53] or Inclusion Dependencies [1, 60]. While the former
class of dependencies essentially expresses that certain components (in the form of
constants assigned to corresponding attributes) of certain database tuples should
be equal, the latter class can be seen as a special case of tuple generating de-
pendencies requiring that the projection of a relational database instance r over a
database schema 〈R|AR|SCR〉 on a certain subset of attributes of AR is completely
contained in a corresponding projection of a relational database instance s over a
(possibly different) database schema 〈S|AS |SCS〉. As an immediate consequence,
the introduction of inclusion dependencies would require to consider database in-
stances with multiple relations – in contrast to the simplifying assumption met in
Section 2.1 that a database instance with only a single relation is considered in
this thesis. In general, for each further class of a priori knowledge an adversary’s
enhanced possibilities to compromise a confidentiality policy need to be analyzed
with scrutiny in the spirit of Section 5.2 and then, if necessary, suitable counter
measures need to be developed to disable these additional inference-channels.
In terms of availability knowledge should usually only be distorted, if an adver-
sary might otherwise be able to compromise confidentiality requirements. But in
this thesis, both Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 5.2 only prove that the developed
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weakening algorithms suitably distort confidential knowledge in a sufficient way.
While the generic weakening algorithm and its availability-maximizing instantia-
tion do not seem to provide room for improvements of availability – at least, if
their clustering stages remain instance-independent – Algorithm 5.1, which can
also handle an adversary’s a priori knowledge in the form of single premise tu-
ple generating dependencies, seems to generally overestimate the threats posed
by possible inference-channels. It might hence be worthwhile to analyze if and to
what extend these threats are overestimated and how this overestimation might be
reduced without losing the computational efficiency of this algorithm. Of course,
the most desirable result of this analysis would be an improved weakening algo-
rithm only introducing necessary distortions together with formal proofs that this
improved algorithm suitably distorts confidential knowledge in a both sufficient
and necessary way.
In Section 1.3.1 the enforcement of confidentiality requirements with the help of
weakening disjunctions has been motivated by the well-known approaches of k-
anonymization and `-diversification [47, 70, 79, 86]. Thereby, k-anonymization
aims at preventing the re-identification of individuals on the basis of so-called
quasi-identifiers, which describe some of the individuals’ properties, by gener-
alizing these quasi-identifiers to such an extent that an individual can not be
distinguished from k−1 other individuals on the basis of these quasi-identifiers.
Similarly, a weakening disjunction of length k should not enable an adversary to
distinguish whether a certain potential secret of this disjunction or one of the k−1
other potential secrets of this disjunction is satisfied by the original instance. One
could hence try to model k-anonymization within the weakening approach de-
veloped in this thesis by ensuring that this approach forms disjunctions suitably
distorting the knowledge to which of k different individuals each quasi-identifier
of a set of k corresponding quasi-identifiers, which are to be made pairwise in-
distinguishable, is allocated. This might for instance be achieved by developing
a notion of admissible indistinguishabilities leading to disjunctions of the above
mentioned structure, which are created over a confidentiality policy containing all
potential secrets occurring as disjuncts within these disjunctions.
But even under k-anonymization confidentiality might still be breached, if all
quasi-identifiers of a group of k pairwise indistinguishable quasi-identifiers are re-
lated to the same sensitive value: although an adversary can still not disclose
which of the k pairwise indistinguishable quasi-identifiers is related to which of
the k individuals represented by these quasi-identifiers (due to k-anonymization),
he can nonetheless conclude that all of these individuals are definitely related to
the considered sensitive value. To mitigate this inference-channel, `-diversification
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additionally requires that there should be at least ` pairwise different sensitive val-
ues, with which the quasi-identifiers of each group of k pairwise indistinguishable
quasi-identifiers should be related. Within the weakening approach this addi-
tional requirement of `-diversification imposes an additional restriction on the
construction of weakening disjunctions, which might again be implemented by a
corresponding notion of admissible indistinguishabilities.
Such a modeling of k-anonymization and `-diversification within the weakening
approach would have the great advantage that the property of inference-proofness
in the sense of Controlled Interaction Execution, which is guaranteed for the weak-
ening approach according to Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 5.2, would also hold for
this modeling of k-anonymization and `-diversification, while current standard ap-
proaches to k-anonymization and `-diversification are usually not analyzed with
respect to their achievements in confidentiality in a formal way. This is in particu-
lar true for scenarios, in which an adversary is supposed to have a kind of a priori
knowledge, under which the weakening approach is known to be inference-proof.
Within this thesis the generation of weakened views is always analyzed under the
(implicit) assumption that an adversary gets to know only one single weakened
view on an original database instance. But in many real-world scenarios the data
stored in such an instance might change over the time and there might hence be the
wish to release an updated weakened view on a certain original database instance
some time after a first weakened view on this instance has been released. Although
the problem of updating data in an inference-proof way has generally been studied
within the framework of Controlled Interaction Execution [20, 21, 31, 33], it is
still an open problem in the context of inference-proof weakened views. Similar
to the field of privacy preserving data publishing (cf. [56, 92]), the challenge is to
ensure that an adversary knowing several weakened views on an original database
instance – whose data have possibly changed in the course of time – can not take
advantage of this knowledge to compromise a confidentiality policy.
From a practical point of view, another emerging question is how (extensions of
commonly used) relational database management systems (cf. [1, 75, 78]) can op-
erate on weakened views on relational database instances. Thereby, this question
naturally comprises the problem of a suitable representation of disjunctive knowl-
edge within relational database management systems as well as the challenge of
finding suitable extensions of (the semantics of) commonly used operators of the
relational algebra, which are able to handle disjunctive knowledge.
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